Uncovering the iceberg:mandating the measurement of fraud by Tunley, Martin James
 
 
 
 
UNCOVERING THE ICEBERG: MANDATING THE 
MEASUREMENT OF FRAUD 
 
 
Martin James Tunley 
 
 
University of Portsmouth 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the 
requirements of the Professional Doctorate in 
Criminal Justice Studies (DCrimJ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies Professional Doctorate in 
Criminal Justice Studies (DCrimJ) 
 
 
Thesis submitted as partial requirement for the award of a 
Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice Studies (DCrimJ) 
 
 
Title: Uncovering the Iceberg: Mandating the Measurement of 
Fraud                                 
 
 
Submitted by: Martin James Tunley 
 
 
 
Declaration: 
 
Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not 
been registered for any other research award. The results and 
conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named 
candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic 
award. 
 
I confirm that, subject to final approval by the Board of Examiners 
of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, a copy of this thesis 
may be placed upon the shelves of the library of the University of 
Portsmouth and may be circulated as required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:  
 
 
Date:          1st September 2013 
 
 3 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………….……. 14 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………. 16 
Chapter 1: The Issue………………………………………….…….……..... 
   Introduction……………………………………………………… 
   Context…………………………………………………………… 
   What is Fraud?...................................................................... 
   Why do we Measure Crime and Fraud?............................... 
   Do we really look for Fraud?.................................................. 
   How do we Measure Fraud?.................................................. 
   Fraud: The Current Picture…………………………………..... 
   Options for Change…………………………………………….. 
   Justifying State Intervention…………………………………… 
   How to Regulate?.................................................................. 
   The Research Argument.……………………………………... 
   Why is this Research worth Doing?....................................... 
   Thesis Outline…………………………………………………… 
   Conclusion………………………………………………………. 
17 
17 
17 
19 
22 
23 
24 
26 
28 
38 
51 
60 
61 
66 
67 
Chapter 2: Literature Review……………………………….……………... 
                   Introduction………………………………………………………. 
                   The „Dark Figure of Crime‟…………………………………….. 
                   The „Dark Figure of Fraud‟……………………………………... 
                   Crime Statistics………………………………………………….. 
                   Crime Surveys…………………………………………………...                    
                   Fraud within Crime Statistics…………………………………... 
                   Fraud in Crime Surveys………………………………………… 
                   Sources (Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria)…………..................... 
                   Search Strategy…………………………………………………. 
                   Identified Methodologies and Issues………………………….. 
                   Obstacles to Accurate Measurement…………………………. 
                   Statistically Valid Loss Measurement Surveys………………. 
                   Measuring Detected Fraud…………………………………….. 
69 
69 
70 
72 
74 
78
80 
82 
86 
86 
87 
89 
94 
100 
 4 
                   Guestimates……………………………………………………... 
                   Impostors………………………………………………………… 
                   The Charitable Sector………………………………………….. 
                   Review of Methodologies………………………………………. 
   Methodological Deficiencies…………………………………… 
                   Measuring Fraud in Medicare and Medicaid: A Case Study.. 
  Conclusion………………………………………………………. 
101 
124 
126 
129 
133 
143 
152 
Chapter 3: Methodology…………………………………….…….……...... 
   Introduction……………………………………………………… 
   Method Selection……………………………………………….. 
   Epistemological Perspectives…………………………………. 
   Framing the Research Design………………………………… 
  The Qualitative Element……………………………………….. 
  The Sample………………………………………………………. 
  Structured Interviews……………………………………………. 
  Interviewing Respondents……………………………………… 
  Security of Data………………………………………………….. 
  Transcription and Analysis……………………………………… 
  The Quantitative Strand…………………………………..…….. 
  Questionnaire Design…………………………………………… 
  Layout…..…………………………………………..…………….. 
  The Pilot Study…………………………………………………... 
  Sampling Strategy…………………………………….…………. 
  Circulating the Questionnaire…………………………………... 
  Launching the Questionnaire…………………………………... 
  Response Rates…………………………………………………. 
  Coding and Analysis…………………………………………….. 
  Rigour…………………………………………………………….. 
  Ethical Considerations………………………………………….. 
  Limitations............................................................................... 
  Conclusion……………………………………………….............   
154 
154 
154 
155 
156 
158 
159 
162 
163 
165 
166 
168 
169 
171 
171 
172 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
183 
183 
186 
 
  
 5 
Chapter 4: What, When, Who, Why and How?……..………………….. 
   Introduction……………………………………………………... 
   The Sample…………………………………………………….. 
   What is Fraud?...................................................................... 
   Do you measure Fraud?........................................................ 
   Why no Measurement?.......................................................... 
   Immoral Phlegmatism?.......................................................... 
   Is Measurement Important?................................................... 
   How do we Measure Fraud?.................................................. 
   How often should we Measure Fraud?.................................. 
                   What is Measured?……………………………………………... 
                   Conclusion……………………………………………………….. 
187 
187 
188 
191 
194 
196 
202 
207 
213 
216 
222 
224 
Chapter 5: Laying Down the Law.……...………………………….……... 
   Introduction……………………………………………………… 
   Mandating Measurement………………………………………. 
   Proactive Measurement………………………………………... 
   Creating a Statute………………………………………………. 
   Legislating Measurement: When, What and How?................ 
   Directing Measurement………………………………………… 
   Reporting Findings……………………………………………… 
   A Fraud Measurement Agency?............................................ 
   Conclusion………………………………………………………. 
226 
226 
226 
235 
237 
248 
251 
252 
257 
259 
Chapter 6: The Doctrine of Measurement………………………………. 
   Introduction……………………………………………………… 
   Reliability of Measurement…………………………………….. 
   Statistically Valid Measurement?........................................... 
   Creating a Standard……………………………………………. 
   The Fraud Loss Calculation…………………………………… 
   Adopting the Standard…………………………………………. 
   Mandating Standards…………………………………………... 
   Developing „Best Practice‟……………………………………... 
   Conclusion………………………………………………………. 
261 
261 
261 
264 
270 
275 
277 
282 
285 
290 
  
 6 
Chapter 7: Conclusion……………………………………………….……... 
   Introduction……………………………………………………… 
   Addressing Immoral Phlegmatism………………………...….. 
   Defining Fraud for Measurement Purposes…………………. 
   Who should Measure…………………………………………… 
   Increasing Measurement Consistently……………………….. 
   Mandating Measurement………………………………………. 
   The Art of Persuasion............................................................ 
   Creating a Statute………………………………………………. 
   Regulating the Sectors.......................................................... 
   Setting a Standard……………………………………………… 
   Knowledge Management………………………………………. 
   Conclusion……………………………………………………….  
292 
292 
293 
299 
301 
301 
303 
305 
311 
315 
321 
325 
328 
Postscript: Reflecting on Research...……………………………………. 330 
Appendices………………………………………………………………….... 335 
Bibliography…………..……………………………………………….……... 352 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Summation of fraud measurement methodologies……….…….. 130 
Table 2: Summation of limitations of fraud loss measurement 
               reports........................................................................................                       
 
141
Table 3: Please indicate which sector your organisation falls within……. 188 
Table 4: What is your position in the organisation?............................….. 189 
Table 5: What is your organisation‟s function?......……………………….. 190 
Table 6: Does your organisation measure fraud?..........…………………. 194 
Table 7: How important do you think the accurate measurement of 
fraud is?..................................................................................…. 
 
208 
Table 8: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the public 
sector?.......................................................………………………. 
 
209 
Table 9: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the private 
sector?.......................................................………………………. 
 
210 
Table 10: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the 
Voluntary/charitable sector?.......................……………………… 
 
212 
Table 11: How does your organisation measure fraud?........................... 214 
Table 12: Percentage proactive/reactive approaches to fraud 
measurement by sector (based upon confirmatory responses. 
 
215 
Table 13: Percentage of fraud measurement exercises by typology 
conducted annually by sector……………………………………. 
 
217 
Table 14: How often do you think fraud should be measured?................ 218 
Table 15: Should a statute be created to mandate fraud measurement 
in the UK?................................................................................. 
 
227 
Table 16: Arguments against mandating fraud measurement…………... 228 
Table 17: Arguments against the creation of a statute…………………… 237 
Table 18: Which sectors should this proposed legislation apply to?........ 242 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
List of Tables (Continued) 
 
Table 19: How regularly should mandated fraud measurement 
exercises be conducted?.......................................................... 
 
248 
Table 20: Should legislation prescribe what types of fraud are 
measured?................................................................................ 
 
251 
Table 21: Should legislation prescribe what fraud measurement 
methodology is employed?....................................................... 
 
251 
Table 22: Should legislation also mandate the publication of fraud loss 
data?......................................................................................... 
 
252 
Table 23: What are the perceived risks to publishing fraud loss data?.... 255 
Table 24: What is the level of statistical confidence of your 
organisation‟s fraud loss data?................................................. 
 
264 
Table 25: How important is the creation of a British Standard of fraud 
measurement?.......................................................................... 
 
270 
Table 26: Would a British Standard of fraud measurement be adopted 
by your organisation?............................................................... 
 
277 
Table 27: Which sectors should a British Standard of fraud 
measurement be applied to?.................................................... 
 
279 
Table 28: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the public sector?........................................................... 
 
282 
Table 29: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the private sector?.......................................................... 
 
283 
Table 30: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the voluntary/charitable sector?...................................... 
 
283 
Table 31: How important is the creation of a knowledge management 
infrastructure for sharing best practice?................................... 
 
286 
Table 32: Would your organisation participate in a knowledge 
management infrastructure?..................................................... 
 
288 
 
 
 9 
List of Charts 
 
Chart 1: Does your organisation measure fraud? (Percentages by 
sector)………………………………………………………………... 
 
195 
Chart 2: If your organisation does not measure fraud please indicate 
why……………………………………………………………………                
 
197
Chart 3: How important do you think the accurate measurement of 
fraud is? (Percentages by sector)…………………………………. 
 
209 
Chart 4: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the public 
sector? (Percentages by sector)………………………………….. 
 
210 
Chart 5: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the private 
sector? (Percentages by sector)………………………………….. 
 
211 
Chart 6: How often do you think fraud should be measured? 
(Percentages by sector)……………………………………………. 
 
219 
Chart 7: What types of fraud does your organisation measure?.............. 223 
Chart 8: Should a statute be created to mandate fraud measurement in     
the UK? (Percentages by sector)…………………………………. 
 
227 
Chart 9: Which sectors should this proposed legislation apply to? 
(Percentages by sector)……………………………………………. 
 
243 
Chart 10: Should legislation also mandate the publication of fraud loss    
data? (Percentages by sector)………………………………….. 
 
253 
Chart 11: How important is the creation of a British Standard of fraud 
measurement? (Percentages by sector)……………………… 
 
256 
Chart 12: Would a British Standard of fraud measurement be adopted 
by your organisation? (Percentages by sector)……................. 
 
278 
Chart 13: Which sectors should a British Standard of fraud 
measurement be applied to? (Percentages by sector)……….. 
 
280 
Chart 14: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the public sector? (Percentages by sector)…………….. 
 
282 
Chart 15: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the private sector? (Percentages by sector)……………. 
 
283 
 
 
 10 
List of Charts (Continued) 
 
Chart 16: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the voluntary/charitable sector? (Percentages by 
sector)………………………...................................................... 
 
 
284 
Chart 17: How important is the creation of a knowledge management 
infrastructure for sharing best practice? (Percentages by 
sector)………………………...................................................... 
 
 
287 
Chart 18: Would your organisation participate in a knowledge 
management infrastructure? (Percentages by 
sector)………………………......................................................... 
 
 
289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
List of Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Interview Schedule………………………………………….… 335 
Appendix 2: Introductory letter to research participants…………………. 336 
Appendix 3: Web based questionnaire……………………………………. 337 
Appendix 4: Websites used for sampling frame………………………….. 348 
Appendix 5: Questionnaire introductory letter…………………………….. 349 
Appendix 6: Letter to „Gatekeepers‟……………………………………….. 350 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
Abbreviations 
 
ABI Association of British Insurers 
APACS Association for Payment Clearing Services 
BCS British Crime Survey 
BDO BDO Stoy Hayward 
BSI British Standards Institute 
CERT Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System 
CIFAS Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DVLA Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
FCIC Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
FED Fraud Error and Debt Taskforce 
FSA  Financial Services Authority 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
IPERA Improper Payments Elimination and recovery Act of 2010 
IPIA Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
KROLL Kroll Advisory Solutions 
NAO National Audit Office 
NFA National Fraud Authority 
NHS National Health Service 
NHSCFS NHS Counter Fraud Service 
 
 13 
Abbreviations (Continued) 
 
OCJS Offending, Crime and Justice Survey 
OIG  US Office of Inspector General 
OMB  US Office of Management and Budget 
PAC Committee of Public Accounts 
RAC Recovery Audit Contractors Program 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Abstract 
 
There has been limited academic interest on accurate fraud measurement, 
and no identifiable published research on practitioner and academic opinion 
on measurement methods and how the process might be improved to 
generate a more realistic loss figure. This thesis presents the findings of 
research conducted as part of a Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice 
studies. The project has gathered views from fraud professionals and 
academics, drawing upon 12 structured qualitative interviews. The opinion of 
fraud professionals from the public, private and voluntary/charitable sectors 
has been gathered through the issue of a quantitative web based 
questionnaire informed by the responses obtained from the qualitative strand. 
The thesis presents collective opinion on the creation of a standard definition 
of fraud for measurement purposes, mandating measurement through the 
creation of a statute based upon empirical evidence provided by the United 
States (US) Improper Payments Information Act 2002, the implementation of 
a consistent standard of measurement, and the development of best practice. 
The research findings have identified a complacent attitude towards fraud and 
associated business risks, defined as immoral phlegmatism. Accordingly, 
solutions are offered to address this phenomenon within all three sectors. 
Recommendations are then proffered on how to improve the accuracy of loss 
figures through the creation of legislation mandating fraud measurement in 
the public and private sectors, the introduction of a British Standard of 
measurement, the development of a knowledge exchange infrastructure, and 
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a marketing campaign to increase fraud awareness and associated business 
risks. 
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Chapter 1: The issue 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will introduce the research topic by first evidencing why this area 
of financial loss requires attention. Moving on, the chapter will trace the 
historical difficulties of defining fraud and how this hampered accurate 
measurement. The discussion will then examine the question „what is fraud?‟, 
before evidencing that accurate fraud loss measurement continues to be 
something that is aspired to, but rarely achieved. The chapter will then 
introduce options for change, which are considered to be essential if this issue 
is to be addressed. Justification for state intervention will be discussed, 
followed by an assessment of regulatory options appropriate to the options for 
change previously suggested. Subsequently, I present the research argument 
followed by a discussion on the value of this research, and how it offers an 
original contribution to new knowledge within the subject matter, before 
closing with an outline of the subsequent chapters within this thesis. 
 
Context 
 
“Fraud is currently a very significant socio-economic 
crime problem, and there is no reason whatever to 
suppose that its costs…will diminish naturally over 
time.” 
     (Levi & Burrows, 2008, p. 316) 
 18 
“Within the UK there is no current overall picture of 
the harm fraud causes to the economy and society as 
a whole.” 
(Office of Fair Trading, 2006, p. 6) 
 
There are varying estimates of the cost of fraud to the UK, these ranging from 
£7 billion to £72 billion. These annual loss figures include the following; £6.8 
Billion to £13.8 Billion (NERA, 2000), £16 billion (Norwich Union, 2005), £40 
billion (RSM Robson Rodes, 2004) and £72 billion (Mishcon de Reya, (2005). 
Reviews of these data suggest that losses may range between £14 billion and 
£72 billion (Fraud Review Team, 2006; Levi, Burrows, Fleming & Hopkins, 
2007). During 2010 annual fraud losses by the public sector, private sector 
and charities were estimated at £30.5 billion (NFA, 2010a, p. 8; NFA, 2010b, 
p. 1). Interestingly, the most recent estimation estimate total fraud losses to 
be £73 billion (NFA, 2012). 
 
Clearly, not all these can be correct; consequently, with such a wide disparity 
of estimates of the cost of fraud, there is a need for an evaluation of existing 
measurement methodology to develop a more accurate mechanism which 
produces meaningful data.   
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What is Fraud? 
 
Introduction 
 
Prior to the Fraud Act 2006, one of the most frequently asked questions was 
„what is fraud?‟. The Fraud Advisory Panel (1999) observe that the lack of a 
“comprehensive or universally accepted definition of fraud limits meaningful 
data analysis” (p. 3), and makes “comparison of statistics from different 
organisations difficult” (p. 6). Similarly, Doig, Johnson and Levi (2001) 
conclude that “there are no definitive figures on the cost of fraud; indeed there 
is no definitive definition of fraud” (p. 91).  
 
The Fraud Review Team (2006) observe that the lack of a legal definition “has 
seriously hampered the objective measurement of fraud” (pp. 22-23). 
Accordingly, organisations apply varying definitions, resulting in no single 
“robust methodology for fraud” (Fraud Review Team, 2006, pp. 22-23). 
Similarly, the Fraud Advisory Panel (2006) remark that “currently there is no 
precise legal definition of fraud” (p. 2). Interestingly, the Fraud Advisory 
Panel‟s (1999) study of published literature on fraud identifies only one report 
offering a definition of fraud (p. 6), describing fraud as “the use of deception 
with the intention of obtaining advantage, avoiding an obligation or causing 
loss to a third party” (HM Treasury, 1995, p. 6). This definition, whilst being 
rather dated, does summarise the key elements of the Fraud Act 2006, and 
warrants consideration when developing a standard definition for 
measurement purposes, being both succinct and unambiguous. 
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The Fraud Act 2006 
 
The Fraud Act 2006, “makes a number of fundamental alterations to the 
general understanding of fraud” (Johnson & Rogers, 2007, p. 296). 
Specifically, that fraud can be perpetrated in three clearly defined ways 
(Summers, 2008, p. 12). These being, 
 
 By false representation. 
 By abuse of position. 
 By failure to disclose. 
 
(Farrell et al, 2007, pp.1-2)  
 
The stated objective of the Fraud Act “is to make the law of fraud more simple 
and readily understandable” (Farrell et al 2007, p. 11). Arguably, this statute 
achieves this by offering a description of how fraud is committed, however it  
fails to answer the definitional question of what actually constitutes fraud. 
 
Optimistically, Hoare (2007) argues that this statute facilitates “effective 
measurement of fraud” by making “recording and reporting fraud easier”      
(p. 277). Whilst being of relevance to this research, this view is based upon 
the presumption that fraud losses may only be measured using reported or 
detected data, which is no longer the case, and will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
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Post Fraud Act 2006 
 
Unfortunately, this statute has failed to address the problem of multiple 
definitions of fraud, because “drafting for legal purposes seldom 
provides…behavioural categorisation that corresponds to the way individuals 
and businesses categorise frauds” (Levi, Burrows, Fleming and Hopkins, 
2007, p. 9). This observation being evidenced by the continuing range of fraud 
definitions used for measurement purposes following the introduction of this 
statute. Interestingly, Levi and Burrows (2008), when examining the impact of 
fraud, create their own definition, describing it as “obtaining…financial 
advantage or causing of loss by implicit or explicit deception; it is the 
mechanism through which the fraudster gains an unlawful advantage or 
causes unlawful loss” (p. 299). The Audit Commission (2009) offer another 
definition, suggesting it is “any intentional false representation, including 
failure to declare information or abuse of position that is carried out to make 
gain, cause loss or expose another to the risk of loss” (p. 9). An examination 
of both definitions identifies important common themes of note relating to 
financial gain and causing loss.  
 
The Civil Definition of Fraud: Derry v Peek (1889) 
 
Gee, Button and Cook (2011) argue that “the criminal law” relating to fraud is 
used to punish individual fraudsters, whereas, the civil law is used “to recover 
losses” (p.15). Drawing upon Derry v Peek (1889), fraud is considered to have 
been proved “when it is shown that a false representation has been made (a) 
 22 
knowingly, or (b) without belief in its truth, or (c) recklessly, careless whether it 
be true or false” (Keenan, 2007, p. 772). I contend that because Derry v Peek 
(1889) utilises the balance of probabilities rather than „beyond reasonable 
doubt‟, thus including cases where fraud is identified but with insufficient 
evidence for a criminal prosecution, it could be used as a standard fraud 
definition for the purpose of more accurate loss measurement. 
 
Why do we Measure Crime and Fraud?  
 
It is also worth considering why crime and fraud are actually measured. 
Foucault (1977; 1979; 2000) argues that collecting information about 
individuals forms part of a government strategy to extend control over the 
population. Similarly, Levi and Burrows (2008), make the point that “the 
collection of crime statistics to serve the panoptican poses a question, namely 
answers are required concerning what is required and what is not collected by 
those managing the state” (p. 293). Arguably, this suggests there may be a 
political agenda in terms of data collection, and explanations are required as 
to why on occasions the state fails to look too closely at certain crime types. 
Brand and Price (2000) offer a simple explanation for the collection of crime 
data, suggesting it provides a way of measuring crime reduction policies      
(p. 3). In terms of measuring fraud, one of the most compelling arguments for 
developing accurate measurement, is that without a precise representation of 
fraud losses, “where do you invest in resources?”, and once mobilised, “where 
do you deploy your best resources?” (J. Gee, personal communication, May 
18, 2009). 
 23 
Do we really look for Fraud? 
 
Levi & Burrows (2008) observe that any policy encouraging individuals to 
report fraud may result in perceived increased levels, and create an 
unachievable public expectation on law enforcement agencies to address this 
issue (p. 315). Arguably, to alleviate such a risk, it is in the interest of law 
enforcement agencies and the government to undercount fraud, which may 
explain the poor quality fraud loss data, which I will discuss later in this 
chapter. 
 
It is also worthwhile considering the methodology behind the fraud 
measurement process, specifically why these data are collected, and possible 
motives for not looking too hard. The Home Office has been criticised for 
targeting research to suit the government‟s political agenda, this being 
“motivated by outcomes that are of immediate benefit to existing political 
demands” (Walters, 2005, p. 6). This charge may also be levelled at the 
collection, or in some cases lack of collection, by central government 
departments of data relating to fraud committed against the department. This 
will be explored further within the literature review chapter. A significant 
finding, which I offer in support of the contention that there is a reluctance to 
look for fraud, is the conclusion within a PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010) 
survey Fraud in the Public Sector, which reveals that in the preceding twelve 
months, only 52% of government owned enterprises reported economic 
crime. 
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When commenting upon Insurance companies, Doig, Jones and Wait (1999) 
observe that some institutions prefer to absorb losses because “fraud is seen 
as another cost associated with increased volume of business or market 
share” (p. 19). Arguably, this suggests that fraud is considered as a business 
cost by these organisations, and accordingly should be measured accurately. 
Furthermore, this reluctance to confront the issue by the private sector due to 
fear of organisational embarrassment, or in the case of the charitable sector, 
concern that exposure may impact on donations, may explain the limited 
engagement with fraud measurement by these sectors. Furthermore, a lack of 
understanding concerning the amount of potential losses to fraud may result 
in these organisations believing that it may be more cost effective to ignore 
rather than address the issue. This thesis will now consider how fraud is 
measured. 
 
How do we measure Fraud? 
 
“Measuring the extent of fraud is complicated further 
by fraud being a constantly changing phenomenon.” 
   (Financial Services Authority, 2003, p. 11) 
 
According to Kirk (2008), “assessing the extent of fraud, and fraud trends, has 
always been a tough task” (p. 335). Levi and Burrows (2008) conclude that 
“before an actual fraud comes to be counted” in official statistics “it has to go 
through a process of being suspected, investigated and identified as such”   
(p. 310). This is an interesting observation, because it implies that fraud may 
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only be measured using reported or detected cases, thus illustrating a 
perception which needs to be addressed if fraud is to be more accurately 
measured.  
 
There are different mechanisms for measuring fraud used by both the public 
and private sectors offering varying levels of accuracy and statistical 
confidence. These include; 
 
 (Censuses drawing on) administrative records of fraud reports.  
 Probability and non-probability sample surveys of individuals and firms 
as fraud victims.  
 Audits of probability samples of customers/accounts/transactions/ 
expenditures to uncover fraud losses. 
 Analyses of samples of Suspicious Activity Reports filed on suspicion 
of money laundering.  
 Analyses of samples of offenders convicted of certain frauds or of law 
enforcement case information. 
                                                                                         (Fleming, 2009, p.11) 
 
I suggest that this array of methods explains why there is a range of estimates 
of the exact cost of fraud, and consequently evidences the need to apply a 
more consistent approach to loss measurement.  
 
An additional factor impacting upon the calculation of fraud losses, and  
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offering an explanation for the variety of measures, is that of cost (National 
Audit Office, 2008a, p. 15). Arguably, the amount of resources devoted to 
measurement exercises influences the reliability and statistical confidence of 
resultant data. Limited resources may result in sporadic measurement 
exercises, with insufficient samples which subsequently generate unreliable 
data. This issue will be revisited in subsequent chapters, because there is an 
urgent requirement to change the way fraud losses are viewed. I will also 
return to the subject of how fraud is measured in the following chapter, when 
individually critiquing the different approaches to measurement. 
 
Fraud: The current picture 
 
Introduction 
 
Following the Fraud Review (2006), fraud has received significant 
parliamentary and media attention. This section will identify the developments 
relevant to this research, and which have informed the research argument, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Fraud Loss Measurement Unit 
 
The NFA (2009a) aims to make “the UK a more hostile environment for fraud” 
(p. 5). The now established Measurement Unit, which forms an integral part of 
the NFA‟s risk assessment strategy is of relevance to this objective, being 
responsible for conducting measurement exercises, whilst also collecting loss 
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data from organisations within all sectors, these populating the Annual Fraud 
Indicator (NFA, 2010a; NFA, 2011a; NFA, 2012; NFA, 2013), which will be 
critiqued within the literature review.  
 
Fraud Task Force 
 
The Cabinet Office based Counter Fraud Taskforce on Fraud, Error and Debt 
proposed within the Smarter Government strategy (Her Majesty‟s 
Government, 2009), was established in late 2010 “to analyse successful 
approaches to combat fraud and error cross Government” (NFA, 2011c, p. 4).  
Led by Francis Maude MP, the Taskforce brings together fraud professionals 
from the public and private sector, creating a “high level cross-Whitehall 
group” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.3). The first „Taskforce‟ publication outlines 
areas of priority, the second of which includes “the independent assessment 
of the accuracy of estimated and reported losses” (Cabinet Office, 2011, 
p.14). When discussing consistency however, the only reference is to the 
adoption of “common and consistent estimates for spend metrics” (p.14). 
Whilst this is important, it is disappointing that no reference is made to 
consistent fraud loss measurement, which should be an additional objective. 
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Options for Change 
 
Introduction 
 
Drawing upon the above, this research project has identified options to 
address the issue of a significant lack of accurate fraud loss measurement 
data, limited consistency of data, and a restricted knowledge base. These 
three options for change; mandating fraud measurement, creating a British 
Standard and developing an information exchange matrix will now be 
discussed. 
 
Mandating Fraud Measurement 
 
In the US, the increased prevalence of fraud and error led to Government 
intervention mandating its measurement in certain public bodies through the 
Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002 (Tunley, 2010a; Button, 
Gee & Brooks, 2012,  p. 69). During fiscal year 2000, the federal government 
of the United States “expended approximately $1.8 trillion” and as the 
“steward of taxpayer‟s dollars” is responsible for safeguarding against 
improper payments (United States General Accounting Office (US GAO), 
2001, p.1). Improper payments are defined as “any payments that should not 
have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount under statutory, 
contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirement” (Gordon & 
Willox, Jr, 2005, p. 2; US OMB, 2006, p. 2). Improper payments are identified 
as “a widespread and significant problem” receiving increased attention by the 
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federal government (US General Accounting Office, 2001, p. 7). To address 
this issue, the President‟s Management Agenda for 2002 (United States 
Office of Management and Budget (US OMB), 2001, pp. 19-21) advocated 
direct action to improve performance. The resultant Improper Payments 
Information Act of 2002 requires all Federal agencies to “annually review 
programs and activities they administer, identify those that may be susceptible 
to improper payments, and submit a report on actions taken to reduce 
improper payments” (US Child Care Bureau, 2007, p. 1; Schick, 2007, p. 
297). Each agency is also required to report on the capability of their current 
information systems and infrastructure to support the effort to reduce improper 
payments (Vallabhaneni, 2008, p. 287). 
 
Agencies are required to systematically review all their “programs” and 
identify those at risk to significant improper payments, defined as “annual 
erroneous payments in the program exceeding both 2.5% of the program 
payments and $10 million” (US OMB, 2003a, p. 2). Agencies are also required 
to estimate annual losses by conducting a random sample large enough to 
“yield an estimate with a 90% confidence interval within 5% precision” (Hatch 
& McMurtry, 2009, p. 3; White House, n.d.), thus improving the statistical 
robustness of these data. Finally, agencies must develop and implement a 
plan to reduce these payments and report these figures to the president 
through OMB and Congress (Hatch & McMurtry, 2009, p. 3). One important 
development has been provision for “alternative sampling methodologies” 
(Hatch & McMurtry, 2009, p. 4) appropriate to individual agency requirements, 
thus improving statistical validity. 
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Each Federal Agency is responsible for conducting loss measurement 
exercises and reporting these findings to the OMB either in the Agency‟s 
Performance and Accountability Report or Annual Financial Report (Executive 
Office of the President, 2011, p. 9). Compliance with the IPIA is policed using 
each individual agency‟s Inspectors General, who are politically independent 
individuals appointed under the Inspector General Act 1978, and responsible 
for ensuring agency compliance with legislation, and in the case of the IPIA, 
conducting financial audits in conjunction with the content of the agency‟s IPIA 
reporting (US Government Info, n.d.). Each agency Inspector General review 
verifies publication of improper payment data, and that the agency has 
conducted a program specific risk assessment for each program identified as 
meeting the criteria laid down in the statute (Federal Housing Finance Agency 
Office of Inspector General, 2013, p. 3). 
 
To assist implementation, guidance has been created to improve the 
management of improper payments (United States Office of Management and 
Budget (US O.M.B.), 2003a; US OMB, 2003b). Agencies are required to 
systematically review all their “programs” and identify those at risk to 
significant improper payments (US OMB, 2003a, p. 2). Re-measurement is 
also an important part of the process, this providing information on the 
effectiveness of the control activities put in place and assisting identification of 
areas requiring further attention (United States General Accounting Office, 
2001, p. 48).  
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There has been renewed focus on improper payments by the Obama 
administration, which were reported at $100 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 
(US OMB, 2010, p. 1). Whilst these figures may still be inflated due to the 
credit crunch, an Executive Order signed by the President on 20 November, 
2009 aims to “reduce improper payments by boosting transparency” (US 
OMB, 2010, p. 1). In the wake of the economic downturn it would not be 
unreasonable to accept an increase in fraud, however, the continued 
determination of the US government to reduce fraud is creditable, and a policy 
the UK government should embrace with similar tangible actions rather than 
just rhetoric. 
 
To supplement the IPIA, on 22nd July 2010 the Improper Payments 
Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) became public law (White 
House, 2010a). “IPERA greatly expands the scope of the IPIA and also adds 
the force of law to the requirements in the Executive Order, thereby providing 
an even stronger incentive for agencies to act” (KPMG Government Institute, 
2011, p. 1). The statute “redefines „significant‟ in terms of dollar levels and 
from fiscal year 2013 onwards, requires reporting of all improper payments 
equaling $10 million or more which amount to 1.5 per cent or more of total 
outlays of $100 million or more regardless of what percent they represent of 
total outlays”  (KPMG Government Institute, 2011, p. 1). As a consequence of 
this supplementary legislation, “many more exercises to measure losses have 
taken place than would otherwise be the case” (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 72). 
Furthermore, the statute requires agency heads to conduct recovery audits for 
“programs that expend $1 million or more annually”, and “allows agencies to 
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retain up to 25% of funds recovered” to further address improper payments; a 
similar figure may also be retained “for the program‟s original purpose” (US 
Social Security Administration, 2010, p. 1).  
 
In March 2010, as a precursor to IPERA, President Obama announced a 
further initiative to recover improper payments identified through 
measurement. These being payment recapture audits, which are described as 
“investigations in which specialized private sector auditors use cutting edge 
technology and tools to scrutinize government payments and then find and 
reclaim taxpayer funds paid in error or gained through fraud” (White House, 
2010b). Accordingly, the implementation of the IPIA and the subsequent 
IPERA have had a positive impact on measuring and reducing improper 
payments, the US OMB (2008) arguing that “Federal agencies can achieve 
the greatest return on investment for the taxpayer by ensuring improper 
payments are eliminated in the highest risk programs” (p. 5). Regular 
measuring and implementation of remedial action has resulted in a continued 
decrease in the improper payment rate for all programs that commenced 
measurement between 2004 and 2007, this falling from 4.3% in fiscal year 
2004 to 2.8% in fiscal year 2008 (United States Office of Management and 
Budget, 2009, p. 3). Nevertheless, Hatch & McMurtry (2009) are somewhat 
critical, arguing that “nearly one third (31%) of the programs in the FY 2004 
cohort...have seen no improvement in their error rates after five years of 
improper payments reporting” ( p. 9). When viewed from a different position, 
these data suggest that over two thirds have demonstrated an improvement in 
their error rates. This is an admirable achievement, particularly when 
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compared with the U.K public sector experience. The Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) commenced fraud measurement in 1997, when 
introducing “a continuous rolling measurement of Income Support and 
Jobseekers Allowance” (Hoare, 2007, p. 269). Yet it was not until 2004-05, 
that changes in measurement methodology achieved “improved accuracy” 
(National Audit Office, 2008b, p.14).  
 
Additional programs commenced measurement in 2008, and as a 
consequence, the government-wide improper payment rate increased to “a 
high water mark” of 5.42%” in fiscal year 2009, before decreasing to 4.35% in 
2012 (Payment Accuracy, n.d.a). A target of 3.32% has been set for fiscal 
year 2013 (Payment Accuracy, n.d.b). Furthermore, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (2012) reports that “we identified 40 federal 
agency programs, or about 50 percent of the total programs reporting 
improper payments in fiscal year 2011, that reported a reduction in the error 
rate of improper payments...when compared to fiscal year 2010 error rates” 
(p. 9). Additionally, federal agencies reported a decrease in improper 
payments of $5.3 billion for fiscal year 2011 compared to the previous year‟s 
figures (p. 5). Further improvements were made during 2012, with President 
Obama announcing that “by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2012, the 
Administration will avoid $50 billion in improper payments” (Payment 
Accuracy, n.d.c).  
 
Published results also indicate a positive impact in recovering the debt 
resulting from improper payments. This is evidenced by the fact that “the 
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government surpassed by more than double a goal the President set in 2010 
to “recapture $2 billion in overpayments to contractors by the end of FY 2012”, 
the total recovered being “$4.4 billion” (Payment Accuracy, n.d.c.). I suggest 
these results evidence the positive impact of mandating fraud loss 
measurement and setting recovery targets through the creation of legislation, 
and I contend that this is an option for change worthy of consideration when 
trying to improve the extent, quality and cost effectiveness of fraud loss 
measurement within the UK.  
 
Moving on to consider mandating fraud measurement in the private sector, 
the area that gives cause for concern is the banking sector, where a 
reluctance to supply mortgage fraud data resulted in an undercounting of 
banking fraud (NFA, 2010a, pp. 24-25). There is also a likelihood that losses 
may be recovered through increased costs passed on to the consumer. 
Furthermore, the revelation that insurance companies make good their fraud 
losses by increased premiums (Association of British Insurers (A.B.I.), 2009, 
p. 8) suggests this industry is worthy of consideration for incorporation into 
any proposed statute. Interestingly, the US also offers an example of where 
persuasion has been unsuccessful, and it has been necessary for the state to 
intervene and regulate the insurance industry. As a result, a statute has been 
created whereby each organisation is legally required to form and maintain a 
fraud special investigation unit and monitor its performance (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2009, p. 12).  
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Consequently, I contend that any statute mandating fraud measurement 
should include an option that, should the NFA suspect banking industry data 
supplied to be knowingly inaccurate, banks should also be compelled to 
measure and supply accurate fraud loss data. Similarly, in view of the 
insurance industry‟s admission that fraud losses are offset by increased 
premiums, any statute should include reference to the insurance industry and 
an option to mandate. 
 
I do however offer one caveat to this recommendation, this being that the 
proposed exercises based upon statistically valid samples are only applicable 
to “a relatively homogenous group of transactions” including payroll, 
procurement, housing, education grant payments, social security and tax 
credit payments, healthcare payments, insurance claims, pensions, 
agriculture subsidy payments and compensation claims (Button & Gee, 2013, 
p. 74). 
 
A British Standard of Fraud Measurement 
 
In 1999 the Council of Standards Australia and New Zealand prepared and 
adopted a joint standard on risk management to provide a cultural framework 
for managing risk in order to minimise losses, including fraud (United States 
General Accounting Office, 2001, p. 13). Within the UK, the British Standards 
Institution (BSI) (n.d.) “deliver best practice solutions through the development 
and publication of British Standards and standards-related information” (p.1). 
These “standards promote and share best practice”, supported by a portfolio 
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of 27,000 British Standards (BSI, n.d., p.1). von Solms (2000) argues that 
following such a code of practice provides assurance that an organisation has 
parity with international best practices and such a standard “provides a single 
reference point” (p.617). Furthermore, to comply with such a standard, and 
display the British Standard logo, “procedures have to be established and 
then documented; staff trained to follow procedures” (Mistry & Usherwood, 
1996, p. 1). The process is then measured “using performance indicators and 
evaluated against predetermined standards; and the firm audited by a 
recognised external body” (Mistry & Usherwood, 1996, p. 1). 
 
Whilst monitoring and evaluation may be an extended procedure, it ensures 
that the process is performed to a consistently high standard, and also offers 
the opportunity to compare data between organisations, or to conduct a 
longitudinal study of one organisation‟s data. Therefore, to ensure that fraud is 
measured consistently and to a prescribed level of accuracy as defined within 
the proposed statute previously discussed, a further option for change is the 
creation of a British Standard of fraud measurement. There are already British 
and International standards for auditing and accounting. For example, BS 
6001-5:2002/ISO 2859-4 provides guidance on “sampling procedures suitable 
for…reviews or audits” (British Standards Institute, 2002, p. v). Similarly, BS 
600:2000 provides guidance on statistical methods “applicable to 
administrative areas and to all sectors including commerce and public service” 
(British Standards Institute, 2000, p. x). Additionally, the Auditing Practices 
Board (2010) produces an international standard covering “the auditor‟s 
responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements” (p. 3), 
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however this only advocates that an auditor should consider the possibility of 
fraud and offers no guidance on measurement. These documents do however 
offer a useful starting point to inform the development of a British Standard of 
fraud loss measurement. 
 
Information Exchange Matrix 
 
“Minimizing improper payments often requires the exchange of relevant, 
reliable, and timely information between individuals and units within an 
organization and with external entities with oversight and monitoring 
responsibilities. This can be achieved by establishing working groups” (United 
States General Accounting Office, 2001, p. 37). The third consideration is 
therefore the structured and controlled sharing of best practice between 
organisations. This could include successful data collection and analysis 
methodologies which could be documented within a manual of guidance. 
Reddy and McCarthy (2006) observe that “the essence of identifying and 
sharing best practice is to learn from others and to re-use knowledge”          
(p. 595). This exchange of information could be implemented through the 
creation of a best practice database supplemented by the creation of a fraud 
measurement working group populated by „fraud measurement champions‟ 
from all sectors. To implement this option, it is important that “the required 
infrastructure is in place” which forms part of a “wider knowledge 
management strategy” (Reddy & McCarthy, 2006, p. 597). The NFA is one 
possible conduit for such an infrastructure; an alternative option might be a 
panel of academic experts, such as those currently involved in externally 
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reviewing the Annual Fraud Indicator (NFA, 2012, p. 6). Furthermore, this 
information exchange matrix should remain in place after the creation of any 
statute mandating fraud measurement to develop core doctrine. The next 
section will discuss state intervention. 
 
Justifying State Intervention 
 
When evaluating whether there is a need for state intervention, it is initially 
worth contextualising the scale and cost of fraud within all criminal activity 
against individuals and organisations to evidence the impact of this offending 
typology. Statistical data suggests that crime trends have continued to reduce 
since 2003, however, even allowing for inflation, fraud losses are in the region 
of four times greater than from other crimes. The Home Office (2005) 
published an estimate of the total cost of crime against individuals and 
households based upon a survey conducted during 2003-2004 which 
suggested that the actual value of property stolen was £2.1 billion. This figure 
however, excluded individual losses to fraud. In comparison, the NFA (2013) 
estimate the total losses to fraud by individuals as £9.1 billion (p. 24). There is 
an even greater differential between losses to volume crime and fraud 
experienced by organisations. The NFA (2013, pp. 11-12) estimate identified 
and hidden losses experienced by public and private sector organisations at 
£41.8 billion. This compares to a figure of £4.2 billion placed on the value of 
stolen property against commercial and public sector organisations for volume 
crimes the last time the Home Office produced an estimate (Brand & Price, 
2000). I contend that these figures illustrate the significant size of the fraud 
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problem in comparison to other crimes; specifically that fraud is the most 
costly crime to society, and thus state intervention is a justifiable 
consideration. 
 
Historically, past governments have used Keynesian ideas to justify state 
intervention (Gunn, 2004, p. 117; Aaronovitch, 1983, p. 46). Arguably, the 
labour government also drew upon Keynesian principles to justify a „bailout‟ 
during the banking crisis. The rescue of Northern Rock by means of 
government intervention was described by Prime Minister Gordon Brown as 
“action that was necessary” (Hencke & Sparrow, 2009, p. 1). Previously, 
during September 2007, £24 billion in emergency loans had been authorised 
to be paid to Northern Rock, justified by the Chancellor because “the 
government has an interest in maintaining financial stability” (Politics.co.uk, 
2007, p. 1). There seemed no end to state intervention, in October 2008 the 
government took a £37 billion stake in three banks, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS (Channel Four News, 2009, p. 1). Further loans 
authorised in January 2009 were justified by the Prime Minister on the 
grounds that “good businesses must have access to credit” (Livingstone, 
2009, p. 1). When reflecting upon the labour government‟s interventions, it is 
worth comparing the value of the losses with fraud loss figures. For example 
the proposed losses at HBOS, forecast to be “nearly £11 billion” (BBC, 2009, 
p. 1) fall well below the total of £17.6 billion lost to fraud by the public sector 
during 2008 (NFA, 2010a, p. 1). 
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In 2009 the Government provisionally estimated that net losses from its 
financial sector interventions may lie between £20 billion to £50 billion (House 
of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009, p. 8). The Committee also 
concluded that the government “was right to take decisive action in response 
to the exceptional instability in financial markets” (House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, 2009, p. 6). Here it is worth revisiting the NFA‟s (2010a) 
Annual Fraud Indicator, which estimates 2008 public sector fraud losses at 
£17.6 billion (p. 1). When also considering the potential for undercounting by 
central government departments, then the true loss figure may be even closer 
to the lower limit of the projected losses from the banking crisis.  Applying the 
average fraud loss figure of 5.7%, calculated by reviewing 205 statistically 
valid fraud loss measurement exercises from nine countries (Button & Gee, 
2013, p. 73) to UK public sector expenditure of almost £600 billion, the 
resultant losses would equate to £34 billion, thus far exceeding the £20 billion 
projected losses from bailing out the banks. I suggest that escalating public 
sector fraud losses, and a requirement to address the “black holes in the 
budget” (Trickett, 2010, p.2), are compelling arguments for the state to 
intervene and mandate the measurement of fraud. The argument is made 
even more persuasive by evidence that regular accurate measurement 
exercises, and use of the resultant data to inform control strategies, contribute 
to reducing these losses, and in the case of the NHS, offer a 12:1 return on 
the cost of the work (Gee, 2009b, p. 20). 
 
When exploring the justification for state intervention further, the principal 
consideration is “will the recommended government intervention have the 
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desired impact?”, and are the “benefits…likely to outweigh the cost?” (Belli, 
1997, p. 2). Clearly in the current macro economic climate with significant 
spending cuts, mandating fraud measurement warrants serious consideration. 
Particularly, when evidence from the NHS supports the contention that regular 
measurement exercises reduce loss by up to 40% within the first year (Button 
& Gee, 2013, p.187), and that “taken as a proportion of the measured losses, 
this equates to two per cent being added to the „bottom line‟ within a year” 
(Gee, 2010a, p. 13).  
 
Arguably, there is scope for pragmatic state intervention (Adams, 2001,         
p. 29), thus ensuring the provision of accurate fraud data, rather than a free 
market where individual choice prevails. Something that is still prevalent , as 
evidenced  in a recent conference presentation (May 21, 2013) when Lynn 
McDonald from the Cabinet Office Fraud Error and Debt Team advised that  
when central government departments were asked about fraud measurement, 
some responded that “we don‟t measure fraud but we know it‟s not large”. 
Additionally, within the presentation Lynn McDonald advised that the Cabinet 
Office are considering offering incentives to central government departments 
to measure fraud, but not compelling them to do so. Furthermore, it could be 
suggested the government are morally obliged to intervene to fulfil their role 
as “the guardian of equity and the interests of future generations” (Arrow, 
1978, p. ix). Therefore, by mandating fraud measurement in the interest of 
“social justice” (Fan, 2008, p. 5), state intervention would be justified by 
reducing the loss of public funds which in turn may contribute to a “net 
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increase in social welfare” (International Monetary Fund, 2000, p. 176) by 
limiting the cuts in public spending. 
 
When debating whether the state should intervene into the private sector, it is 
worth returning to the previously discussed government „bailout‟ during the 
banking crisis. The need for such action has been attributed to “the problems 
in performance of subprime mortgages in the United States” (Hellwig, 2008, p. 
3), which can be linked to fraud and corruption. From applicants fabricating 
false information, to brokers exaggerating their clients prospects without them 
knowing, to ultimately a system of mortgages which was certainly built upon 
negligence if not a great deal of fraud. This all culminated in creating a growth 
in mortgages, which were doomed for default (Bitner, 2008; Ferguson, 2008; 
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
the United States, 2011). I suggest the case for state intervention can be 
further evidenced by the global impact of this subprime mortgage crisis on 
both financial institutions and wider society.  
 
The cost of this resultant Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09, which arguably 
could have been averted by tighter regulation of the US banking sector, has 
been estimated at  $11.9 trillion by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or, 
in plain terms, one-fifth of annual global world output (Daily Telegraph, 2009).  
The impact of this US crisis has had an international impact (Friedman, 
Friedman & Kass-Shraibman, 2008, p. 31), being described by Morris (2008) 
as “the first big boulder in an avalanche of asset writedowns”. This crisis has 
also been felt by the wider society, with millions of Americans being in danger 
 43 
of losing their homes (Morris, 2008), metropolitan areas experiencing higher 
unemployment rates (National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States, 2011, p. 23), and many households 
experiencing a decline in net wealth combined with reduced access to credit 
(National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
the United States, 2011, p. 391). This impact on wider society has also been 
felt outside the US, with some households in the UK also experiencing a 
decline in net wealth as a consequence of low interest rates or reduced 
access to credit.   
 
When examining the impact on UK banking, the forecast losses at HBOS of 
“nearly 11 billion” (BBC, 2009) that necessitated state intervention also fall 
well below the latest estimated private sector losses to fraud, which total 
£21.2 billion (NFA, 2013, p.17). The financial and insurance sector contribute 
£5.4 billion to this (NFA, 2013, p.17), which includes an estimate of £1 billion 
for mortgage fraud, this figure being only £0.2 billion lower than the estimated 
losses for benefit fraud (NFA, 2013, p. 34), which receives much more 
government attention. However, the estimate for mortgage fraud is given a 
poor level of confidence by the NFA, and the figure has remained unchanged 
since 2009 (NFA, 2013, p. 42). Estimated mortgage lending during 2012 
totalled £143 billion (NFA, 2013, p. 42), and when applying the average loss 
figure to fraud of 5.7% and the highest percentage loss figure of 10.6% 
(Button & Gee, 2013, p. 16), the true extent of mortgage fraud losses could 
range between £8 billion and £15 billion. When taking account of the 
continued pressure applied by the state to increase lending, it is conceivable 
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that these losses could be even higher, thus emphasising the need to adopt a 
more accurate measure, which current indications suggest the financial 
institutions are reluctant to implement voluntarily. 
 
Data on the private sector reveals that the total turnover across all business 
sizes is £3.1 trillion (NFA, 2013, p. 17). When applying the average loss to 
fraud figure of 5.7% (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 73) to this figure, losses could be 
as high as £0.18 trillion, which far exceeds the estimate of £21.2 billion for the 
whole of the UK private sector (NFA, 2013, p. 17). I suggest these potential 
private sector losses to fraud warrant consideration being given to state 
intervention into other industries apart from the financial services sector. The 
industries warranting inclusion are those experiencing large scale losses, and  
the estimate supplied being only attributed average confidence in the 2012 
Annual Fraud Indicator (NFA, 2012, p. 18), this being the most recent fraud 
loss dataset broken down by industry. Those into which state intervention is 
worthy of consideration include wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles, manufacturing, mining, utilities, information and 
communication, waste management and transportation (NFA, 2012, p. 18). 
 
Additionally, it is worth examining perception surveys of UK private sector 
businesses conducted by the NFA during 2011 and 2012. The first survey 
took the form of a snowball sample using contacts within the private sector 
and resulted in 202 respondents completing the questionnaire (NFA, 2012,   
p. 16). What is of concern is that no information is supplied by the NFA 
regarding the response rate. Of equal concern is the fact that the 
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questionnaire identified that only “79.2% of respondents said they agree or 
strongly agree that their organisation is at risk from fraud” (NFA, 2012, p. 16). 
Additionally, all respondents were asked to provide an estimate of fraud 
against their organisation as a percentage of annual turnover, however 
“almost half of respondents chose the option „prefer not to say‟” (NFA, 2012, 
p. 16). Whilst I accept this information is commercially sensitive, arguably it 
suggests a reluctance to supply estimated fraud loss data to the NFA, let 
alone accurate data. Equally, it may be suggested that this reluctance to 
supply such an estimate might be because the organisation has no idea 
whatsoever of the extent of their fraud losses. Consequently, to secure these 
missing data, state intervention in the form of regulation may be justified.   
 
Of further interest to this research project are the findings from the 2012 
qualitative survey undertaken with 45 private sector organisations 
participating in the quantitative survey “to understand better the 
considerations for estimating fraud loss” (NFA, 2013, p. 20). The significant 
responses being that many organisations “felt that it was too difficult to place 
a precise figure on an activity they did not know about” and that they “may 
have more hidden fraud occurring than they had originally considered” (p. 20). 
I maintain these issues can be addressed by the creation of a British Standard 
of fraud measurement, supported by the creation of an information exchange 
matrix to improve understanding of the fraud loss measurement process. 
 
The issue of cost is also relevant when advocating the mandating of 
measurement, with a potential argument to be countered being that 
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conducting fraud loss measurement exercises is too costly to be financially 
viable. Historically this may have been the case, with one exercise taking “six 
people six months to complete such an exercise (600+ days)” (Button & Gee, 
2013, p.76). However, “advances in technology and process have reduced 
this to 100-150 days and progress will see these figures reduce further in 
coming years” (Button & Gee, 2013, p.76). The costs are not excessive and 
once organisations are made aware of this, the probability of compliance may 
increase. A further argument I offer when advocating the benefits of fraud loss 
measurement is profitability. For example, applying the global average loss 
rate of 5.7% to the 255 companies in the FTSE 350 who posted financial 
returns and were profitable, the average increase in profitability “would be 
almost 36 per cent” (Button & Gee, 2013, p.187). I suggest this statistic offers 
additional support for the organisational benefits of the proposed options for 
change. 
 
In further support of the contention that fraud loss measurement is cost 
effective and “provides a basis for reaping competitive advantage” (Button, 
Gee & Brooks, 2012, p. 72), there are case studies from both the UK and US 
where adopting this process has resulted in financial benefits. These include: 
 
 The NHS, which had a budget of £87.2 billion for 2005/06, reduced  
losses by up to sixty per cent during the period 1998 and 2006, and by 
up to forty per cent over a shorter period (National Health Service 
Counter Fraud and Security Management Service, 2007). 
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 The US Department of Agriculture reduced losses by twenty eight per 
cent within a £12 billion dollar program between 2002 and 2004 
(United States Department of Agriculture, 2002; 2003; 2004). 
 The Department for Work and Pensions reduced losses in the two 
means tested benefits Income Support and Jobseekers Allowance that 
have an annual expenditure of £11.4 billion by fifty per cent between 
1997/8 and 2005/6 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2007).  
 
The US offers another example of regulatory intervention aimed at addressing 
the risks posed by fraudulent activity, in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 (SOX). The financial impact of the respective collapses of Enron and 
WorldCom (De Vay, 2006, p. 1), particularly the former company who filed 
what was then the largest bankruptcy in US history (Mallin, 2010; McLean & 
Elkind, 2003) was felt globally, but significantly in the US. As a consequence 
of public outcry, President George W. Bush tasked Senator Paul Sarbanes 
and Congressman Mike Oxley  to create “some tough new laws that would 
prevent or at least diminish the possibility of corporate scandals like Enron, 
WorldCom et al from happening again” (Holt, 2008, p. 4). The ensuing statute 
created the most radical set of financial auditing changes in the US since the 
1930s (Moeller, 2004, p. 3; Murphy & Topyan, 2005). The resultant expansion 
of federal regulation was aimed at increasing the reliability of “corporate 
financial reporting, accounting methods and auditing practices” and the 
subsequent reforms mandated by the act left “no significant aspect of public 
company operations” untouched (Ambler, Massaro & Acre, 2010, p. 3). One 
significant component of this regulation, and of particular relevance to the 
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proposals of this research, is the Act‟s imposition of corporate certification 
requirements, whereby Chief Executives and Chief Financial Officers are 
required to certify the Company‟s published statements (Zhang & Wiersema, 
2009). Consequently, this “has resulted in various approaches to structuring 
internal compliance procedures and developing best practice controls” 
(Ambler, Massaro & Acre, 2010, p. 3). This process of self certification and 
developing best practice offers a model that may be used to inform the 
proposals made by this research.  
 
The effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 has been the subject of 
academic discussion, with supporters on both sides of the debate.  A detailed 
critique of all provisions of the Act is outside the scope of this research. 
However, one recurring criticism worth mentioning is that this statute did not 
go far enough in terms of federal regulatory control, this opportunity being 
missed as a consequence of the speed in which the bill passed through the 
legislative process (Perino, 2002, p. 672; Wyant, 2003, p. 567).That said, it 
could be argued that the urgent need to address the risks posed by large 
scale corporate fraud and a plummeting Dow Jones Average (Perino, 2002, p. 
672) through regulatory intervention was recognised by the US Congress, 
hence the swiftness of the act being signed off by the President. 
Nevertheless, this statute has achieved some impact on addressing fraud risk 
and the resultant public harm, through the introduction of the requirement for 
management reporting of internal control (Gupta & Leech, 2006, p. 39); 
increasing penalties for financial statement fraud (Tackett, Woolf & Claypole, 
2004, p. 349); prohibition of auditing consulting services structuring 
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transactions (Cullinan, 2004, p. 861) and providing middle management with a 
reason to resist pressure “to be creative with their numbers” (Wyant, 2003, p. 
578). This importance of this legislation has been acknowledged 
internationally, with “the rest of the world” considering enacting “SOX like 
legislation (Gupta & Leech, 2006, p. 450). Of further significance is the fact 
that the provisions of the act have global impact, with overseas companies 
that have securities registered or listed in the US having to comply with the 
Act‟s requirements. (Cardilli, 2003, p. 790; Litvak, 2006, p.11). A similar 
provision is worthy of consideration within the proposed UK statute. 
 
Finally, I draw upon the Bribery Act 2010 as another example of state 
intervention into the private sector. Section seven of this statute creates an 
offence which may be committed by a commercial organisation should they 
fail to prevent “persons who perform services for or on behalf of that 
organisation from bribing another on their behalf, and are unable to evidence 
that they had the necessary safeguards in place to prevent such activity 
taking place”. I therefore contend that, if the Government intervenes in such a 
manner for bribery, by laying down mandatory obligations to private sector 
organisations to implement specified processes at a cost to the business, why 
not impose similar mandatory requirements for the measurement of fraud, 
which will actually benefit the organisation? 
 
Additionally, Section 9 of the Bribery Act stipulates that the Secretary of State 
must publish guidance on procedures that will assist organisations to comply 
with the legislation. This has subsequently been issued, including a „Quick 
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Start Guide‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2011) which performs the function of a 
manual of guidance.  Furthermore, and of relevance to the research 
argument, this legislation is supported by a British Standard 10500 which 
provides an anti bribery management system for organisations (BSI Group, 
n.d.) which is applicable to “small, medium and large organisations in the 
public, private and voluntary sectors” (BSI Case Study, n.d.). This system 
introduces a significant number of measures resulting in costs to the 
organisations, including “the adoption and communication of an anti-bribery 
policy, training and guidance for employees, appointing a compliance 
manager, undertaking risk assessment and due diligence, controlling gifts and 
hospitality, implementing effective procurement, commercial and financial 
controls, and instituting reporting and investigation procedures” (BSI Case 
Study, n.d.). 
 
In conclusion of this section, I offer the observations of the United States 
General Accounting Office (2001) who argue that “One of the biggest hurdles 
that many entities face in the process of managing improper payments is 
overcoming the propensity toward denial of the problem” (p. 48). This 
research therefore argues that to develop accurate fraud loss measurement 
three valid and co-ordinated options for change have been identified.  Before 
discussing the research argument directing this project, I have examined the 
scholarly works on regulatory options that would require consideration if 
progressing the first option for change discussed, particularly if it were to 
include private sector organisations. 
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How to Regulate? 
 
Introduction 
 
“Regulation has long been an important activity within the traditional UK state” 
(James, 2005, p.326). The most notable, and of relevance to this thesis, being 
the regulatory system associated with finance and accounting which is 
undertaken by the National Audit Office (James, 2005, p. 326). According to 
Hood (1983), if legislation is perceived as being draconian, for example by 
applying a command and control strategy which imposes standards backed 
by criminal sanctions, there is a risk that regulatees may respond negatively 
(p. 5). It is therefore important that any regulation imposed is seen as 
beneficial, workable and cost effective. There may need to be some redress if 
organisations fail to comply, however the statute is more likely to succeed if it 
is perceived as a “carrot” rather than a “stick” (Braithwaite, 2002a, p. 13). 
Consequently, to set the options for change being considered in the broader 
context, I have reviewed regulatory scholarship with a view to identifying how 
organisations are motivated to obey the law, before moving on to consider the 
development and application of responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992). For the purpose of this discussion, regulation is defined as a “means to 
control or direct others by rules, standards or principles” (Braithwaite, 2006a, 
p. 1). 
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Why do organisations obey the law? 
 
Kagan and Scholz (1984) contend that organisations have different 
motivations for compliance and non compliance (p. 69). These motivations 
may be plural (Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, 2003), and have been 
identified by Scheuer (1999) as economic, social and self fulfilling. Nielson & 
Parker (2012) draw similar conclusions, identifying motivations as “economic, 
social and normative” (p. 429), the latter being defined as the extent to which 
the “firm and its managers are committed to obeying the law” (Nielson & 
Parker, 2012, p. 431). Gunningham and Kagan (2005, p. 213) suggest that “in 
economically advanced democracies, firms are concerned about their 
reputations and legitimacy…and often are responsive to the norms underlying 
regulatory requirements”. Arguably, when seeking compliance with financially 
driven regulation, economic and normative motivations are the most 
applicable, because they may be perceived by organisations to have minimal 
social impact (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). However, whilst economically 
“calculated motivations” (Winter & May, 2001) are important, consideration 
should also be given to how reputation and legitimacy could be harnessed to 
inform compliance strategies by triggering and directing managerial 
commitments (Gunningham and Kagan, 2005, p. 213). 
 
According to academic debate, of equal consideration are “internal and 
external” motivations (Houston, 2000, p. 714), with economic being 
considered internal and normative external (Nielson & Parker, 2012, p. 433). 
The motivation of businesses to comply when they have potentially plural 
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interests can be determined by each organisations individual “goal framing” 
(Etienne, 2011). The author further argues that whilst businesses often have 
multiple goals that influence compliance, there is usually one motive that 
influences and frames their course of action (p. 306).  
 
As previously discussed, the normative motivations of businesses require 
consideration, specifically their normative commitment to comply (Burby & 
Patterson, 1993), because the difference between organisations largely 
relates to the level of support for the specific “regulatory regime, not in relation 
to the general duty to obey the law” (Nielson & Parker, 2012, p. 447).  
Whilst the aforementioned motivations are influential, what is equally 
significant in terms of compliance is the legitimacy of any regulations (Levi, 
1988, p. 69). The concept of responsive regulation will now be discussed. 
 
Responsive regulation 
 
Esty and Geradin (2001) contend that “optimal governance requires a flexible 
mix of...cooperation between governmental and non governmental actors” 
(p.31). According to Baldwin and Cave (1999) “A regulatory system will be 
difficult to justify…if critics can argue that a different strategy would more 
effectively achieve relevant objectives” (p. 34). Selznick (1992) contends that 
the challenge of responsiveness is “to maintain institutional integrity while 
taking into account new problems, new forces in the environment, new 
demands and expectations” (p. 336). It is also suggested that “business  
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custom shapes responsive business regulatory law” (Braithwaite, 2006b,       
p. 885). Furthermore, when regulation is seen to be legitimate and fair, the 
likelihood of compliance with the law increases (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & 
Huo, 2001).  
 
When framing appropriate guidelines, Rose-Ackerman (1988) argues that the 
development of good responsive regulatory policy requires interaction 
between state regulation and self regulation. A further pertinent observation is 
offered by Braithwaite (2006a), who argues that “when regulation…includes 
persuasion, influence, voluntary compliance and self regulation, the term „to 
regulate‟ takes on a whole new dimension” (p. 1). The conclusions of Porter 
(1990) that “firms, like governments, are often prone to see the short term 
costs of dealing with tough standards and not their longer term benefits”       
(p. 648) are particularly pertinent when developing regulation that has cost 
implications for organisations.  
 
Minimising Non Compliance 
 
“A strategy based mostly on punishment fosters an organized business 
subculture of resistance to regulation” (Braithwaite, 1990, p. 61). Similarly, 
should a business perceive that the regulator is being unfair, this may have a 
negative impact on compliance in the long term (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, 
Gibson & Makkai, 1994). Moreover, Braithwaite (2002b) argues that 
frequently, financial penalties for non-compliance will either be too limited to 
deter calculated misconduct or they will be too excessive that businesses do 
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not have the capacity to pay (p. 108). Therefore, “the trick of successful 
regulation is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion” 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p. 25). Haines (1997) and Gunningham and 
Grabosky (1998) go one stage further, identifying a shift from coercive to 
cooperative legislation with punishment being replaced by the more 
appropriate option of persuasion. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) further 
suggest that persuasion should be the first tactic, because if this proves to be 
successful, “more resources are left to expand regulatory coverage” (p. 26). 
One further opinion of note is that of Braithwaite (2002a), who maintains that 
punishment is a more useful tool than reward (p.25), however, the most 
difficult decision is when to punish and when to persuade (Braithwaite,1985). 
Parker (2006) concludes that there is a low probability of…successful 
enforcement action for most business offences, making the perception of 
deterrence even less potent (p. 592).  
 
Regulatory best practice suggests that regulators should blend regulatory 
strategies to improve compliance rather than just relying on deterrence (May, 
2005). Braithwaite (2006b) draws a similar conclusion, arguing that 
individually, “restorative justice, deterrence and incapacitation are all flawed 
theories of compliance” whereas coercive control combining all three 
elements in a regulatory pyramid is more likely to succeed (p. 887).   
 
When considering punishment for non compliance, it is imperative that a 
balance is struck so that the sanction is not considered too severe. Sunstein 
(1990) argues that too stringent regulatory laws may in fact result in under 
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regulation (pp. 91-92). Therefore, when formulating sanctions, it is worth 
considering that formal changes in the levels of sanctions, enforcement 
strategies or inspection efforts may only change the behaviour of regulates in 
the short term (Whelan, 2007). In terms of policing fraud loss measurement, 
these observations are particularly relevant because the costs of validating 
compliance are likely to be sizeable. Winter and May (2001) observe that 
traditionally, enforcement has been based upon the assumption that 
increased activity will lead to increased compliance, however deterrent 
features should be seen as only one means of  achieving compliance (p.675).  
 
To maximise the potential for compliance, consideration also needs to be 
given to the capabilities of each individual business. Winter and May (2001) 
make a pertinent observation, noting that regulated firms vary in their 
available resources, therefore, irrespective of motivation, if a business does 
not have the financial capacity there is a risk that they will fail to comply 
(P.680). Nielson and Parker (2012) consider that lack of technical know-how 
is another factor influencing compliance. A similar observation is offered by 
Braithwaite, 2006b) who advocates that “non compliance is neither about lack 
of goodwill to comply, nor about rational calculation to cheat. It is about 
management not having the competence to comply” (p. 887). The standards 
being imposed also require careful consideration; specifically they need to be 
realistic and achievable, because imposing too high standards that have a 
cost implication may result in increased rates of non compliance (Makkai & 
Braithwaite, 1993, p. 272). 
 
 57 
The question of maximising compliance therefore requires consideration of 
both regulatory strategies, and associated sanctions. Three regulatory options 
have therefore been evaluated, these being direct government regulation, self 
regulation and enforced self regulation, which will now be discussed.  
 
Regulatory Options 
 
Direct government regulation involves state „policing‟ of all regulatees to 
ensure compliance, including auditing of accounts and direct inspections. 
According to Clinard and Yeager (1980) however, “fiscal pressures invariably 
prevent government inspectors from checking every workplace…for crooked 
bookkeeping” (p. 95). Similarly, Braithwaite (1982) argues that in terms of 
regulation, “the state simply cannot afford to do an adequate job on its own” 
(p. 1467).  Peters and Hoornbeek (2005) also draw similar conclusions, 
observing that “direct regulation requires significant resources for standard 
setting, monitoring and enforcement” and such resources are only likely to be 
available “in those cases where the numbers and types of activities are 
reasonably limited” (p. 96). These observations suggest that this model would 
be unsuitable where there are large numbers of regulatees and the process 
involves a significant amount of inspection. 
 
Self regulation is an internal regulatory process induced by government or 
public authority (Aalders & Withagen, 1997, p. 427). However, the question of 
striking a balance again comes to the fore. Braithwaite (1990) argues that “a 
strategy based totally on persuasion and self regulation will be motivated 
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when actors are motivated by economic rationality” (p. 61). This observation is 
particularly relevant when regulation has cost implications to the regulatees, 
because should organisations fail to be persuaded that the proposed 
regulation is of economic value to them, there is a significant risk of           
non-compliance. One pertinent disadvantage of self regulation is that whilst 
businesses have more capability than government of regulating their 
activities, “they are not necessarily more willing to regulate effectively” 
(Braithwaite, 1982, p. 1469). This observation is particularly appropriate when 
considering regulatory options when there is likely to be some resistance from 
regulatees. 
 
“Under enforced self regulation, rules may be written, monitored and enforced 
by companies themselves in conjunction with the government and state 
agencies” (Vincent-Jones, 2006, p. 88). According to Parker (2006) 
“Enforcement action might provide an opportunity…for businesspeople to be 
persuaded of the value of compliance with the law” (pp. 609-610). Fairman 
and Yapp (2005) identify that enforced self regulation differs from self 
regulation “in that the standards to be achieved are determined by the 
regulator and not from within the industry. These are enforced by “agents of 
the state and not by the industry body itself” (p. 493). Genn (1993) argues that 
there are disadvantages to enforced self regulation, specifically that 
businesses sometimes have difficulty in understanding how self assessment 
works. This issue can easily be addressed however, because enforced self 
regulation involves negotiation between the state and individual firms “to 
establish regulations that are particularized to each firm” (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
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1992, p. 101). When attempting to regulate a range of organisations of 
differing size and structure, this is worthy of consideration, and some flexibility 
should be built in to accommodate the differences between businesses so 
that rules are “tailored to match the company” (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992,     
p. 110). The rules may not necessarily be written by each company; however 
any proposed regulation could include different criteria which would be 
applicable dependant upon the characteristics of each the business. Arguably, 
this model offers the most scope because, “in terms of flexibility, compliance, 
enforcement and accountability, the Enforced Self Regulation model is 
considered to confer greater benefits than self regulation” (Ojo, 2011, p. 142). 
 
Sanctions 
 
Addressing the issue of non compliance necessitates the creation of 
appropriate penalties which serve two purposes. Firstly, to facilitate some 
form of redress from those that fail to act in accordance with the regulation, 
but more importantly, to act as a motivator for compliance which removes the 
need to sanction. Braithwaite‟ (2002a) argues that “punishment is not the 
most important lever of compliance” (p. 25) and that compliance is not always 
closely related to the perceived risk of punishment (Braithwaite & Makkai, 
1991). Accordingly, Braithwaite (1990) suggests that “the existence and 
signalling of the capacity to get tough as is needed can usher in a regulatory 
culture more voluntaristic and less litigious than is possible when the state 
rules out adversariness and punitiveness as an option” (p. 64). When 
considering how to sanction, academic debate suggests an enforcement 
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pyramid that includes the options of criminal penalty and licence suspension 
(Braithwaite, 1990 p. 62; Braithwaite, 2002a, p. 20). An alternative option, 
which seeks to avoid the deterrence trap resulting in large scale non 
compliance, is the use of “broad, informal, weak sanctions” (Braithwaite 
(2002b) p. 110). I suggest the latter is more appropriate when attempting to 
regulate when there is likely to be organisational resistance to the process 
that is being imposed. This chapter will now discuss the research argument 
directing this project, drawing upon the three options for change previously 
discussed. 
 
The Research Argument 
 
As discussed, whilst there is one overarching research argument, this is 
actually supported by two sub-arguments, all of which might be considered 
independently, but ideally mesh together, and arguably, may be of limited 
impact on an independent basis. The research argument is as follows: 
 
 The measurement of fraud should be mandated 
 This statute should be supported by the creation of a British Standard of 
fraud measurement  
 The creation of knowledge exchange infrastructure based upon the US 
strategies previously discussed that develops core doctrine through the 
development of a „manual of guidance‟ will support the implementation of 
the first two options for change 
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Why is this Research worth Doing? 
 
Introduction 
 
“A true picture of fraud is a chimera, but a better and 
truer picture of fraud is possible.”  
                                        (Levi & Burrows, 2008, p. 315) 
 
“Assessing the scale of loss from fraud is an 
important first step in developing a strategy for 
tackling external fraud.” 
                                (NAO, 2008a, p.13) 
 
This section will advocate the value of this research by developing specific 
themes relating to the benefits of improved fraud loss measurement. I will 
examine the lack of rigour in existing research, the impact on business costs 
and crime reduction, before moving on to discuss how this research is 
compatible with the professional doctorate ethos. Before evaluating these 
however, the discussion will initially question the need for improved accuracy 
of fraud loss data. 
 
Why improve measurement accuracy? 
 
Brooks, Button and Frimpong (2009) argue that “fraud is an ongoing problem 
that needs continuous monitoring and assessment” (p. 497), however the      
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NFA (2009a) observe that “there is little guidance available on how to quantify 
the cost of fraud” (p. 16). Arguably these conclusions suggest there is an 
urgent need to develop a consistent standard of measurement, supported by 
best practice guidance.  
 
Gee, Button and Brooks (2010a) suggest that “it is no longer reasonable to 
suggest that fraud losses cannot be measured” (p. 15). I maintain this 
statement suggests this research is of value, and in further support of this 
argument, I proffer Gee‟s (2009a) contention that “measurement of fraud 
losses is crucial to reducing them, if you don‟t know the nature and scale of 
the problem how can you apply the right solution?” (p. 255). In support of the 
argument for increased measurement, I draw upon Herdan (2010) who 
identifies an urgent need for more organizations to measure fraud (p. 28).  
 
Limited Rigour 
 
Commenting upon fraud studies, Levi et al (2007) observe that “details of the 
methodology used are typically lacking”, and consequently, “fraud research 
findings are based on loose methods (at best)” (p.16). Of significance is the 
Attorney General‟s acknowledgement that, due to a lack of accurate fraud 
measurement methodology, “it is impossible to say how big it is” (Scotland, 
2007). The Fraud Review Team (2006) identify inconsistencies in extant fraud 
loss data which rely upon “various estimates which all use different methods 
of measurement” (p. 38). Equally, Doig (2006) suggests that “any attempt to 
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assess the true cost of fraud will continue to be hindered by the various 
reporting sources and the criteria they use” (p. 47). 
 
Levi and Burrows (2008) conclude that considerable work is required to create 
a rigorous fraud measurement methodology, observing that “the financial 
costs…of deception offences have tended to be more the subject of rhetoric 
than of serious empirical investigation” (p. 294). A pertinent observation is 
also made by Hoare (2007), who suggests that “most measures of 
fraud…have not been carried out to a robust methodology-they all measure 
different things-so adding them up to produce an overall total is not possible” 
(p. 277).  
 
Crime Reduction 
 
Crime reduction is defined as 
 
“action to reduce the seriousness of criminal 
events.” 
(Ebklom, 2004, p. 15)    
 
Walker (2011) argues that “effective crime reduction is likely to be achieved 
by a number of different policies working together” (p. 8). Arguably, by 
adopting a policy of regularly measuring and re-measuring fraud losses to an 
improved standard of accuracy, and using the resultant data to reduce 
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vulnerability through informed prevention policies can lead to a reduction in 
fraudulent criminal activity perpetrated against an organisation.  
 
In support, I offer the example of the NHS, who between 1998 and 2006 
conducted regular statistically valid fraud loss measurement exercises, with 
the resultant data being used to inform fraud reduction strategies. As a 
consequence, fraud losses were reduced by up to 60% (Gee & Helwig, 2008, 
p. 19). If this large organisation can develop and implement effective 
measurement processes, which in turn are used to inform risk assessment 
and improve crime reduction, then it is not beyond the capabilities of central 
and local government, and even private and charitable sector organisations. 
Furthermore, once established, progress on achieving crime reduction can be 
gauged by regular re-measurement exercises. To further emphasise the 
importance of establishing effective crime reduction strategies, within which 
accurate fraud loss measurement can play an integral part, I draw upon 
Plasvic (2007), who advocates that “there is a real danger that both the cost 
and frequency of fraud will rise significantly over the next five years and 
beyond” (p. 3).  
 
Financial Value 
 
“The measurement of losses to fraud (and error) is 
an essential first step to successful action.” 
                       (Gee, Button & Brooks, 2010b, p. 4) 
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Gee (2009b, p.19; 2009c) maintains that the true value of accurate fraud 
measurement is that losses may be treated as a business cost. Interestingly, 
and of relevance to this research, this may then result in “greater pressures 
from shareholders, taxpayers, governing bodies to reduce this cost” (Button, 
Johnson and Frimpong, 2008, p.246). Moreover, once a robust mechanism 
for fraud loss measurement is established “there may also be a trickle down to 
smaller organizations unable to afford a counter fraud resource” (Button, 
Johnson and Frimpong, 2008, p. 246). Equally, if adequate investment is 
made in fraud measurement, “a considerable return…can be made” (Gee, 
2007, p. 7), simply because limited focus upon fraud costs means they have 
become one of the “great unreduced business costs” (Gee, 2010a, p. 13). The 
financial value of re-measurement is also worthy of consideration. When 
conducting the review of statistically valid fraud loss measurement exercises 
discussed earlier, Button, Gee & Brooks (2012) identified that organizations 
that repeated fraud loss measurement exercises tended to show a reduction 
in the percentage loss rate, which equates to “an average reduction of just 
under 15 per cent”, which in many organizations “would amount to a 
significant sum of money” (p. 71). 
 
Professional Doctorate Ethos 
 
This research provides me with the opportunity to combine academic 
knowledge with practitioner researcher skills drawn from experience as a 
fraud investigator and criminal intelligence analyst. Equally, because fraud 
measurement has received minimal attention from academia, it presents an 
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opportunity to make an original contribution to knowledge construction (Eraut, 
1994), thus embracing the professional doctorate ethos by contributing to 
practice (Scott, Brown, Lunt & Thorne, 2004, p. 113).  To further evidence 
this, I draw upon Levi and Burrows (2008) who conclude that “few of the 
studies on fraud are derived from academic or professional analytical 
sources” (p.296). Having contextualised the research topic, I close by 
summarising the content of the subsequent chapters within this thesis. 
 
Thesis Outline 
 
The subject of fraud measurement is taken up in Chapter 2 through a 
thematic literature review that offers an overview of the limited critiques of 
fraud measurement, before moving on to evaluate existing fraud loss data 
outputs. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate existing measurement 
methodologies, with a view to identifying best practice and inadequacies of 
technique, both of which inform the data collection plan for this project. The 
chapter also critiques the broader literature on crime data including the 
concept of the „dark figure of crime‟. The chapter concludes with a case study 
that examines the impact of IPIA on healthcare fraud in the US. 
The research methods are described in Chapter 3, commencing with a 
discussion of my worldview which led to the adoption of a pragmatic approach 
to methodology, influenced by practitioner experience and in keeping with the 
professional doctorate ethos. The chapter also contains a discussion of the 
data collection plan, data security, analysis, ethics, and academic rigour, all 
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which are intended to offer an open and transparent account of this project for 
the benefit of any future researchers examining the same subject.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 describe my findings, following analysis of the qualitative 
data harvested from semi-structured interviews and the quantitative data 
gathered using a web based questionnaire. The three chapters address the 
topics of who measures fraud and the methods applied, mandating fraud 
measurement, the creation of a common standard of fraud measurement and 
the development of doctrine. Chapter 7 summarises the entire thesis by 
offering conclusions based upon the analysis of data collected and 
recommendations that offer improvements to existing practice, thus providing 
an original contribution to knowledge. Finally, as a postscript I offer a 
reflective account of my journey through this research process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, this chapter has discussed the historical difficulties in defining fraud, 
and how lack of a universally applied definition has hampered accurate and 
consistent measurement, before detailing some of the varying definitions that 
have been applied. Moving on, this chapter has offered some options for 
change to support the development of a more accurate fraud measure, 
justification for state intervention and a discussion on regulatory options. The 
evidence presented however, suggests that to progress these proposed 
changes, a standard definition of fraud is the starting point. In support of this 
conclusion, I close this chapter, by offering the conclusions of the NFA 
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(2009a) that “there needs to be an agreed definition of fraud before it can be 
measured consistently” (p. 6). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the subject of fraud measurement by 
conducting a thematic literature review which critically examines extant 
publications containing fraud loss measurement data. The purpose of the 
review is to report findings having conducted critical analysis of the 
measurement processes applied, paying particular attention to accuracy, 
reliability and comparability. An assessment of data collection methods has 
identified differing typologies which have in turn informed the structure of this 
chapter. Consequently, the review of fraud loss reports will discuss in turn  
publications falling into the following four criteria; „statistically valid surveys‟, 
„measuring detected fraud‟, „guestimates‟ and „impostors‟. Within these 
classifications reports will be grouped in terms of which sector‟s data they 
present, this being public sector, private sector or „hybrids' which synthesise 
data from both sectors, but are distinguished by the sector from which they 
originate. The charitable/voluntary sector is not used as an additional        
sub-classification, because currently there are no fraud loss reports produced 
by this sector, although this review will discuss the current standing of 
measuring fraud within this sector. 
 
Having critiqued the aforementioned literature, this chapter will then present a 
review of measures, providing a synopsis of the typologies applied by the 
organisations whose loss data have been examined during this critique. I will 
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then outline the methodological issues that have been identified through 
content analysis of the literature. Before moving on to discuss the fraud loss 
measurement publications, this chapter will explain the literature inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, before describing the search strategy employed to identify 
the literature and then offering a review of identified methodologies and issues 
highlighted by past reviews of fraud processes harvested during the collection 
process. The final section of the chapter presents a case study of the impact 
of the Improper Payments Information Act 2002 on US healthcare fraud. 
Firstly, this chapter will contextualise this study by examining crime statistics 
and surveys, seeking to explain the „dark figure of crime‟ before moving on to 
discuss the limited attention paid to fraud within these data outputs, thus 
resulting in what may described as „the dark figure of fraud‟. 
 
The ‘Dark Figure of Crime’ 
 
“The term dark figures has been widely used by criminologists to represent 
the gap between the true extent of crime and the amount of crime known to 
the police” (Mosher, Miethe & Hart, 2011, p. 93). The authors contend that the 
principle sources of this gap are “ the inability of police to observe all criminal 
activity, the reluctance of crime victims and witnesses to report crime to the 
police, and variation in the recording of known crime incidents due to police 
discretion” (p. 93). Interestingly, Coleman and Moynihan (1996) maintain that 
the dark figure of crime is “not simply out there waiting to be counted by the 
application of a simple rule”, but crime rates result from the fact that “people 
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with particular interests, concerns and objectives use a set of definitions, rules 
and procedures...to arrive at that product” (p. 20).  
 
In terms of addressing this issue, Jones (2001) argues that “crime surveys 
have gone some way towards shedding light on what is referred to as the dark 
figure of crime”; data from the British Crime Survey (BCS) suggesting that 
“about half of all known crime is brought to the attention of the police” (p. 56). 
Nevertheless, Jones (2001) goes on to observe that “even the surveys 
themselves do not completely expose the dark figure” (p. 65). In defence of 
the British Crime Survey, Hough, Maxfield, Morris and Simmons (2007) 
suggest that the case made by the Home Office‟s Crime, Planning and Policy 
Unit was that the proposed survey “placed less importance on the dark figure 
of unreported crime than on obtaining intelligence in respect of crime 
prevention, fear of crime and for informing enforcement responses” (p. 13). 
Consequently, criticism that this survey fails to address the dark figure of 
crime is somewhat unjustified because this is not the principal function of 
these data. As evidenced by these observations, it is apparent that the two 
main changes required to at least reduce this dark figure, are enhanced police 
crime recording processes that capture a wider range of data, and increased 
reporting of crimes by victims.  
 
The dark figure of crime (Biderman & Reiss, 1967) is an international problem, 
having been identified as an issue in the US. During 1965, US President 
Lyndon Johnson convened a Commission to examine rising crime in urban 
areas (Rennison & Rand, 2007, p. 18). The Commission was unable to draw 
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meaningful conclusions because these missing data prevented the “accurate 
measurement of crime trends” (President‟s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 40). Again drawing on the US as 
an example, the dark figure of crime is also offered as an explanation for the 
divergence of crime levels measured in the Federal Bureau of Intelligence‟s 
Uniform Crime Reports and the Bureau of Justice Statistics‟ National Crime 
Victimization Survey (Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 253). Similar criticism has been 
levelled towards recorded crime statistics and the British Crime Survey due to 
the disparities in these data; however this is unsurprising because of the 
reluctance of victims to report certain crimes, and in some instances victims 
being unaware of the crime, fraud being one example, as will be discussed in 
the following segment which examines what may be described as the „dark 
figure of fraud‟. 
 
The ‘Dark Figure of Fraud’ 
 
Many frauds remain undiscovered, and therefore absent from official returns. 
Consequently, police recorded statistics, and data compiled by agencies such 
as the DWP only capture a limited amount of fraud (Doig & Levi, 2009; Doig & 
Macaulay, 2010; Gannon & Doig, 2010), thus contributing to what may be 
described as „the dark figure of fraud‟. Arguably, the first acknowledgement of 
the possible existence of a dark figure of fraud is offered by Sutherland 
(1940), who identifies a lack of recognition of white collar crime in police 
recorded statistics. White collar crime being defined as “crimes committed by 
persons of respectability and high social status in the course of their 
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occupations” (Sutherland & Cressey, 1960, p. 40). Sutherland (1940) 
concludes that this is because prosecution is frequently avoided due to the 
status of the parties involved, that the offences are often considered trivial, 
and on occasions it is difficult to gather sufficient evidence. Debatably, this 
explanation is still valid in terms of the under-representation of fraud within 
official crime statistics. In support, I offer the conclusions of Allen et al (2005) 
who maintain that only a small proportion of frauds are recorded by the 
criminal justice system. Two explanations for this „dark figure of fraud‟ are 
offered by Sutton (2007), who suggests that “many frauds are not seen by 
individual victims as crimes that warrant reporting to the authorities”, or 
alternatively, “the hassle, or culpable embarrassment of informing the 
authorities may outweigh the desire to report the scam” (p. 250). 
 
Following the refinement of criminal statistics, more types of “private 
criminality” have been studied, such as white collar crime, yet they still remain 
“greatly under-represented in recorded crime figures” (Maguire, 2007, p. 247). 
The author offers a potential explanation, suggesting that “the relationship 
between frequency and seriousness is not straightforward” (p. 265). 
Consequently, “fraud and forgery appear in recorded crime figures in relatively 
small numbers”, however if the measure focused upon value stolen, “fraud 
would come out as of greater significance than other categories with many 
times the number of recorded offences” (p. 265). To address this issue, the 
criteria for crime statistical recording should incorporate monetary value in 
addition to frequency, and through an awareness campaign, individual victims 
encouraged to report losses.   
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To explain the concept of the „dark figure of fraud‟, this thesis will examine the 
status of fraud as a crime within criminal statistics and surveys, before moving 
on to critique fraud loss measurement data outputs. Firstly, the review will 
examine the collection of general crime data using official statistics and 
surveys. 
 
Crime Statistics 
 
Field (1990) suggests that crime statistics reveal more about those collecting 
and recording them than they do about crime itself (p. 2). Historically, crime 
measurement in England and Wales consisted of annually compiled Home 
Office statistics detailing offences recorded by the Police (Maguire, 2007,      
p. 241). The politicisation of crime however, has resulted in increased 
“collection, analysis and publication of crime data from many new sources” 
(Maguire, 2007, p. 242.). Academic critique of crime statistics has also 
influenced change in data collection practise.  For example, Bottomley and 
Coleman (1981) identify that police recording methods can actually influence 
these statistics and create inaccurate data that fail to reflect criminal activity. 
Accordingly, changes and improvements have been implemented to both the 
typology of data collected, and the methodology employed. 
 
Ghatak (2008) observes that the “collection, analysis and archiving of data on 
the national population is a critical part of…the rationality of governance of 
modern states” (p.32). Accordingly, the collection and publication of crime 
data has, and continues to be, the remit of the public sector. For example, the 
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Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate produce a 
number of „thematic‟ statistical publications, in addition to the annually 
produced paper which combines crime survey and police statistics (Walker, 
Kershaw & Nicholas, 2006; Office for National Statistics, 2012). The thematic 
reports relevant to the recording and measurement of fraud will be discussed 
in the subsequent segment of this review. 
 
These official data are subject to criticism, specifically that on occasions they 
can be skewed, thus presenting what appears to be a significant change in 
criminal activity, rather than reflecting the changes in the data collection 
process (Maguire, 2007, p. 257).  Koffman (1996, p. 1) is more dismissive, 
arguing that official figures are not an objective measure of crime. Attempts 
have been made to clarify the recording methodology. One example being the 
implementation of the Perks Committee (Departmental Committee on Criminal 
Statistics, 1967) recommendation to issue revised guidance to try and achieve 
consistency in recording (Home Office, 1971). Unfortunately, this guidance 
created different inconsistencies resulting in further changes to the counting 
rules in 1980, and again in 1998. The latter revision implemented 
amendments to counting within the British Crime Survey, whereby statistics 
reflect the number of victims wherever possible (Maguire, 2007, pp. 259-260). 
This modification has had minimal impact on the measurement of financial 
fraud within official crime statistics, because monetary value of loss is more 
significant than the number of victims. For instance, a prolific credit card 
fraudster‟s activities may result in the recording of multiple offences, but with a  
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combined loss figure of a few thousand pounds. Whereas one single victim of 
“boiler room fraud” (Levi, 2008, p. 403) may lose hundreds of thousands of 
pounds. Debatably, this evidences a lack of understanding of fraud by those 
charged with developing crime data collection strategies. 
  
A further review of crime statistics was commissioned by the Home Office in 
response to the changing requirements of crime control practise, for example, 
intelligence led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008). The report argues that a new 
approach is required whereby the problem is first identified, and then a 
suitable data collection plan formulated (Simmons, 2000, p. ii). To further 
improve the reliability of these data, National Crime Recording Standards 
were introduced in April 2002, the most significant change being a shift from 
an evidential to a prima facae principle (Maguire, 2007, p. 292). The impact 
being a requirement for police to record all crime reports, as opposed to 
discounting those they believed to be “mistaken” (Burrows, Turling, Mackie, 
Lewis & Taylor, 2000, p. 74). A further review of crime statistics conducted 
independently on behalf of the Home Office concludes that there are still 
significant flaws in current police recording processes, whilst also identifying 
growing gaps in national figures and limited coverage of the British Crime 
Survey (Smith, 2006, pp. 7-9), thus suggesting there is still more scope for 
improvement. 
 
One important issue concerning all government statistics is that of trust (Duffy, 
Hall & Williams, 2005), which is particularly relevant to crime statistics 
(Statistics Commission 2005; Statistics Commission 2006). The Statistics 
 77 
Commission (2005, p.4) observe that the flow of statistical messages from the 
Home Office are regulated to the extent that, sometimes policy responses are 
issued in advance of the statistics. Accordingly, the Commission recommends 
a distancing between differing functions, namely that the Home Office 
statistical function “should be located at arms length” from policy functions 
(Statistics Commission, 2006, p. 6). Smith (2006) draws similar conclusions, 
arguing that the governance, management and organisation of the Police and 
Home Office should be revised to offer assurance of independence and 
integrity of statistics.  
 
In conclusion, I maintain that although these data make interesting reading, 
they carry a sizeable caveat in relation to accuracy and usefulness when 
forecasting patterns and trends. The principal flaw being in the collection 
methodology, data being gathered by “busy people for a variety of purposes” 
(Maguire, 2007, p. 267), which renders them of minimal value for the objective 
of forecasting patterns and trends. The key issue is that these data are reliant 
upon the victim reporting the crime. This potential for undercounting is 
evidenced by  the 2006/07 Survey of Crime in England and Wales, which 
identifies that 71% of respondents did not report the crime to the police 
because they perceived the crime to be trivial or that the police could not, or 
would not do anything about it (Nicholas, Kershaw & Walker, 2007, p. 26). 
Furthermore, there are a considerable range of crime typologies excluded 
from official statistics, and of those offences that are reported, bias exists in 
both the reporting and recording (Walker, 1995, p. 5). Consequently, the 
reliability of these statistics is best summed up by Barclay (1995), who 
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observes that “no-one knows the true extent of crime in this country” (p. 1). 
Maguire (2012) does offer a solution, arguing that “any attempt to present the 
national state of crime through any statistical measure…should focus on more 
serious and more reliably measurable offences” (p. 239). Having considered 
official recorded data, this review will now explore crime surveys. 
 
Crime Surveys 
 
Social surveys are described as democratic instruments used to collect data 
on individual‟s fears and experiences of crime (Young, 1992, p. 50). The trend 
towards a victim focused approach emerged during the 1980s and directed 
attention towards the offence and away from the offender (Maguire, 2007,     
p. 250). As a result, the first British Crime Survey (BCS) was conducted in 
1982 (Hough & Mayhew, 1983). This has now become an annual publication 
(Spalek, 2007, p. 6), complemented by local surveys (Maguire, 2007, p. 249), 
and is currently known as the Crime Survey of England and Wales. For the 
initial 20 years following its launch, “a fundamental requirement in the 
management of the British Crime Survey has been to maintain: 
 
1. The routine monitoring of crime rates; 
2. Measuring and understanding these crime rates, and 
3. Researching other crimes that are new or strangely neglected” 
(Sutton, 2007, p. 244) 
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The sampling frame used within the BCS utilises the Postcode Address File, 
because this is believed to offer a more accurate representation of the 
population than the Electoral Register (Foster, 1994; Bolling, Grant & 
Donovan, 2008 p. 9). The BCS is considered to provide unique information on 
the reporting and recording of crime, but also on public fears of crime and 
attitudes to the police (Bottomley & Coleman, 1995, p. 45). 
 
A significant criticism of national crime surveys is offered by Sutton (2007), 
who contends that, 
 
“such work is increasingly commissioned merely to 
service the needs of ministers and their advisers in 
order to comply with short term and narrowly focused 
political agendas” (p. 257).  
 
I suggest that this observation might also be levelled at fraud measurement 
within the public sector, whereby such exercises may be politically biased and 
under representing losses through inaccurate counting may actually suite a 
particular political agenda. 
 
Smith (2006) identifies limitations in the BCS, in particular that it excludes 
those under sixteen years old and those not living in „normal‟ households, for 
example student accommodation and nurses accommodation (p. 10). 
Furthermore, because the BCS and official crime statistics do not cover 
exactly the same crime areas, making a comparison is difficult (Maguire, 
 80 
2007, p. 268). Sutton (2007) argues that “administrative criminologists 
currently design and control national crime surveys and then use these 
findings to shape their work” (p. 245). A solution would be to “replace this     
in-bred administrative criminology with a more widely informed, up to date, 
and comprehensive policy-orientated criminology that has more external input 
from expert academics” (Sutton, 2007, p.245). Sutton‟s observation is relevant 
to this research, which advocates a more accurate mechanism for measuring 
fraud, which is up to date and academically informed. Furthermore, it may be 
suggested that, apart from generic crime statistics, some existing fraud 
measurement methodologies are politically influenced and maintained by 
administrative criminologists, thus resulting in the identifiable omissions within 
state produced crime data. This review will now move on to consider the 
recording of fraud within official crime statistics. 
 
Fraud within Crime Statistics 
 
The main source of fraud data within crime statistics is provided by the police, 
who have recorded fraud and forgery offences since the nineteenth century 
(Simmons & Dodd, 2003, p. 63). Police recorded crime data “provides a count 
of fraud, based on legal definitions and according to National Crime 
Recording Standards and Home Office Counting Rules”, however they are 
“generally considered to be a poor indication of the real level and trends” 
(Hoare, 2007, p. 265). This limited representation results from the fact that  
fraud and forgery offences are particularly susceptible to underreporting (Allen 
et al, 2005, p. 1; Coleman & Moynihan, 1996 p. 8), often because victims are 
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unaware of the fraud, or elect not to report the incident to the police (Fraud 
Review Team, 2006, p. 7).  Newburn (2007) draws a similar conclusion 
concerning underreporting, observing that for a crime to be reported it has to 
be „known‟, and on occasions where a victim has been defrauded of a small 
sum of money they may not be aware of it (p. 57). Accordingly, this offence 
may not find its way into either the official crime statistics or victim surveys, 
thus contributing to the „dark figure of fraud‟. This aforementioned „dark figure‟ 
may also be exacerbated by the counting rules for fraud offences, which 
actually limit their contribution to the overall picture of crime, because, as 
previously discussed, these figures fail to take account of the size of the 
monetary value involved (Maguire, 1994, p. 252). 
 
One exception is credit and debit card fraud data produced by the Home 
Office which uses data supplied by UK Payments (formerly Association for 
Payment Clearing Services), because this fraud typology is often reported 
direct to the card issuer rather than the police (Nicholas, Kershaw & Walker, 
2007, p. 86). In fact, Maguire (2007) observes that “only an estimated 5 per 
cent of fraudulent credit card transactions are reported to the police”             
(p. 282). These data are now incorporated into the Crime in England and 
Wales report (Office of National Statistics, 2012, p. 89). The principal 
explanation for this level of reliability is that the credit card fraud is likely to be 
reported because the consumer no longer bears any financial liability once 
reported to the card issuer. The crime statistics produced by the Office of 
National Statistics also include fraud data from the National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureau; however these data are “subject to ongoing development before they 
 82 
should be seen as providing an authoritative measure of fraud” (Office of 
National Statistics, 2012, p. 89).   
 
Following the introduction of the Fraud Act 2006, the way in which the police 
record crime has changed due to the introduction of an economic crime 
category (Maguire, 2012, p. 213). This is encouraging because it raises the 
profile of fraud within official crime statistics, however changes in this 
recording process means that “year on year comparisons are only possible 
from 2007/08 onwards” (Office of National Statistics, 2012, p. 60). A further 
development which may also assist in reducing the „dark figure‟ results from 
the National Statistician‟s  review of Crime Statistics in England and Wales 
(National Statistician, 2011), which identifies fraud as a significant gap within 
official crime statistics, and that data should be provided from additional 
sources. One positive development in terms of fraud reporting is that from 
April 2013 the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau took over full responsibility 
for recording all fraud offences from the police (Office of National Statistics, 
2012, p. 59). 
 
Fraud in Crime Surveys 
 
Maxfield Hough and Mayhew (2007) suggest that interviewing offenders can 
reveal information about the perpetrators of volume frauds which in turn may 
lead to a more precisely defined target population resulting in better counts (p. 
313). Jansson (2007) suggests that the BCS “is used to examine new or 
emerging types of crime such as fraud” (p. 30). However, the BCS only covers 
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debit and credit card fraud, and more recently has been expanded to include 
identity fraud and mass marketing fraud. I suggest that the inclusion of the 
latter does not necessarily assist the calculation of the economic cost of fraud, 
because identity theft is a modus operandi that enables the criminal to 
facilitate fraud by the use of either a fictitious or hijacked identity. Hoare 
(2007) argues that a significant difficulty in using crime surveys to measure 
fraud is the delay between the fraudulent act and its discovery, consequently, 
in terms of the BCS, “respondents may be victimised by fraud at the time of 
the interview, but be unaware of the fact” (p. 268). The author further argues 
that “evolving crimes, such as internet fraud can be difficult to keep up with on 
a large scale continuous survey” (p. 267). A similar observation is also offered 
by Mann & Sutton (1998), who contend that national crime surveys should 
focus more on technological changes such as the internet, which opens up 
new opportunities for criminality (p. 225). This criticism is particularly relevant 
to the measurement of fraud, because evidence suggests that fraudsters are 
frequently turning to cyber crime because the internet offers a quick and 
effective medium for their scams (Thomas & Loader, 2003). Consequently, to 
be of value, it is imperative that the BCS keeps up to date with new and 
emerging crimes, such as cybercrime, which can be achieved by asking 
questions on “the most important and up to date subject matter” (Sutton, 
2007, p. 250).  
 
A further omission within the BCS, thus further contributing to „the dark figure 
of fraud‟, is that it surveys individuals and excludes fraud against businesses 
(Blunt & Hand, 2007, p. 7). There have however, been surveys conducted by 
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private sector organisations (British Retail Consortium, 2009; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011), that have attempted to measure fraud by 
surveying a random selection of businesses. These surveys are somewhat 
unreliable due to their small or unrepresentative sample, and the lack of 
consistency between methodologies employed.  
 
There have however been some Government led victimization and offender 
surveys that have incorporated fraud offences within the data gathering 
process, thus making some progress in illuminating the „dark figure of fraud‟.  
The 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS) (Budd, Sharp & 
Mayhew, 2005)  “was the first nationally representative self report offending 
survey to cover fraud crime, providing information from an offender‟s 
perspective” (Hoare, 2007, p. 265). The survey includes “credit and debit card 
fraud and also explores benefit fraud, income tax fraud and insurance fraud” 
(Hoare, 2007, p. 265). The findings of this first survey are combined with 
supplementary modules in the 2002/03 BCS which asks respondents about 
fraud and technology crimes, which are presented as a thematic report (Allen 
et al, 2005). The exercise was repeated in the 2004/05 BCS and an updated 
report issued (Wilson, Patterson, Powell & Hembury, 2006).  
 
The first commercial victimization survey was conducted in 1994       
(Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995), however the follow up was not conducted until 
2002 (Shury, Speed, Vivian, Kuechel & Nicholas, 2005). According to Maguire 
(2007), this provides “a new source of information about theft and fraud 
against businesses” (p. 282). Surveys of this nature and the aforementioned 
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report on fraud and technology crimes do offer some useful information, but 
offer minimal assistance in terms of eradicating the „dark figure of fraud‟ 
simply because they are not produced on a regular enough basis and require 
an increased sample size. Furthermore, in respect of the commercial 
victimization survey, the questions concerning fraud are located amongst 
those relating to crime typologies that may be considered of higher impact 
and consequently may be overlooked. Arguably, to develop a more informed 
picture of the extent and nature of fraud, surveys should be conducted more 
frequently and be fraud specific. 
 
I close by suggesting that to make inroads into reducing the dark figure of 
fraud, there is a need to increase awareness of fraud as a crime, place more 
emphasis on the importance of reporting it, and in the case of organisations, a 
“memorandum of understanding” issued by the police that may help “clarify 
any dilemmas directors have” about reporting fraud (Higson, 1999, p.2). 
These proposals will actually contribute to a more accurate picture of fraud 
within official crime and survey data because improved awareness may result 
in increased reporting of fraud related crime to the police, or more answers in 
the affirmative when being surveyed, and an increase in organisations 
conducting fraud loss measurement exercises. This chapter will now discuss 
the literature inclusion and exclusion criteria of the fraud data publications that 
will be subsequently critiqued. 
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Sources (Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria) 
 
When deciding upon the publications for review, to produce a more holistic 
viewpoint, it was important to move outside fraud and examine crime reporting 
data, victim survey, and crime survey documents, paying particular attention 
to data collection methodologies and the reliability of data. The next logical 
step was to examine fraud as a sub-set of these data, and reviewing these 
documents proved illuminating when formulating the research argument and 
project design. Nevertheless, due to word count limitations, a detailed 
discussion of all these documents has not been possible. Accordingly, the 
documents selected for inclusion are restricted to fraud data output 
publications and critiques of fraud measurement. 
 
Search Strategy 
 
To garner relevant documents for this review, the following sources were  
explored: 
 Google. 
 Google Scholar. 
 Google Books. 
 Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts. 
 Sage Full Text Criminology Journals. 
 Cambridge Scientific Abstract Database.  
 Birmingham City University Library catalogue. 
 „My iLibrary E-books‟. 
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Below are the „key-words‟ used to identify relevant material: 
 
 Fraud. 
 Counter fraud. 
 Definition of Fraud. 
 Fraud Act.  
 Measuring Fraud. 
 Fraud Measurement. 
 Public sector fraud. 
 Private sector fraud. 
 Fraud in Charities. 
 Charitable fraud.  
 
The bibliographies contained with documents retrieved were used as an 
additional source of material. 
 
Identified Methodologies and Issues 
 
Introduction 
 
Before reporting the results of this current review, I will initially discuss the 
existing typologies of measuring fraud identified, before moving on to explore 
the issues requiring remedial action. These have informed the classification of 
fraud data outputs, which will be discussed in the following sections. I 
commence by exploring the „top down and bottom up‟ approaches. 
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Top Down or Bottom Up? 
 
 Levi et al (2007, p. 19) and Levi and Burrows (2008, p. 306) identify two fraud 
measurement methodologies, “bottom up” and “top down”. The former is used 
to calculate the costs of fraud from an organisational perspective, whereas a 
top down methodology estimates fraud from a national perspective (Levi & 
Burrows, 2008, p.306). An example of the former is where an annual loss 
figure is merely the sum of all reported frauds. A „top down‟ macro approach 
involves the creation of an estimated figure using linked datasets, possibly 
sourced externally, which consequently renders it more exposed to error, and 
limitations in statistical certainty than a bottom up approach. 
 
Gee, Button and Brooks (2009a) identify two typologies of fraud 
measurement, a percentage loss rate, and secondly a fraud frequency        
rate (p. 7). The percentage loss rate (PLR) shows the proportion of 
expenditure lost to fraud and error, whereas a fraud frequency rate (FFR) 
details the frequency of fraud and error. The authors correctly point out that 
the same exercise can produce different PLR and FFR figures, dependant 
upon the value of fraudulent items of expenditure (p.7).  
 
Finally, as previously suggested, another fraud measurement methodology 
with limitations calculates losses based upon successfully detected cases. 
Gee (2010b) observes that “no unlawful act has a 100% detection rate and 
the essence of fraud is deception and concealment” (p. 24). Interestingly, 
organisations conducting measurement exercises using common sampling 
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have identified that detection rates rarely exceed one in thirty (Gee, 2010b,   
p. 24), which offers additional evidence to suggest that this approach to 
measurement is flawed. What gives further cause for concern, and further 
evidences the need for a sea change in the approach to measurement, is the 
fact that the Cabinet Office‟s Fraud, Error and Debt (FED) Taskforce (HM 
Government, 2012), who are seeking to “reduce the impact of fraud and error” 
(p. 6) are still advocating the use of this methodology, rather than compelling 
central government departments to undertake “proactive” fraud loss risk 
measurement exercises” (p.17). 
 
Obstacles to Accurate Measurement 
 
Introduction 
 
“Levels of Fraud are extremely difficult to quantify.”  
(NFSA, 2008, p. 1) 
 
The Fraud Review Team (2006) identify two problems when measuring fraud, 
these being: 
 
 Having clear definitions of what constitutes fraud. 
 Having robust and transparent mechanisms for measuring fraud. 
(p. 23) 
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Interestingly, research into strategies and techniques for detecting fraud by 
Silverstone and Davia (2005) cited by Hoare (2007, p. 277), identifies that 
only 20% of fraud “is exposed and public” another 40% is “known but not 
publicised” and the remaining 40% is “undetected”. This is a 'detection and 
reporting' issue, but in terms of measurement, can be addressed by a 
common sampling approach, which will be discussed further within this 
chapter. 
 
Under- Reporting 
 
Under-reporting often results from a reluctance to accept fraud losses as a 
legitimate business cost and is considered a significant barrier to accurate 
fraud measurement (Foresight Crime Prevention Panel, 2006, p.10). Ernst 
and Young (2000) suggest that within the private sector, this is due to “fear of 
adverse publicity, the perception of customers and shareholders, or perhaps 
just the embarrassment at having to admit to being defrauded” (p. 4). 
Similarly, Maxfield, Hough and Mayhew (2007) contend that “companies could 
be particularly resistant to saying much about fraud” (pp. 306-309). Jones and 
Levi (2000) remark that “there will always be companies that do not contribute 
data”, therefore fraud statistics “should be viewed as the lowest reliable figure, 
rather than a true full blown picture” (p. 9).   
 
Russell (1998) reports survey findings that reveal “only a fifth of finance 
directors…would report an incident of suspected fraud” (p. 5), because of a  
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“concern that it would become public knowledge” (p. 6). Blunt and Hand 
(2007) suggest that companies are reticent to report fraud because they are 
concerned about: 
 
 Length and cost of legal proceedings. 
 Risk to the company‟s reputation. 
 Hazy definitions of fraud. 
 Belief that authorities place a low priority on fraud. 
 The easiest option may be to dismiss the individual concerned. 
              (p. 24) 
 
Similar explanations are offered by Higson (1999), who suggests that 
companies are reluctant to report fraud due to: 
 
 The impression of the word fraud. 
 The vagueness of directors‟ responsibilities. 
 Confusion over the reason for reporting suspected fraud (is it to 
gain the magnitude of fraud, or to deter potential perpetrators? 
Or to punish fraudsters. 
       (p.2) 
 
This reticence by companies to report crime is not specific to fraud however, 
as evidenced by the 2012 Commercial Victimization Survey which reveals low 
reporting rates on many crimes including assaults, theft by persons unknown 
and thefts by employees (Home Office, 2013, p. 21). To achieve a more 
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accurate picture of private sector fraud, mandating measurement may be an 
option worth considering, this being supported by an awareness campaign on 
the associated business benefits. This in turn may result in companies 
becoming more willing not just to measure, but also to report fraud, thus 
providing a more accurate representation of private sector fraud in UK loss 
data and also official crime statistics, thus contributing to reducing the „dark 
figure of fraud‟.  
 
Undetected Fraud 
 
When discussing undetected fraud, whereby fraud has been committed but 
the victim is unaware of the fact, Blunt and Hand (2007) observe that “one 
definition of fraud ensures that we can only identify fraud at the end of the 
legal process…thus estimating undetected fraud is a logical contradiction”   
(p. 23). Interestingly, Levi (1987) identifies a link between undetected and 
under-reported fraud, suggesting that the victim may believe that “he or she 
has been unfortunate or has made a commercial misjudgement” (p. 27), 
rather than being defrauded. 
 
One problem identified is that there are numerous grey areas. For example, 
two activities that might be committed with fraudulent intent but may also go 
undetected are: 
 
 Default on personal loans or credit cards where the borrower 
had no intention of repaying. 
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 Bankruptcy or Individual Voluntary Arrangements used as a 
means of avoiding debts. 
(Blunt & Hand, 2007, p. 23) 
 
Arguably, the above should be considered within a common sample during 
any measurement exercise and incorporated into loss data.  
 
Costs of Measuring Fraud 
 
The costs of measurement exercises are dependant upon: 
 
 The frequency of the estimating exercise. 
 The sample sizes checked. 
 The work involved in checking each case sampled. 
 The work involved in validating the results. 
 
(NAO, 2008a, p. 15) 
 
The NAO (2008a) also observe that due to costs, in smaller departments and 
agencies, a one off estimate or one produced at longer intervals may be 
sufficient (p. 15). Nevertheless, despite such cost implications, the advantage 
of regular measurement exercises is actually acknowledged by the NAO 
(2008), who argue that they enable a department to “track changes over time 
in the estimated fraud loss” (p. 15), thus enabling organisations to evaluate 
the effectiveness of reduction strategies. 
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Statistically Valid Loss Measurement Surveys 
 
Introduction 
 
This appraisal will initially examine fraud data outputs which following 
evaluation are considered to contain sound loss measurement methodologies. 
The selection criteria has been informed by critical evaluation of methodology; 
specifically, data sources, sampling methodologies, and levels of statistical 
confidence. Interestingly, this section only contains reports produced by two 
public sector organisations. I commence however, with a discussion of the 
drivers behind the development of public sector fraud loss measurement. 
 
Public Sector Fraud Loss Measurement: 
 
Public sector fraud first came to prominence with the publication of the HM 
Treasury (1989) report Government Accounting. Fraud subsequently became 
a significant issue following the publication of Managing the Risk of Fraud: A 
Guide for Managers (HM Treasury, 1997), which required government 
departments to identify levels of fraud committed against them. Managing the 
Risk of Fraud: Assurance Control and Risk contains further guidance, 
including advice on “evaluating the scale of fraud risks” (HM Treasury, 2003, 
p. 4). This review contends that these directives explain why certain public 
sector organisations have developed surveys with sound methodologies. It is 
apparent however, that not all central government departments have 
embraced these instructions, resulting in limited data, a theme which will be 
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developed later in this chapter. In terms of public sector methodologies, 
Maguire (2007) offers the pertinent observation that most organisations 
estimate fraud losses using differing methodologies, including common 
sampling, rather than “simply analysing detected cases” (p. 282). In support of 
this contention, I suggest that the DWP and NHS are the only two government 
departments conducting statistically valid fraud loss measurement surveys. 
The former will now be discussed. 
 
Department for Work and Pensions 
 
The DWP “began a continuous rolling measurement of Income Support and 
Jobseekers Allowance in 1997, recognising their vulnerability to fraud loss” 
(Hoare, 2007, p. 269). When examining data quality, the Benefit Fraud 
Inspectorate (1998) conclude that there are “a number of weaknesses in the 
way fraud is measured” (p. 19). Sainsbury (1998) further suggests that 
despite announcements of a reduction in fraudulent benefit claims by 
consecutive governments of the late nineties, “whether we now have an 
accurate idea of the amount of fraud in the system…is more debatable” (p. 4). 
 
Some of these historical shortcomings in data quality have been addressed, 
and more statistically robust estimates of losses are the outcome. For 
example, Fraud and Error in the Benefits System: April 2007 to March 2008 
(DWP, 2008) provides estimates for the means tested benefits Income 
Support, Jobseekers Allowance, Pension Credit and Housing Benefit, based 
on “analysis of random samples drawn from the benefit caseloads” (p. 2). The 
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data presented are subject to some “statistical uncertainty”, which is 
quantified in the form of “95% confidence intervals” (p. 2). A lack of statistical 
robustness of certain measures is acknowledged, for example, assumptions 
being made about benefits which have not been “regularly reviewed” (p. 18). 
This trend has continued, with extant data being subject to “statistical 
sampling uncertainties” and that “a proportion of continuously measured 
benefit expenditure cannot be captured by the sampling process” (DWP, 
2012, p. 9). Even taking into account these shortcomings, which will be 
discussed later, I contend that through the use of continuous rolling 
measurement excercises, DWP data are far more statistically reliable than 
any other government department, with the exception of historical NHS data.  
 
Interestingly, the National Audit Office (NAO) (2008b) report Progress in 
Tackling Benefit Fraud considers that measurement frequency is 
“proportionate to the value of expenditure and the assessed likelihood of 
fraud…occurring in each benefit type” (p. 14). The report does however 
identify limitations in DWP data, observing that “the size of the sample of 
cases examined can only distinguish regional variations; reliable data is not 
available at district or office level” (p.14). This criticism of the DWP is 
significant, and arguably suggests increased value being placed on micro 
data, because when previously undertaking an international comparison of 
fraud and error, the NAO suggested that by using large samples, the DWP 
“measures fraud and error more comprehensively than the rest of the 
countries” (NAO, 2006, p. 5). It is noteworthy that the NAO revised its opinion 
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on sample sizes, and is something that should inform future revisions to 
measurement processes.  
 
One final shortcoming of benefit fraud data is the fact that DWP only conduct 
measurement on a continuous basis of benefits accounting for only 27% of 
total expenditure (DWP, 2012, p. 7). “Occasional reviews” are conducted on 
benefits that account for 59% of total expenditure and the remaining benefits 
accounting for 14% of total expenditure go “unreviewed” (DWP, 2012, p. 8). 
When considering that the unreviewed benefits actually accounted for 
expenditure in 2011/12 of £22.5 billion (DWP, 2012, p. 8), this further 
suggests that there is more work required to establishing a more accurate 
picture of benefit fraud. 
 
Finally, when comparing the measurement methodology, it is worth noting that 
DWP rely upon a criminal based evidential test informed by the conditions of 
benefit entitlement, thus placing emphasis on beyond reasonable doubt. 
Whereas, the NHS rely upon a civil definition of fraud which applies the 
balance of probabilities, which will now be discussed. 
 
National Health Service 
 
When evaluating fraud measurement by the NHS, Levi and Burrows (2008)  
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observe that, 
 “considerable progress has been made in specific 
fields”  
(p. 309) 
 
The task of measurement is challenging, fraud being committed by patients, 
pharmacists, dentists, opticians, doctors, hospital consultants, and staff (NHS, 
1999, pp. 34-37). This requires a significant commitment in terms of 
measurement exercises, and because of the volume and diverse nature of 
fraud, the decision to measure each area of spend separately is sound. 
 
Within each individual measurement exercise, the NHS Counter Fraud 
Service (NHSCFS) validate data on a case-by-case basis, decisions being 
made using a civil definition of fraud (Hoare, 2007, p. 270). This may be 
considered a tactical decision because the civil burden of proof is based upon 
the balance of probabilities, and thus any measurement exercise may appear 
to uncover more fraud than by applying the test of „beyond reasonable doubt‟. 
On the other hand, because the NHS are required to measure such a wide 
range of estimated fraud the decision to adopt a definition applicable to all is a 
logical decision, and worth remembering when considering a definition of 
fraud for the purpose of loss measurement across all sectors. 
 
To further progress the measurement strategy, Countering Fraud in the NHS, 
identifies the need to “develop a robust measure of the amount of fraud that 
exists” to accurately target “available resources at areas most at risk” (NHS, 
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1999, p.10). The strategy initially concentrates upon one area of fraud, this 
being prescription fraud (NHS, 1999, p.10) in order to gain understanding of 
measurement processes and develop best practice. This is prudent because 
prescription fraud is simple to measure, using means tested benefits data, 
thus avoiding the production of “heavily qualified estimated figures” (p. 31). 
 
Countering Fraud in the NHS: Identifying the nature and scale of the problem 
unveils the Risk Measurement Project (RMP) which measures fraud using 
“statistically valid samples of cases in each area of NHS spending” (NHS 
CFSMS, 2001a, p. 2). Most importantly, this strategy acknowledges that 
“information about the money that is lost to fraud” may be used to illustrate 
“where savings have been made”, which may then “inform the development of 
preventative measures” (NHS CFSMS, 2001a, pp. 2-3). This approach of 
publicly acknowledging the value of fraud loss data is sadly lacking within 
other government departments. 
 
In conclusion, an improvement in the accuracy of fraud loss data through the 
use of common sampling (NHS, CFSMS, 2001b, p. 31) has enabled effective 
targeting of the counter fraud tactical resource (Gee, 2010b, p. 25). One 
concern however, is that having made progress in developing measurement 
strategies, the NHS have not published any loss figures since 2006 (Phillips, 
2010; Gee, 2010b, p. 25). The only NHS specific data contained within the 
Annual Fraud Indicator (NFA, 2013), is that of patient charges fraud (p. 44). 
Any other NHS specific fraud appears to have been absorbed into the 
remaining fraud by typology data, which therefore offers a less accurate 
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picture of healthcare fraud than available prior to the NFA collating fraud loss 
data. This chapter will now examine the measurement of detected fraud. 
 
Measuring Detected Fraud 
 
Introduction 
 
This discussion will now examine reports utilising data from successful 
investigations, where fraud has been proven based upon the evidential test 
applied by each organisation, the inadequacies of this methodology having 
already been discussed within this and the preceding chapter. There are 
additional reports that incorporate detected fraud, but have been allocated an 
alternative classification within this review. Paradoxically, the only report 
falling within this section that relies wholly on detected cases is published by 
the Audit Commission. 
 
Audit Commission 
 
The Audit Commission‟s (2010) report Protecting the Public Purse 2010 
contains the results from the survey of “detected fraud committed against 
councils” (p. 10). In contrast to previous surveys, the Audit Commission 
“made submission of 2009/10 survey data mandatory” (p.10). Of significance 
however, is the statistic that a return rate of 94 per cent was achieved (p.10). 
The response rate for the subsequent report improved to 99 per cent (Audit 
Commission, 2011).  I maintain however, that if the Audit Commission fails to 
 101 
achieve total compliance when mandating reporting of fraud losses, this 
further evidences the need for a statute that mandates fraud measurement, 
but also contains sufficient penalties for non compliance.  
 
One interesting finding is that despite the Audit Commission offering a 
definition of fraud (p.10), “some councils do not record all types of fraud, or do 
not always classify all fraudulent activity as fraud” (Audit Commission, 2010, 
p.11). There has been some improvement, with public bodies “classifying 
more incidents correctly as fraud” (Audit Commission, 2011, p. 7). 
Nevertheless, I suggest if fraud is to be measured accurately, there is need 
for both a recognised definition of fraud and standard of accuracy that are 
applied when conducting mandatory loss measurement exercises. In 
conclusion, I contend that these documents are of interest in terms of 
comparing the levels fraud investigation activity by individual local authorities. 
However, they fail to offer a full and accurate picture of local government 
fraud losses, and may continue to do so until all local authorities are 
compelled to correctly record all frauds.   
 
Guestimates 
 
Introduction 
 
This section examines fraud loss publications containing data that are 
considered little more than guestimates. For the purpose of this review, 
documents falling within this criterion contain data collected using an unsound 
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collection plan, or provide significant caveats on reliability, or limited 
disclosure of methodology. This segment is mainly populated by reports 
produced by private sector organisations advertising their accounting and 
auditing capability, rather than collecting meaningful fraud loss data. This 
discussion will however, commence with the public sector documents which 
worryingly fall into this category despite the government strategy to improve 
public sector fraud loss data.  
 
Public Sector 
 
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) 
 
The BBC match their data with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister‟s count 
of the number of homes, which is then matched against “TV penetration data” 
supplied by the Broadcasters Audience Research Board (Fraud Review 
Team, 2006, p. 328). The evasion rate totalling £195 million is estimated at 
5.3% “which is a calculation of the number of premises where no licence is 
held but a licence is believed to be needed” (TV Licensing, 2009, p. 8). The 
overall loss figure is very subjective, being reliant upon the accuracy of third 
party data, and no account is taken of whether these dwellings are occupied. 
Consequently the confidence level should be rated as low and the resultant 
data considered nothing more than guestimates. 
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Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) 
 
“Estimates of Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) evasion are derived from periodic 
roadside surveys” (Fraud Review Team, 2006, p. 329).  The evasion rate is 
calculated using Department for Transport vehicle sightings data collected 
annually during June from 250 locations. These data are then compared with 
the licensing status record of each vehicle, enabling a national estimate of 
VED lost through evasion (DVLA, 2009, p. 51). VED evasion is calculated at 
£50m, which equates to less than 1% of total due (DVLA, 2009, p. 9). This 
fails to stand up to scrutiny; firstly, because the sample is limited in terms of 
representation, and secondly, the figure of 1% falls significantly below the 
average public sector loss of 4.57% (Gee, Button & Brooks, 2010a, p. 4). VED 
evasion data harvested using the same methodology is now incorporated into 
the Annual Fraud Indicator, and for 2011/12 was estimated to be £40 million, 
this being 0.7% of revenue (NFA, 2012, p. 52), which when compared with the 
aforementioned average public sector loss, again raises questions on the 
accuracy of these data. 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
 
The FCO investigates fraud relating to operational procedures (Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, 2010); however no specific information is provided on 
what fraud typologies are considered. When attempting to measure fraud, the 
Department‟s main predicament is that data are collected from a wide 
geographical area and they rely upon “data received from third parties” 
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(Hoare, 2007, p. 270). Consequently, data are considered to have very 
minimal statistical confidence, the resultant loss figure being considered 
nothing more than a guestimate and the resultant contribution towards 
constructing an accurate picture of public sector fraud losses is minimal.  
 
Her Majesty‘s Treasury   
 
When developing this taxonomy of fraud loss measurement outputs, the HM 
Treasury‟s (2009a) 2008-2009 Fraud Report “analyses data submitted by 
central government departments and their agencies about fraud and theft 
perpetrated by staff” (p. 5). The findings concentrate upon “fraud relating to 
departments‟ administrative affairs” and exclude “fraud perpetrated by 
external fraudsters” (p. 3). Disappointingly; the findings are only based upon 
data supplied by “45 central government bodies”, which reveals that 20 
departments submitted a nil return (p. 5). When judging the accuracy of public 
sector fraud losses, this observation casts significant doubt on the reliability of 
these data. It is no surprise therefore, that the report includes the caveat that 
it is “not a definitive account of all frauds affecting government departments 
during the relevant period” (p.5). What is uncertain is whether these 
departments have conducted measurement exercises and found no evidence 
of fraud, failed to detect fraud, or simply not bothered measuring and just sent 
a nil return.  
 
I advocate that the lack of suggestion within the report that questions have 
been raised concerning these missing data proffers further evidence to 
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support the argument for mandating fraud measurement within the public 
sector. Furthermore, it is of concern that external fraud is not measured, nor 
any explanation offered concerning its omission. Of equal interest is the fact 
that this document is no longer produced, it being considered to have “served 
its purpose”, and that the Treasury should withdraw, “as the National Fraud 
Authority begins to build and share knowledge in central government” (HM 
Treasury, 2009b). This is a significant development, and it will be interesting 
to see how the NFA addresses the issue of nil returns from departments, 
which clearly cannot be accurate. Should these issues fail to be addressed, I 
suggest mandating public sector fraud measurement is the only option 
available. 
 
Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
 
Introduction 
 
HMRC employ different methodologies when measuring fraud, and similar to 
the NHS, have a large number of inputs and outputs to measure. This review 
will commence by exploring the measurement of taxation losses.  
 
Indirect/Direct Taxation 
 
When measuring indirect taxation, actual tax receipts are compared against a 
potential yield informed by external statistics on consumption. Regrettably, 
these estimates include generous confidence intervals because consumption 
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estimates are uncertain. In contrast, because there is no reliable equivalent 
source for direct taxation, “it is difficult to establish…the value…of this type of 
fraud” (Hoare, 2007, p. 269).  
 
The introduction to Measuring Indirect Tax Losses-2007 advises that 
“estimating the scale of…revenue losses is not only inherently difficult, but 
also a relatively untested area of work for governments in the EU” (HMRC, 
2007, p. 3). Within the updated document Measuring Tax Gaps–2009, HMRC 
(2009) reveal they have “developed estimates for tax gaps for the main direct 
and indirect taxes that are the best possible based on the available 
information” (p. 4). A “top down approach” is used to measure indirect taxes, 
whereby the tax gap is estimated by subtracting tax paid from an estimate of 
revenue due” (p. 5). Due to the uncertainty of the estimates however, 
methodologies are regularly reviewed (p. 4).  
 
The methodology for measuring Value Added Tax (VAT) losses compares 
“the net theoretical tax liabilities with actual VAT receipts, the difference 
between these amounts being known as the VAT gap” (p. 39), which 
disappointingly is also “subject to a degree of uncertainty” (p. 36). 
Consequently, HMRC (2009) advise they are unable to produce a precise 
confidence interval in respect of VAT loss estimates (p. 36). 
 
When discussing Missing Trader Intra-Community VAT fraud, („carousel 
fraud‟), HMRC are vague in describing their measurement methodology, but 
do reveal that a “bottom-up approach” is applied “to estimate attempted fraud 
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and its impact on VAT receipts” (p. 12). Excise gaps also include spirits 
cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco, being defined as the amount of duty and 
VAT not collected due to illicit purchases (p. 13). Losses are measured using 
a “top down technique”, calculating the illicit market as total consumption 
minus legitimate consumption (p. 13). Minimal confidence can be placed in 
these data, HMRC advising that “it is not possible to provide an accurate 
single estimate of the illicit market for spirits and tobacco” (p. 14). 
Interestingly, the Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) (2004) research 
identifies that HMRC estimates of spirits fraud are five times higher than those 
of the Scotch Whisky Association, the conclusion being that “neither method 
could be considered reliable” (p. 8). However, it could be suggested that the 
latter may have a brand investment in underestimating, hence the wide 
discrepancy. A further limitation relates to estimated losses for cigarettes, 
calculated using General Household Survey data which only becomes 
available twelve months after completion of the survey (HMRC, 2007, p. 16). 
Estimates of losses are therefore always behind loss data for other 
commodities, which limits any meaningful aggregated analysis of fraud loss 
data. All figures presented “are subject to statistical uncertainty caused by 
sampling and systematic errors in the data, resulting in estimates that are 
either too low or too high”, thus generating “margins of error within which the 
true value would be expected to lie 95 per cent of the time” (HMRC, 2009,     
p. 36).  
 
A similar caveat is contained within the HMRC (2010) statistical release, 
declaring that the data presented are subject to both random and systematic 
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errors (p. 4). This suggests that a revision of collection methodology and data 
sources is urgently required to facilitate more reliable loss measurement. The 
continuing issue is the reliance upon third party data, many of which have 
limited confidence levels, which may skew HMRC fraud loss data. Arguably, 
this lack of a robust data collection methodology by such an important public 
sector department further evidences a pressing requirement to mandate fraud 
measurement to a prescribed level of accuracy. 
 
Tax Credits 
 
Child and Working Tax Credits presents the results from the first random 
enquiry programme measuring tax credit fraud and error (HMRC, 2006, p. 2). 
A random stratified sample of 4,500 cases is reviewed, the results being 
“scaled up…to estimate the overall level of error and fraud in the tax credit 
system” (p. 2). Fraud levels are calculated to a 95% confidence level (p. 3), 
but subject to “sampling errors” (p. 8), which cast doubt upon data accuracy. 
Furthermore, the rigour may also be questioned because not all cases in the 
original sample were used (p. 9). Lamentably, a review of extant data output 
(HMRC, 2010), indicates that despite a developing awareness of the 
limitations of fraud loss data, no progress has been made to improve the 
robustness of these data. I suggest this further evidences the need to 
mandate public sector fraud measurement. 
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Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
 
“Right back to the time of Samuel Pepys and before, 
the task of supplying and supporting military forces 
has attracted thieves and fraudsters” 
                                         (MOD, 2011, p. 1) 
 
The MOD „Defence Fraud Analysis Unit‟ (DFAU) “provides estimates based 
on reports from line managers or whistleblowers” (Hoare, 2007, p. 266). There 
is limited clarity in the data offered, and it is difficult to establish exactly how 
many of the cases reported on actually involve fraud as opposed to theft. 
Accordingly, these data should be attributed a low confidence level, and 
considered nothing more than a guestimate. 
 
Private Sector 
 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
 
The ABI (2009) research brief General Insurance Claims Fraud estimates that 
undetected general insurance claims fraud “totals £1.9 billion a year” (p. 1). In 
estimating the cost of undetected fraud the ABI employ an amalgam of data  
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collection techniques including: 
 
 “ Interviews with: 
- ten insurers accounting for over half the retail and commercial           
general insurance markets. 
- other bodies (including IFB, CIFAS, and MIB) who have relevant    
knowledge in this area. 
- several of the major loss adjustors. 
  A survey of customers – as part of the ABI‟s Savings and 
Protection quarterly survey - asking about attitudes and behaviours in 
respect of general insurance fraud. 
     A review of the relevant literature, including that relating to the 
relationship between crime and the economy (and by implication the 
likely impact of the recession).” 
         (p. 2) 
 
 This data collection plan is more comprehensive than those applied by most 
other organisations in the public and private sectors, estimates being obtained 
of “total fraud risk” during interviews with insurers (p. 2). This is a good 
starting point, but unfortunately, much of it is based upon qualitative surveys. 
The quantitative data however, do come with some statistical confidence 
which is sadly lacking from most private sector produced reports. 
 
 
 
 111 
UK Payments (Formerly Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS)  
  
Fraud the Facts, which contains payment industry fraud loss data, is 
published twice yearly (APACS, 2009, p. 2). This area of fraud measurement 
is relatively unique, because there is a high probability that victims report 
fraud, simply because most account holders are likely to identify erroneous 
transactions on their statements. Blunt & Hand (2007) describe these data as 
“comprehensive” (p. 9), a view shared by the FSA (2003), who conclude that 
these “statistics are comprehensive” (p. 14). I contest these findings, because 
it is difficult to assess the reliability and validity of these data due to the source 
not being disclosed, the sampling methods unexplained, and no detail of how 
the figures have been calculated being offered. These are repeated in the 
2012 edition of this report (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2012). Should these 
omissions be addressed, the document would offer an even more robust 
illustration of evidentially supportable fraud losses in this sector. 
 
The review will now evaluate reports categorised as hybrids, these being 
defined as outputs containing data from multiple sectors. I will commence with 
the public sector before moving on to the private sector and conclude with the 
NFA‟s cross sector publication. 
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Hybrid (Public) 
 
The Nature, Extent and Economic Impact of Fraud in the UK   
 
This report “was commissioned by the Association of Chief Police Officers  
and the Home Office to meet the following objectives: 
 
 To determine as accurately as possible… the nature, extent, 
and cost of fraud to the public and private sectors. 
 To assess critically the availability and quality of existing 
evidence on fraud. 
 To recommend appropriate strategies to facilitate the 
comprehensive and consistent recording of data on fraud.” 
                                         (Levi et al, 2007, p. 8) 
 
The authors suggest that to improve the quality of fraud loss data, owners of 
statistical systems should encourage data providers to “expose and better 
estimate undiscovered fraud” (p. 49). Arguably, this final recommendation 
may only be achieved by action that is stronger than just encouragement, 
such as the mandating of fraud loss measurement to a set standard of 
accuracy.  
 
Whilst critiquing extant fraud loss measurement methodologies and offering 
pertinent observations, (Levi et al, 2007, p. 8) also offer their own estimate of 
UK fraud losses (p. 5), collating data from a range of available reports 
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estimating loss. Paradoxically, this appears to be based upon a combination 
of measures, of which all have weaknesses, being identified as such by the 
authors within their report. This suggests there is a culture, whereby when 
discussing fraud losses, there is a perceived need to offer some form of loss 
figure, no matter how statistically robust. 
 
Hybrid (Private Sector) 
 
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) 
 
The Economic and Social Cost of Fraud produced by NERA (2000) “provides 
estimates of expenditure on investigations, court proceedings and 
preventative measures and the amounts of money defrauded across the 
economy” (Brand & Price, 2000, p. 47). This is the “first contemporary cross 
sector snapshot” of the cost of fraud (Doig, 2006, p. 43), dividing it into 
“discovered and undiscovered components” (NERA, 2000, p. 2). Moreover, 
“discovered fraud can then be further subdivided into reported fraud and 
unreported fraud” (p.3). NERA (2000) also suggest that reluctance by firms to 
report fraud may cause data collection problems, which may be rectified by 
using survey evidence (p. 3).  
 
Fraud costs are divided into two types, firstly resource costs, which include 
prevention and detection costs, and secondly transfers, which are simply 
defined as “the amount defrauded” (p.4). The published data “are based on 
the definitions of fraud used by those who have compiled the original 
 114 
statistics”, consequently the figures “may not be strictly comparable with the 
Home Office definition of fraud, or with each other” (NERA, 2000, p. 4). 
Arguably, this significantly limits the value of these data for analysis, because 
the failure to adopt a standard definition of fraud that restricts individual 
interpretation renders any comparison or aggregation of data relatively 
meaningless. 
  
Unsurprisingly, the report has been criticised, Doig (2006) observing there 
was “no review of the methodology used” (p.44). Furthermore, Brand and 
Price (2000) suspect undercounting, noting that “the difficulty of detecting 
some frauds and the limited data collected…led NERA to believe that even 
the higher figure, (of £14 billion), is likely to be an underestimate” (p. 47). 
Equally, Blunt and Hand (2007) observe that NERA offer little discussion 
concerning “uncertainty in measurement” (p. 11). Nevertheless, the NERA 
estimate of fraud was used as a baseline figure for some considerable time 
even though it may only be considered a guestimate.  
 
BDO 
 
BDO‟s (2010) FRAUDTRACK 7 considers cases “that have been through the 
criminal justice system and reported by the media” (p. 2); the inclusion 
criterion being “cases over £50,000 from December 2008 to November 2009” 
(p. 30). This further illustrates the limitations of some private sector produced 
fraud reports, the overall loss figure excluding a significant number of frauds 
because they fall under the report‟s „radar‟. Consequently, the figure produced 
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underestimates the true extent of losses. The credibility of some private sector 
fraud reports, often produced by auditing companies, has been challenged by 
Kirk (2008), who observes that they are often designed specifically to entice 
corporations into using that particular organisation (p. 335).  
 
KPMG Fraud Barometer 
 
KPMG‟s (2010; 2012) Fraud Barometer examines cases relating to “financial 
services, non-financial services, company, government, investors and „other‟” 
(Levi et al, 2007, p. 76). In terms of contributing towards an accurate picture 
of fraud, these data are also of limited value. The principle shortcoming of the 
report is that it measures “fraud cases in court where the loss/claim is a value 
over £100,000” (Fraud Review Team, 2006, p. 32), thus only capturing a 
portion of fraud cases. Again there is a risk of double counting data from other 
fraud measurement exercises supplied by the Serious Fraud Office, banks, 
and government departments. Consequently, KPMG data offers a limited 
contribution in establishing an accurate representation of fraud losses from 
any sector. 
 
Norwich Union 
 
The Fraud Report (Norwich Union, 2005) was produced because no official 
body “currently compiles or publishes comprehensive annual statistics on the 
economic cost of fraud to the UK” (p. 7). The report estimates that in 2004 
fraud cost the UK economy “in the region of £16 billion” (p. 2). Whilst also 
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highlighting the range of wide disparities in estimates of the total cost of fraud 
by non government organisations which range from “£7- 40 billion” (p. 5).  
The methodology employed replicates the NERA (2000) survey by seeking 
updates from the original sources (p. 12). Where extant data are unavailable, 
the original figures are subjected to a 12.4% inflation modifier, as advised by 
the National Statistics Office (p. 12). Conceivably, such a calculation renders 
these data of limited value because they fail to take account of changes in 
levels of fraudulent activity. Furthermore, drawing upon data supplied by 
various private sector organisations and the Serious Fraud Office increases 
the risk of double counting. Consequently, the final loss figure achieved may 
only be considered to be a guestimate.  
 
Hybrid (Cross Sector) 
 
National Fraud Authority– Annual Fraud Indicator 
 
The NFA‟s (2010a) first Annual Fraud Indicator aims to provide “the best 
picture possible” of fraud losses, whilst also acknowledging the estimate “is 
some way from perfect” (p. 3). The report incorporates public and private 
sector data, and estimates fraud losses in the charitable sector (p. 7). NFA 
estimate that fraud cost the UK economy £30.5 billion in 2008, but suggest 
this figure is a significant underestimation because certain organisations only 
measure reported fraud (p. 6), confirming that there is still much work to be 
done in terms of accurate measurement. Significantly, in terms of this 
research, the report suggests there is an urgent need for a standardised 
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measurement of fraud, by identifying the limited value of the figures in terms 
of comparative analysis, because estimates from contributors utilise varying 
definitions and methodologies (p. 6).   
 
This report has been described as “puzzling” by Jim Gee, former chief 
executive of the NHS Counter Fraud service, and the figures for the health 
service considered “extraordinary” (Phillips, 2010). The data in dispute are the 
NFA figure for NHS fraud, which equates to 0.27% of the budget, whereas the 
global average has been calculated at 5.59% for healthcare systems (Phillips, 
2010). Whilst acknowledging these observations, this report does provide a 
useful starting point for developing a more accurate picture of overall fraud 
losses, whilst also illustrating there is more work required to achieve this. The 
principal issue being that all contributing organisations must supply data that 
is statistically valid by applying the same definition of fraud and standard of 
loss measurement. 
 
Some concerns identified within the first report are addressed within the 2011 
edition (NFA, 2011a), it being described as “the most…definitive assessment 
of fraud loss in the UK” (NFA, 2011b, p. 9).  The NFA (2011a) report confirms 
that “work has continued…to develop a more robust and comprehensive 
picture of fraud loss in the UK” (p.5), with fraud being estimated to cost the UK 
£38.4 billion a year (p. 15). What has to be recognised, and this may require 
some education, is that increased and more accurate measurement will result 
in an increased loss figure. There are still data limitations however, the NFA 
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acknowledging that “caution must be taken when using and interpreting the 
figures provided, particularly when drawing comparisons between different  
figures” and that “further work is still needed to improve the robustness and 
granularity of some of the new fraud loss estimates provided in this 
publication” (p. 6). 
 
The NFA (2012, p. 7) Annual Fraud Indicator evidences this, reporting an 
increased overall loss figure of £73 billion. This increase is largely attributed to 
changes in methodology, specifically “direct engagement with UK 
businesses…to improve the comprehensiveness of loss against the private 
sector” (p. 6).  The report suggests this figure now includes an estimate of 
undetected fraud within the private sector (p. 5). When examining the 
methodology however, the figures do not appear particularly robust. 
Respondents of an online survey were asked to estimate how much fraud 
there could be in their organisation as a percentage of turnover. This estimate 
ranged from 3% (91 respondents) to 1.4 % (37 respondents) (p. 16). The NFA 
applied the “conservative estimate of 1.4%” to calculate private sector losses 
(p. 16). This falls well below both the average figure of 4.57% for expenditure 
lost to fraud (Gee, Button and Brooks, 2009a, p. 8) and the updated figure of 
5.7% (Button & Gee, 2013, p.16).  It is also somewhat mystifying why the NFA 
elected to apply this figure, thus basing the estimate for total losses within the 
private sector (excluding financial and insurance industries) on the opinion of 
37 respondents, when a much higher proportion of respondents indicated 
losses at 3%. What this does evidence however, is that the figure for private 
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sector losses and the overall loss figure fall well below what might actually be 
the true cost of fraud. 
 
One acknowledgement contained within the 2012 report is that, there are 
 
“some limitations to the approach of using surveys to 
estimate areas of unknown fraud loss, such as the 
potential bias of organisations self selecting to 
participate; the level of response rates; issues of 
representativeness within the samples; and findings 
which are based on opinion rather than fact”  
          (p.6) 
 
This has resulted in each estimate being assigned a level of confidence 
ranging from excellent to poor (p. 6). Interestingly, mortgage fraud has been 
assigned the lowest rating, and the estimated figure of £1 billion remains 
unchanged from the 2011 estimate (p.37). Similarly, the estimated loss for 
fraudulently obtained public sector assistance grants remains unchanged, the 
NFA observing that “further work is required to identify a more robust 
methodology for this area of fraud.” (p.34). I maintain these admissions further 
suggest that the overall loss figure significantly undercounts true fraud losses. 
Accordingly, this can only be addressed by a standard measure that would 
generate data with a consistent confidence level.  
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Moving on to examine the 2013 Annual Fraud Indicator (NFA, 2013), overall 
fraud losses are now estimated at £52 billion (p. 2). This figure comprises of 
“identified fraud loss estimates by victim” (p. 11) and “hidden fraud loss 
estimates by victim” (p. 12). The overall loss figure represents a reduction of 
£21 billion from the 2012 figure, however due to the changes in the research 
methodology “year on year comparisons are not meaningful” (p, 4). Whilst the 
aim to improve accuracy of data is commendable, the fact that these changes 
in methodology prevents each annual figure from being used “to trend or draw 
conclusions on the „growth‟ or „decline‟ of fraud over time” (p.4), does render 
the document of limit value in terms of a holistic evaluation of the impact of 
counter fraud strategies. The significant reduction in the overall loss figure, in 
the main, results from a decrease in private sector losses, which at £21.2 
billion (p. 17) represents a decrease of £24.3 billion on the 2012 figure. This 
change is again attributable to the change in research methodology, which 
employed a “quota sample survey of 500 small, medium and large 
businesses” (p.17). What is most disappointing is the fact that these loss data 
are no longer presented by industry, instead being categorised by business 
size, with the exception of financial and insurance activities (p. 17). This limits 
the amount of meaningful analysis of fraud loss within the private sector that 
can be undertaken using these data. 
 
The figure of £20.6 billion for public sector losses (p. 13) is more convincing, 
this representing an increase of £0.3 billion on the 2012 figure and equating to 
an average loss rate of 3.76%. Nevertheless, some of the component data 
continue to be afforded confidence levels that suggest there is still room for 
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improvement in developing a more accurate measure of fraud within this 
sector. For example, grant fraud data to be assessed as poor (p. 14) and the 
estimated losses to procurement fraud are only allocated an average level of 
confidence. 
 
This report however, still fails to provide an accurate figure of overall fraud 
losses because of the significant gaps in, and limited reliability of, some of 
these data. For example, the figure of £1 million is based upon the “opinion” of 
mortgage fraud experts (p. 42), rather than being measured, and remains 
unchanged since the initial publication of this report in 2010.These limitations 
are recognised by the NFA (2013), who admit that “there are large gaps in 
knowledge about fraud losses” (p.3), and as a consequence, “the entire fraud 
spectrum is not captured” (p. 4). Furthermore, some of the data used 
continues to be very outdated, the earliest used having originally been 
captured in 2006 (p. 4).   
 
The significant fact that the fraud loss data contained within the NFA‟s (2013) 
Annual Fraud Indicator “ranges from 2006 to 2013” (p. 4) clearly indicates that 
in certain industries, fraud loss measurement continues to be sporadic, and 
arguably of low priority. I maintain this again supports the argument that it is 
no longer acceptable for industries to measure fraud on the hoc basis that the 
National Fraud Authority appear to be content with. This is the fourth 
publication of this report, yet in certain calculations they continue to use data 
that was actually outdated when the first report was published in 2010. 
Additionally, the NFA (2013) identify the same limitations in the use of survey 
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data, which were acknowledged in the 2012 report, although some attempt 
has been made to mitigate these through the use of increased sample sizes 
and “stronger sampling strategies” (p. 5). Clearly it is time to move on from 
voluntary measurement and the use of surveys which are often based upon 
individual perception, and consider some form of regulation that involves 
mandating measurement.  
 
The limitations in the use of perception based surveys rather than statistically 
based common sampling are clearly evidenced by the estimate from the 
private sector survey of 500 businesses that “on average, fraud losses as a 
proportion of turnover could be in the region of 0.54 per cent” (p. 7), of which 
hidden losses amount to “0.36 per cent of their turnover of £2.9 trillion” (p, 18). 
Effecting a comparison with the research conducted by Button & Gee (2013) 
on statistically valid fraud loss measurement exercises that concluded that on 
average fraud losses amount to 5.7% (p.16) suggests this methodology is 
unlikely to offer anything near an accurate measure of losses for this sector. 
Further limitations of these private sector data are firstly that the estimated 
loss figure is actually based upon the 278 respondents who “stated that they 
were either „sure‟ or „very sure‟ in their estimate (p. 18), and secondly the  
“indicative confidence interval of +/-4.4 per cent on a 50 per cent finding”      
(p. 59), which falls below the confidence level mandated within IPIA. Arguably, 
this suggests there is a need for the creation of a mandated standard of 
measurement with a prescribed confidence level.  
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The overall loss figure for financial and insurance activities also contains “an 
estimate of hidden fraud losses based on assumptions” (p. 19). As a 
consequence, these data have been afforded a poor level of confidence by 
the NFA (p.65), yet still incorporated into the report. I again maintain that this 
use of poor quality data in terms of validity is unacceptable and the only 
realistic option available is to mandate measurement using common sampling 
within these two industries through regulation.  
 
The limitations of using a perception survey are also evidenced by estimate of 
charity income lost to undetected fraud, which “equates to 0.17 per cent of 
income” of all charities with an income of £100,000 or more (p. 23). Once 
again, effecting a comparison with the average fraud loss figure of 5.7% 
(Button & Gee, 2013, p.16) enables the conclusion to be drawn that this 
methodology fails to offer an accurate measure of losses for this sector. The 
results of the online survey of charities also suggests there continues to be 
much work needed to be done to promote fraud loss measurement with only 
21% “having attempted to measure their fraud loss in the last financial year” 
(p. 23). Furthermore, these data are only afforded a confidence level of “+/- 
2.5 per cent”, and with only a 6% response rate, the NFA acknowledge that 
“there may be issues of representativeness and the ability to generalise” (p. 
58). 
 
In conclusion, I suggest this document offers the most accurate picture of 
fraud losses across all three sectors. Nonetheless, it also continues to 
evidence that there remains an urgent need to develop and progress 
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improved mechanisms of measurement across all three sectors. I will now 
move on to discuss the final classification of reports within this review, these 
being described as impostors. 
 
Impostors 
 
Introduction 
 
Critical analysis of the fraud loss measurement reports has identified a further 
typology, which this thesis has classified as „impostors‟. These publications 
originate from the private sector and offer no contribution to developing a 
more accurate picture of losses, but simply „talk up‟ fraud losses or global 
threats from fraudsters in an attempt to generate business. These 
aforementioned publications are frequently produced by auditing and 
accountancy companies, the first example being published by Ernst and 
Young, which will now be discussed.   
 
Ernst and Young 
 
Ernst and Young‟s (2006) 9th Global Fraud Survey has been included in this 
section because it fails to offer any specific fraud loss data. The publication 
actually provides the findings of a qualitative study which aims to improve 
understanding of how companies manage “the risks associated with bribery of 
government officials outside their home countries” (p.1). The methodology 
employed involves qualitative interviews with over 500 corporate leaders 
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representing worldwide organisations (p. 3). This offers a valuable insight into 
the issues impacting on large global organisations, “but is inherently limited by 
this focus” (Hoare, 2007, p. 268). Consequently, this lack of robust data 
renders this document of little value in terms of identifying worldwide fraud 
losses. The report does identify that within the survey “over 50% of managers 
investigate fraud” (p. 8). This level of investigative activity illustrates the need 
for accurate data so that this resource can be deployed towards areas of 
maximum impact in terms of reducing losses. Interestingly, the 12th Global 
Fraud Survey (Ernst & Young, 2012) also fails to offer a valid contribution to 
developing an accurate picture of losses.  
 
CIFAS 
 
The longstanding annual publication Fraudscape, CIFAS (2011; 2012) 
records information on fraud cases that have been detected by CIFAS 
members. Blunt and Hand (2007) are critical of CIFAS data, arguing that they 
“do not show fraud losses, rather the amount of money saved by members of 
the CIFAS service” (p. 17).  Consequently, these data are only just considered 
guestimates, this being another output seeking to advertise the organisation‟s 
services and are of very limited value in providing an accurate picture of fraud 
losses. 
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KROLL 
 
The KROLL (2009) Global Fraud Report has been included within this 
category because no detailed explanation of the measurement methodology 
is offered. The report advises that “a total of 729 senior executives took part in 
the survey” (p.2), but no detail provided about the questions asked, and what 
evidence the respondent‟s answers are based upon. As a consequence, the 
finding that financial services fraud has increased by 18% (p. 6) cannot be 
given any credibility because no data audit trail is provided. 
 
The Global Fraud Report (Kroll, 2012) provides a combination of fraud related 
articles but offers even less in terms of specific fraud loss data. The report‟s 
findings could be given more credence if there was more detail concerning the 
research methodology. I contend these are both examples of reports raising 
organisational profile, but contributing little to progressing accurate fraud 
measurement. I will now discuss the charitable sector 
 
The Charitable Sector  
 
Fraud in the charitable sector is a relatively new discovery; in fact the 
Charities Commission has not even begun estimate fraud within this sector 
(NFA, 2010a, p. 31). The first suggestion that charities are vulnerable to fraud 
was provided by the Fraud Advisory Panel‟s (2009) report on Fraud in the 
Charitable Sector, observing that “the extent of fraud within and against 
charities in the United Kingdom is relatively unknown” (p. 4). The findings 
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reveal that “7% of respondents had been the victim of fraud in the last two 
years” (p. 7). The research methodology comprises of “a self completion 
postal survey” and “six in depth interviews” (p. 10). The response rate for the 
postal survey of 22% (p. 10) suggests that the limited data acquired is 
insufficient to provide an accurate picture of the losses suffered by this sector.   
 
The NFA (2011a) advise that with over 180,000 charities registered with the 
Charity Commission, “their focus for this year in quantifying fraud loss in the 
third sector has been on measuring fraud against charities” (p.18). Targeted 
measurement work involves the issue of a survey to 10,000 charities, the 
responses numbering “more than a 1,000” (p.18). I suggest that any data 
produced has to be treated with caution, when considering that the response 
rate of 10% actually equates to one per cent of the total registered charities.  
For the subsequent report, the NFA (2012) increased the size of the sample 
to 34,000 but achieved a lower response rate of 9% (p. 19). It is estimated 
that charities lose 1.7% of their income to fraud, which equates to £1.1 billion      
(p. 21). This figure is questionable because it also falls well below the average 
percentage of expenditure lost to fraud of 5.7% (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 73). 
Further data giving cause for concern is that the “vast majority of those 
surveyed believed that their organisation was effective at preventing fraud” 
and that fewer than 4% of respondents indicated that they had detected fraud 
(NFA, 2012, p. 21).    
 
The estimate for the VC sector of £147 million (NFA, 2013, p. 21), which is a 
significant reduction from the 2012 estimate due to a change in the research 
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design, also has limitations, being based upon a response rate of just 6% to 
an online survey of charities with an income of over £100,000 a year (p. 23). 
This survey is also based upon perception; with respondents being asked to 
estimate a percentage of their income lost to fraud that is undetected (p. 23). I 
suggest that the significant reduction in estimated losses from the 2012 may 
constitute a gross undercounting of losses, however, until losses are 
measured accurately rather than using perception the true impact of fraud on 
this sector will remain unclear.  
 
The responses to both surveys raises some serious questions, firstly, are 
charities still being complacent about fraud, believing that it will never 
happen? Alternatively, is there an awareness that fraud exists, but reluctance 
to measure because any publicity might impact on donations? What is 
imperative however is that this sector acknowledges vulnerabilities to fraud 
and develops appropriate counter strategies. Failing this, an alternative option 
would be to incorporate this sector in any mandating legislation. This may 
appear draconian, but without a drive for increased measurement, which is in 
the interest of this sector as it will enable development of informed reduction 
strategies, the full picture will never be known. Furthermore, in view of the 
pressure on charities to reduce overheads, thus compensating for grant cuts 
(Sherman, 2011, p. 3), measuring fraud and addressing losses will help 
compensate for this lost funding.  This chapter will now review the 
methodologies identified. 
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Review of methodologies 
 
Introduction 
 
This section of the chapter offers a review of the analysis of fraud data 
outputs by producing a synopsis of the fraud measurement methodologies 
adopted by each organisation. The objective being to summarise the findings, 
which have also informed the following section of this chapter addressing the 
shortcomings of these measures. 
 
The table overleaf summarises the multiplicity of fraud measurement data 
collection methodologies applied by the public and private sectors when 
attempting to measure fraud. 
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Table 1: Summation of fraud measurement methodologies 
 Count of 
Detected 
Fraud 
Count of 
Suspected 
Fraud 
Probability 
Sample 
Administrative 
Data 
Data 
Matching 
Literature 
Review 
Qualitative 
Interviews 
AUDIT 
COMMISSION 
 
  
 
   
BBC        
DVLA        
DWP        
FCO        
HMRC        
H M TREASURY        
MOD        
NFA        
NHS        
ABI        
BDO        
CIFAS        
ERNST & YOUNG        
KPMG        
KROLL        
NERA        
NORWICH UNION        
n.b. U.K Payments have been excluded because no detail of methodology was supplied in the document 
examined. 
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Having conducted a detailed review, the statistically valid fraud data outputs 
considered to contain sound methodologies, are those employing 
representative samples that stand up to rigorous academic scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the DWP who trail blazed the development of an improved 
measure of fraud losses has maintained data quality, thus presenting a 
starting platform for future development of best practice. Nevertheless, 
despite being at the forefront of fraud measurement, there is room for 
improvement within DWP processes, which will be discussed shortly. In 
contrast to the findings of the Fraud Review Team (2006, p. 31) that 
considered HMRC to have robust fraud measurement methodologies, this 
review finds otherwise. I advocate that HMRC data are unreliable because 
certain measures are reliant upon third party data, whose validity is beyond 
their control.  
 
There is also a significant lack of rigour in the loss data provided by many 
central government departments, evidenced by those that offer a nil return. 
Equally, those that do measure fraud losses present data of very poor quality, 
mainly because they rely upon detected fraud, rather than conducting 
sampling exercises. It is therefore imperative that the NFA (2010c) stand by 
their intention that “a more comprehensive estimate of public sector fraud 
should be produced on an annual basis” (p. 7). 
 
In terms of the private sector, insurance industry data are the only 
measurements that come anywhere close to standing up to academic 
scrutiny. Much of the private sector produced reports such as those produced 
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by Ernst and Young (2012) and Kroll (2012) are of limited value due to the 
failings previously discussed. Arguably, this research typology would be better 
replaced by measurement exercises conducted by each individual industry in 
the private sector, which at least would offer a worthy contribution to 
developing a more accurate picture of fraud losses. 
 
In sum, the data presented within Table 1 enables the conclusion to be drawn 
that the recommendations contained within existing fraud measurement 
critiques about standardisation have not been implemented. Specifically, it is 
worth noting that the NFA, who are perceived to produce the most accurate 
representation of fraud losses, actually employ all of the measurement 
methodologies within their annual indicator. I therefore conclude that, seven 
years on from the Fraud Review (2006), the need to improve the quality of 
fraud measurement now requires more assertive action based upon the 
options for change discussed within the preceding chapter. On a more 
positive note, this review has identified some good practice, which offers a 
starting point for the development of improved fraud loss measurement. 
  
I close this section by suggesting that the varying methods employed to 
calculate fraud losses evidenced above, further indicates the need for a 
standardised method of loss measurement that is embraced by all 
organisations, and if necessary, mandated to ensure compliance. I maintain 
this can be achieved through “a statistically valid, representative sample of 
payments or cases” which are “examined thoroughly” to decide upon the 
potential presence of fraud, maintaining an accuracy level of + or - 1%, and a 
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95% level of statistical confidence (Gee, Button & Bassett, 2010, pp.20-21). 
The latter is significant, because the higher the level of statistical confidence, 
the more accurate the result will be (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 74). 
 
Methodological Deficiencies 
 
Introduction 
 
Critical analysis of the measurement processes within the fraud data outputs 
reviewed, combined with content analysis (Krippendorff, 1980) of the limited 
critiques of fraud measurement has identified recurring issues that need to be 
addressed to improve the quality, reliability and comparability of fraud loss 
data. I will discuss these issues, commencing with the question of why 
organisations measure fraud. 
 
Why is fraud being measured? 
 
This is a question I have considered whilst reviewing private sector fraud loss 
reports, particularly those produced by organisations that are not inwardly 
looking. That is to say, those that conduct organisational fraud loss 
measurement exercises, but fail to release data at national, sector or even 
industry level. When examining fraud loss data publications, this analysis has 
identified considerable variations in fraud loss figures, specifically „estimates‟ 
produced by private sector organisations vary significantly. I contend that this 
further evidences the unreliability of private sector loss measurement 
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exercises that appear to be self initiated, rather than underpinned by sector or 
industry sponsorship. To reiterate previous suggestions to improve accurate 
fraud measurement, organisations should only measure their own losses, 
unless specifically commissioned to do so, rather than produce commercially 
motivated data that is meant to create an organisational “moral panic” (Cohen, 
1972) to generate business. Kirk (2008) offers an example, when citing a 
BDO report with the emotive headline “as the credit crunch bites so do the 
fraudsters” (p. 335). 
 
Whilst some reports provide interesting qualitative data, they offer little 
contribution towards the accuracy of fraud measurement within the UK. A 
pertinent example being the Ernst and Young (2006; 2012) reports which fail 
to offer any specific fraud loss data, rather sitting within the category of 
marketing documents, whose specific intention is to generate new business. 
Whilst these types of documents are inevitable in the commercial world, I 
suggest they offer no contribution towards offering a more accurate measure. 
 
Debatably, this type of research should be replaced by measurement 
exercises conducted by each individual private sector industry. Consequently, 
these publications should be discounted when any improvements to 
measuring fraud are developed. Arguably, they should be eradicated by the 
further development of the NFA‟s Annual Fraud Indicator, which must source 
data direct from those specifically measuring fraud within their own area of 
responsibility.  
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Frequency of measurement 
 
Whilst DWP offer what this review considers to be the most statistically valid 
fraud loss data, there are certain inadequacies in these data due to the lesser 
frequency of measurement of certain benefits.  To expand, although DWP has 
frequently reported substantial fraud losses (National Audit Office, 1998; 
National Audit Office, 2008b), these data lack extant Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) fraud data (Sainsbury, 1996, 1999, 2001). This review has 
identified that this is still the case, DLA last being measured in 2004, and prior 
to this, it was reviewed in 1996 (DWP, 2005, p. 3). Arguably, this timescale is 
inadequate to provide accurate detail of total losses of DLA, a benefit 
frequently targeted by the greedy calculating or systematic fraudster (Tunley, 
2010b, p. 14; Tunley, 2011, p. 316), when compared with the rolling 
measurement of means tested benefits. I suggest this may be explained by be 
a perception that DLA losses are low and do not warrant such frequent 
measurement. Alternatively, because of the sensitivity and potential adverse 
publicity, a less rigorous approach is applied. Finally, I pose the question that 
if DLA is considered to be a low priority benefit in terms of fraud 
measurement, why does the DWP employ specialist DLA fraud investigation 
teams in most regions? 
 
There are other public sector organisations that conduct measurement 
exercises sporadically, one example being local authorities as evidenced by 
the Audit Commission (2010; 2011). The NFA (2010c) however, do seek to 
address the infrequency of data compilation within the public sector by 
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recommending that “a more comprehensive estimate of…fraud should be 
produced on an annual basis” (p. 7). Nevertheless, as evidenced, central 
government departments have continually ignored HM Treasury directives, so 
even with the backing of the Cabinet Office, what guarantee is there that 
these departments will fully comply with instructions issued? I therefore 
advocate that to ensure compliance, there appears to be little option but to 
mandate the measurement of fraud throughout the public sector through the 
creation of a statute.   
 
Inconsistent definitions of fraud 
 
Levi and Burrows (2008) identify “inconsistencies in defining fraud” (p.298) as 
an obstacle to improving accuracy. Yet the Economic Impact of Fraud report 
(Levi et al, 2007) issued the previous year offers an estimate of overall losses 
drawn from „hybrid‟ data using inconsistent fraud definitions. I therefore 
contend that if those charged with reviewing the process actually identify 
weaknesses, but then offer loss data that is based upon such inconsistencies, 
then there is an urgent requirement for a standard definition for measurement 
purposes. I evidence this assertion using the observations of this review, 
which maintains that little progress has been made. To develop this theme 
further than previous reviews, I will now discuss the range of different fraud 
definitions identified.  
 
Within the public sector for example, there are departments with bespoke 
counter fraud legislation such as the DWP and HMRC, which although used 
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as a prosecution tool, are the criteria upon which loss measurement exercises 
are based. For example, the DWP normally prosecute benefit fraud under the 
Social Security Fraud Administration Act 1992. Thus when measuring fraud 
using common sampling, the DWP use this statute as an evidential test of 
whether fraud can be proved, but also use the benefit conditions of 
entitlement as a test as to whether a claimant‟s declared circumstances are 
considered fraudulent. Interestingly, the NHS relies upon the civil definition of 
fraud (Keenan, 2007, pp. 320-321), based upon case law (Derry v Peek 
1889). Because of the range of functions performed by the NHS, there is no 
specific statute that prescribes conditions of entitlement; therefore drawing 
upon the common law to measure fraud is a reasoned decision.  
 
Similarly, there is no consistent definition of fraud within central government 
departments, however HM Treasury (2009a) do offer examples of the modus 
operandi of fraud typologies based upon detected cases. In terms of 
measuring fraud in local government, the Audit Commission offer their own 
„bespoke‟ definition of fraud, which was discussed in chapter one. As 
discussed, the NFA‟s Annual Fraud Indicator is a „hybrid‟ report that 
incorporates data based upon varied definitions of fraud. If this report is to be 
given credibility, I maintain that all data used must be based upon one single 
definition of fraud, which would then enable comparative and longitudinal 
analysis of these data. Examination of private sector fraud measurement 
publications reveals that frequently there is no disclosure of the fraud 
definition upon which the measurement has been based upon, APACS (2009) 
data being one example. Furthermore, many private sector produced fraud 
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loss reports rely upon criminal determination, drawing upon successfully 
prosecuted cases. 
  
I suggest that if there is no consistent definition of fraud within the public 
sector, then the likelihood of finding consistency amongst all sectors is 
extremely remote. The problem with an individually created definition of fraud 
however, is that it can be both politically and commercially driven to influence 
the outcome of any measurement exercise. Consequently, an independently 
devised definition, possibly informed by academia, might prove to be best 
solution. As a starting point I offer my own definition, this being ‗the deliberate 
false representation, including omission of material fact with the intention of 
knowingly making gain, or causing loss to a third party‟. Alternatively, the civil 
definition of fraud has stood the test of time, and arguably can be embraced 
by all sectors. 
 
Unsubstantiated and Inconsistent Data  
 
This review has identified a continuing failure to measure fraud accurately and 
consistently, hence the inclusion of the „guesstimate‟ category.  Analysis has 
identified the two principal deficiencies that limit the reliability of these fraud 
loss statistics; these being reliance upon apparently unsubstantiated third 
party data, and inconsistencies in data used. I will firstly address the problems 
of using data matching for the purpose of fraud measurement. 
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Whilst many of the reports described as hybrids are reliant upon what may be 
described as an amalgamation of data from a range of sources, there are 
some measures that are dependant upon data matching using third party 
data. For example, the measurement of TV licence evasion (TV Licensing, 
2009) combines two data sets, one of which is external data which presents 
problems when attempting to set a level of statistical confidence. Specifically, 
the importing organisation has no control over the data collection and 
analysis, and consequently, if unclear from the data supplied, any statements 
of statistical validity may well have to be taken upon trust.  
 
Furthermore, there is no explanation of how these data have been captured, 
and consequently their validity cannot be judged, because frequently no 
explanation is offered within the methodology about the robustness of these 
third party data. It may be that in some instances these data are fit for 
purpose, for example means tested benefit records; therefore it is essential 
that there is a full and detailed explanation of methodology, which includes an 
account of the statistical validity of all data used. I therefore suggest that if any 
organisation has no alternative but to rely upon third party data, they validate 
its accuracy to ensure that any fraud loss measurement data stands up to the 
highest level of scrutiny.  
 
For the purpose of this review, I define inconsistent data as any that originate 
from multiple sources and used in reports that have been categorised as 
hybrids. The principle issue with these reports blending data is that they are of 
significantly limited value; because harvesting data from a number of sources 
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frequently results in a muddle of figures based upon assorted data collection 
methodologies, varying time spans, different data typologies, and inconsistent 
statistical validity.  
 
Regrettably, the NFA‟s Annual Fraud Indicator falls within this category. The 
NFA are predominantly „fraud data collection agents‟, and therefore reliant 
upon third party data. Consequently, the arguments presented earlier about 
the inadequacies of these data may apply to the fraud losses reported by the 
NFA because they have no option but to rely upon these figures. Based upon 
this „given‟, I suggest the only option to ensure regular and accurate fraud 
measurement, at least in the public sector, is to mandate this activity and 
supply a common standard supported by a manual of guidance that offers 
„best practice‟. 
 
Lack of rigour 
 
This review has identified that there is very limited rigour within the fraud loss 
data outputs evaluated. Levi and Burrows (2008, p. 296) observe that few 
studies on fraud emanate from academic sources. From the literature 
reviewed, this continues to be the case, there being no identified loss 
measurement exercises supported by academic input. Content analysis of the 
publications falling within the inclusion criteria has enabled the identification of 
specific shortcomings, all impacting upon the rigour of these fraud loss 
reports. The principle issues identified are detailed in the table overleaf. 
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Table 2: Summation of limitations of fraud loss reports 
 Purpose 
Not 
Explained 
Lack of 
Detailed 
Method 
Deficient 
Research 
Methods 
Limited 
Statistical 
Confidence 
Lack 
of 
Clarity 
Poor Quality 
Presentation 
Lack of 
Informed 
Conclusion 
AUDIT 
COMMISSION 
   
 
   
BBC        
DVLA        
DWP        
FCO        
HMRC        
H M TREASURY        
MOD        
NFA        
NHS        
ABI        
UK PAYMENTS        
BDO        
CIFAS        
ERNST & YOUNG        
KPMG        
KROLL        
NERA        
NORWICH UNION        
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I again suggest this issue may be addressed by the creation of a British 
Standard of measurement, supported by an information exchange matrix and 
manual of guidance informed by academic input. 
  
Combining Fraud and Error 
 
One final methodological issue identified by this review is only relevant to the 
public sector, this being combining of fraud and error when conducting and 
reporting the results of measurement exercises, something that is still 
advocated by the FED Taskforce (HM Government, 2012, p. 9). Both are 
entirely different, possessing diverse root causes and can be identified 
through a thorough examination of cases sampled. Consequently, there is no 
reason why they should not be measured and reported individually. In terms 
of the DWP, Sainsbury (2003) offers an explanation, suggesting that ministers 
have always sought to make political capital from social security fraud and 
combine fraud and error figures “for dramatic effect” (pp. 291-2). I therefore 
suggest that any legislation mandating fraud measurement should direct 
organisations to separate fraud losses from error. This review will now offer 
further evidence of the positive impact of legislation on the measurement of 
improper payments in the US. 
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Measuring Fraud in Medicare and Medicaid: A Case Study 
 
Introduction 
 
The US spends more than $2.3 trillion on healthcare per annum (National 
Healthcare Anti-Fraud Association, 2010). Fraudulent acts by patients, 
professionals and health care providers result in increasing pressure on 
health care expenditure (Brooks, Button & Gee, 2012, p. 76). The US 
Government Accountability Office estimates that over $70 billion are lost each 
year to health care fraud, waste and abuse (US Energy and Commerce 
Committee Subcommittee on Health, 2012, p. 1). This case study therefore 
examines the impact of the Improper Payments Information Act 2002 on 
identifying and reducing fraud in Medicare and Medicaid healthcare 
programmes in the US.  
 
The Medicare and Medicaid programs were created to provide healthcare for 
the elderly and the impoverished (Iglehart 2001; Payne 2006; Rowland & 
Garfield 2000). Medicare is a federally operated program that provides 
healthcare for individuals who are disabled or elderly, and Medicaid is a state 
program providing healthcare for individuals on low incomes (Payne, 2012).  
The principal cause of improper payments across Medicare is insufficient 
documentation supplied by contractors to support the claim, and in the case of 
Medicare Fee For Service, the administration of medically unnecessary 
services (US Government Accountability Office, n.d.). Medicare processes 1.2 
billion medical claims per year for more than one million registered health care 
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providers (Gaines III, 2012, p. 1). From these statistics it is evident that 
identifying improper payments is a significant challenge. Furthermore, 
Medicare has been designated as a high risk program “because of its size, 
complexity and susceptibility to improper payments” (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2011a,). “Improper Medicaid payments can 
occur within a variety of health care settings by a number of different 
providers” (Policastro & Payne, 2013, p. 191). The fraudulent offences 
committed include billing for services the doctor did not perform and double 
billing which involves charging a patient and/or multiple insurance providers 
for the same services (Pontell, Jesilow & Geis, 1982, p. 118). 
 
Prior to the creation of the IPIA, there was limited measurement of fraud in 
Medicare. When fraud loss measurement was suggested, there was minimal 
resistance at field level; however senior management raised the technical 
objection that “scientific measurement couldn‟t be done” (Sparrow, 2000,      
p. 154). Consequently, whilst quality review processes in Medicare were in 
existence, none were designed to “measure the level of fraud in the system”   
(p. 154). Furthermore, Sparrow (2000) cites the response from the vice 
president for audit of a Medicare contractor, who when asked if his company 
might consider random audits for fraud measurement purposes, commented 
“There is no reward for finding fraud. There are no out of pocket losses for us. 
Why would we put ourselves in this painful position? We have to think about 
our shareholders” (p. 154). This is an interesting statement in terms of attitude 
to fraud measurement, and one that is extant, as reflected in the research 
questionnaire responses discussed in chapter five suggesting potential 
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arguments to the publication of fraud loss data. Similarly, the dismissal of 
measurement on the grounds of no out of pocket expenses suggests that as 
long as losses can be offset, fraud loss measurement is not considered a 
priority, a culture that is currently prevalent in the insurance industry . 
Arguably, this statement evidences why the US needed to create a statute to 
mandate fraud measurement. Of further interest is the apparent outsourcing 
of public sector responsibilities such as Medicare and Medicaid to private 
sector organisations. The existing culture of market testing in the UK resulting 
in outsourcing of public sector functions, such as the running of some prisons 
for example, gives cause for concern that where state functions are performed 
on a „for profit‟ basis, similar attitudes towards fraud measurement may also 
exist. Returning to the case study, some fraud loss measurement exercises 
were being performed in Medicare prior to the introduction of the IPIA, which 
will now be discussed.  
 
 Fraud Loss Measurement pre IPIA 
 
Measurement of Medicare improper payments by the Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) actually commenced in July 1997, however the auditing 
procedure followed the standard medical review process and consequently 
was unlikely to uncover the majority of fraud schemes (Sparrow, 2000, p. 94). 
Furthermore, due to the small sample size of approximately 6,000 claims, it 
was not possible to identify improper payment rates by claim processing 
contractor type or identity, service type or provider type (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2012, p. 7). The one exception was the Texas study, 
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which contained a “rigorous fraud audit protocol”, and unlike the OIG sampling 
process, included interviews with patients. Consequently, this study did 
identify fraudulently made false claims (Sparrow, 2000, p. 94). 
 
The legislature‟s involvement at state level was the precursor to intervention 
at a national level. In Texas this involvement was “precipitated in 1996 by the 
reported amounts of improper payments in the Texas‟ Medicaid program” 
which ranged from “$365 million to $730 million” (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2001, p. 13).  Consequently, “Texas lawmakers sought to 
reduce improper payments by mandating specific actions by responsible 
agencies” to deter fraud and abuse including publicizing activities (p. 13). 
Texas conducted payment accuracy reviews in 1998 and 2001, the latter 
included client telephone interviews and medical record reviews. The costs of 
conducting a first time review were found to be between $250,000 and 
$400,000, however the state recognised that these would reduce after the 
baseline measurement had been determined, and the cost benefits of being 
able to focus resources on high risk areas (United States General Accounting 
Office, 2001, p. 19).  This is an observation of note, because cost is a 
potential issue that may be raised within objections to mandating fraud 
measurement in the UK. 
 
The IPIA 
 
Following the passage of the IPIA, changes were made to the way improper 
payments were measured in healthcare. In 2003, measurement of improper 
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payments became the responsibility of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), who immediately increased the sample size substantially. 
This currently stands at fifty thousand claims, and enables the calculation of a 
national improper payment rate and a contractor and service specific improper 
payments rate (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2012, p. 7). 
These additional rates provide CMS and its contractors with “valuable 
information to assist in the development of specific, robust corrective actions 
to prevent improper payments from occurring in the future” (p. 7). As a result 
of implementing this strategy and the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing 
Program (CERT), the national improper payment rate reduced from 10.8% in 
2009 to 8.6% in 2011 (p. 9). The CERT program involves the evaluation of a 
random sample of Medicare Fee-for-Service claims to determine if they were 
paid correctly. If these criteria are not met, the claim is designated as a total 
or partial improper payment. Consequently, the CERT program ensures a 
statistically valid sample which can then be extrapolated to reflect all of the 
paid Medicare Fee-For-Service claims during the year (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2012,   p. 10). Another achievement resulting from the 
implementation of the IPIA is that the error rate target for 2010 in the 
Medicare Advantage Program was exceeded by 0.02% (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2011b, p. 5).   
 
On 8 June 2010 “ A Presidential announcement discussed the goal to cut the 
improper payment rate in the Medicare Program in half by 2012, a reduction 
of more than $20 billion annually” (KPMG Government Institute, 2011, p. 4). 
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Arguably, this evidences the confidence the US government has in the impact 
this legislation on measuring and reducing losses. 
 
Supplementary Legislation and Strategies 
 
Successful identification of where fraud occurs within Medicare through 
improved and increased measurement has resulted in the development of 
accompanying strategies to act upon this improved knowledge. For example, 
the creation of an Interagency Health Care Fraud Prevention and 
Enforcement Action Team “to combat abuses in Medicare” (Iglehart, 2009,    
p. 229). Another strategy informed by the identification of losses resulting from 
mandating the measurement of improper payments is the Medicare Recovery 
Audit Contractors Program (RAC), which utilises independent contingency fee 
paid contractors “to ferret out improper payments in exchange for a 
percentage of the dollars recovered”  (Gaines III, 2012, p. 1). This strategy 
was limited to only part of the Medicare program, however the effectiveness of 
the identification and recovery of improper payments resulted in this being 
extended to all states in the Medicaid Program during 2012, as laid down in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Gaines III, 2012,       
p. 1). There is an ethical issue concerning the offering of financial incentives 
to identify improper payments, because this may open up the risk of abuse by 
these contractors. However, the system does appear to be working 
successfully in identifying improper payments in all programs, and has 
resulted in expansion of recovery auditing initiated by this legislation, which is 
estimated to save more than $2 billion per anum (Gaines III, 2012, p. 2).  
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To assist in delivering the requirements of IPIA, the Center for Program 
Integrity was created in 2010 to serve as a focal point for all integrity issues 
including identifying and monitoring all program vulnerabilities (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2011b, p. 7). The Center has contributed to 
achieving the objective of “identifying the nature, extent and underlying 
causes of improper payments” in Medicare and Medicaid (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2011c, p. 20) as mandated within the IPIA 
the IPERA. 
 
To ensure compliance with the IPIA and associated guidance, the CMS 
developed the “Payment Error Rate Measurement program” which measures 
improper payments in Medicaid and produces error rates for each component 
of the program” (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.). Prior to 
the presidential announcement on 10th March 2010 of Payment Recapture 
Audits discussed in chapter one, under separate statutory authority the CMS 
implemented a recovery auditing demonstration project in the Medicare Fee 
For Service program. The project was run in California, New York and Texas 
between March 2005 and March 2008. The recovery audit contractors 
recaptured a total of $900 million in improper payments (Hatch & McMurtry, 
2010, p. 19). I maintain this further evidences the value of mandating fraud 
measurement across the public sector, and putting in place strategies to 
recover identified losses. UK government departments already have targets 
imposed on them through public service agreements (Vincent-Jones, 2006,  
p. 146). Therefore, these could be employed to set recovery targets for 
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fraudulent payments identified through mandated loss measurement 
exercises rather than create supplementary legislation. 
 
The influence of the IPIA 
 
The impact of the IPIA and associated legislation imposing recovery audits 
can be evidenced by the fact that in Fiscal Year 2011 over $4 billion dollars of 
improper payments were recovered, which represents “the single largest 
health care fraud recovery in history” (US Energy and Commerce Committee 
Subcommittee on Health, 2012, p. 1). Within the Medicare Fee For Service 
program, which provides hospital and supplementary medical insurance, 
Recovery Auditors recaptured $939 million in improperly paid claims during 
Fiscal Year 2011 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2012, p. 3). 
Furthermore, the United States Government Accountability Office (2012) 
reports that “the fiscal year 2011 improper payment rate for the Medicare 
Advantage program”, which is the area of healthcare posing the highest risk, 
“decreased from the fiscal year 2010 reported amount of $13.6 billion to $12.4 
billion, which represented a decrease in the error rate from 14.1 percent to 
11.0 percent” (p. 10). Whilst this figure might still be considered excessive, 
healthcare fraud “frequently involves higher than average value items of 
expenditure” (Button, Gee & Brooks, 2012, p. 72), and debatably does 
evidence that the mandating of measurement is having a positive impact on 
reducing losses through improper payments. This is further illustrated by the 
results reported for Fiscal Year 2012 in which the Medicare Fee For Service 
improper payment rate reduced from the previously discussed 11.0% in 2009 
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to 8.5% in 2012 (Payment Accuracy, n.d. d). Positive results are also reported 
on improper payment accuracy in Medicare Advantage which reduced from 
14.1% in 2009 to 11.4% in 2012 (Payment Accuracy, n.d. e), and in Medicaid 
where the improper payment rate reduced from 9.6% in 2009 to 7.1% in 2012 
(Payment Accuracy, n.d. f). There has also been significant success in the 
recovery of improper payments to contractors since the enactment if the IPIA, 
with the Medicare Recovery Audit Contractors Program recovering at total of 
$3,163.4 million “from fiscal year 2004 through 2012 (Payments Accuracy 
(n.d. g).    
 
In conclusion I contend that this case study has evidenced that the mandating 
of fraud loss measurement exercises supported by a targeted recovery 
strategy can have a positive effect in reducing and recapturing losses, even 
within an area of high vulnerability such as healthcare. However, one lesson 
to be learned from the US model is that careful consideration is required when 
framing any statute to ensure that it includes all necessary options from the 
outset. I close by drawing upon the challenging target set in the high risk 
Medicare Fee For Service program for a further reduction in the improper 
payment rate which is expected to reduce to 8.0% by 2014 (Payment 
Accuracy, n.d. d), which arguably evidences an expectation that regular 
measurement exercises have a continued positive effect on stemming losses. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter commenced by examining crime statistics and surveys, paying 
specific attention to the concept of „the dark figures‟ of crime and fraud. 
Having discussed the literature inclusion criteria, the following section 
examined fraud measurement within all sectors by evaluating fraud data 
outputs, and reviewing critiques of existing fraud measurement 
methodologies. Having reviewed the former, some evidence of good practice 
has been identified, yet there is much room for improvement, evidenced by 
the caveats concerning data quality and statistical confidence contained within 
many of the publications reviewed.  
 
The issues identified are principally based upon the frequent assumption that 
fraud may only be measured by examining reported instances or detected 
cases, and such exercises are labour intensive and therefore costly. 
Furthermore, despite regular criticism of data quality, little remedial action has 
been taken in the form of collecting data fit for purpose, from which 
meaningful and comparable analysis may be conducted.  
 
I close by suggesting that a thorough review of the literature has uncovered 
evidence which suggests that there is still much work to be done to improve 
fraud loss measurement. This is evidenced in table two, which highlights the 
identified limitations of some fraud loss reports. These being,  
 
 No explanation of the nature and purpose of the report. 
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 Lack of detailed methodology. 
 Deficient research methods. 
 Limited statistical confidence. 
 Lack of clarity when reporting findings. 
 Poor quality presentation of findings. 
 Lack of informed conclusion.   
 
Furthermore, I contend that, in view of the matter-of -fact approach taken to 
fraud measurement and the reluctance to voluntarily address the deficiencies 
evidenced within this review, improvements in data quality and accuracy may 
only be facilitated by legislation mandating fraud measurement, a theme 
which will be further explored in the findings chapters. Moving on, the 
following chapter will discuss my research methodology. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will initially outline the background to the method selection and 
then discuss the epistemological perspectives underpinning this research. 
Subsequently, the design of the enquiry will be explained and the 
methodology selection justified. Details of each research strand will then be 
presented including a discussion about the paradigms adopted and participant 
selection. Issues considered during the project will be explored, and an 
explanation of how data were collated, evaluated and analysed provided. The 
validity and reliability of these data will also be discussed. In sum, the chapter 
will demonstrate rigour by providing a decision trail, which audits “the events, 
influences and actions of the researcher” (Koch, 2006, p. 100). 
 
Method selection 
 
According to Kaplan (1964, p. 23) methodology assists the understanding of 
the processes of scientific enquiry. Data were required to measure opinion on 
the research argument, whilst also seeking individual and organisational 
perspectives on fraud measurement. Selecting the most appropriate 
technique for measuring opinion, whilst also maintaining rigour, was 
imperative. Furthermore, working within a limited self funded research budget, 
it was essential that the methodology selected was practicable, whilst also 
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facilitating exploration and maintaining neutrality about the likely study 
outcomes. 
 
Epistemological Perspectives  
 
Introduction 
 
Creswell (1998) argues that qualitative researchers “approach their studies 
with a certain paradigm or worldview, a basic set of assumptions that guide 
their inquiries” (p. 74). Conversely, Patton (1990, p. 90) argues that method 
should be distinct from epistemology. Similarly, Brannen (1992) argues that in 
addition to epistemological and ontological links, pragmatic factors including 
researcher skills influence method selection. Practice based experience of 
frequently needing effective and time bound research methods influenced 
method selection more than any worldview. Furthermore, contrary to Greene 
and Caracelli‟s (2003) argument that by placing limited value on epistemology 
researchers are “insufficiently reflective” (p. 107), embracing the professional 
doctorate ethos, reflection (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p.124) significantly 
influenced the development of the project design.   
 
A Pragmatic Approach 
 
Whilst accepting that personal assumptions are relevant, this study offers a 
pragmatic view (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003, p. 4). Methodological 
pragmatism (Rescher, 1977) has created a research design based upon 
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“practicalism” (Maxcy, 2003, p. 82) which evaluates “the rules of method…in 
terms of success” (Sankey, 2008, p. 138). Contrary to Bryman‟s (2007, p. 15) 
observation that researchers sometimes use methods “with which they are not 
entirely comfortable” (p.15), methodological pragmatism informed a design I 
was at ease with, and that was appropriate to the research argument (Mason, 
2002, pp. 27-30; Bryman, 2006, p.118; Blaikie, 2000, p. 58; de Vaus, 2001, 
p.9; Brannen, 2005, p. 8; Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987, p. 369; 
Erzberger & Kelle, 2003, p. 482).  
 
Critics argue that pragmatism fails to offer an appropriate worldview (Schmitt, 
1995, p. 78; House & Howe, 1999, p. 65; Mertens, 2003, p. 159). In contrast, I 
contend that pragmatism offers an alternative worldview (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003a, p. 680), viewing methods “in a technical rather than 
epistemological frame” (Bryman, 1988, p. 127). Accordingly, this study has 
been pragmatically directed by empirical practitioner knowledge, as opposed 
to epistemological considerations (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p.36; Harden & 
Thomas, 2005, p. 265). 
 
Framing the Research Design 
 
The Influence of Research Aims 
 
The selection of the most advantageous methodology (Burke Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15) was dictated by the theoretical drive of the project 
(Robson, 2002, p. 81; Morse, 1991a), which examined a phenomenon that is 
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poorly understood (Fleury, 1991, 1993, 1998). To evaluate the viability of the 
research argument, I concluded that the topic under investigation (Greene & 
Caracelli, 2003, p. 107) required the collection of “rich empirical data” 
(Hermerinta-Peltomaki & Nummela, 2004, p. 178) from multiple sources to 
complement each other (Miller and Crabtree, 1994, p. 344). 
 
Mixing Methods 
 
Firstly, the views of fraud professionals (practitioners) and academics with 
recorded opinion about fraud measurement were required on the research 
argument. This was to ascertain whether the research argument was viable in 
its entirety, or required any revisions. The intention being to draw upon the 
resultant opinion when developing the research instrument for the second 
strand of the research, which sough data from a larger sample of individuals 
involved in fraud investigation, fraud measurement or audit from a range of 
organisations, acting as a barometer of opinion „from the field‟ on the research 
argument. Having considered the appropriate sample size for each data 
source, which will be discussed later, it became apparent that qualitative 
methodology was appropriate for the first element of data collection because 
of the detailed informed opinion required on the research argument 
(Denscombe, 2010, p. 152). Whereas, the number of participant organisations 
required for the second research component, and the volume of data needed 
to ensure validity, suggested that this paradigm was not appropriate (Nardi, 
2006, p. 17). Consequently, a pragmatic decision to mix methods (Moran-Ellis 
et al, 2006, p. 46) was taken, blending quantitative and qualitative strategies 
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(Kuhn, 1970) into a single study (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, pp. 17-18; 
Morse, 2003, p. 191). Furthermore, this methodology enabled the application 
of practitioner researcher “techniques” (Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, 
p. 15), thus embracing the ethos of the professional doctorate. 
 
A Fixed Design 
 
The design was therefore determined by the “number of methodological 
approaches, number of strands and type of implementation process” (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2006, p.14). A fixed design was therefore considered 
appropriate, having already established what the research was “looking for” 
(Robson, 2002, p.46). Whilst this methodology is normally associated with 
quantifiable phenomena, it may also be applied to a qualitative design 
(Oakley, 2000, p. 306).   
 
The Qualitative Element  
 
Introduction 
 
Qualitative methodology permitted a flexible approach to this element of the 
project (Polit & Beck, 2003, p. 274; Grady, 1998, p. 4), which generated the 
rich data required to evaluate the achievability of the research argument 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The qualitative component 
had two specific objectives; firstly to obtain informed opinion on the reliability  
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of extant fraud measurement exercises by asking “what is going on?” (Morse 
& Field, 1996, p. 1987), and secondly, to harvest opinion on the research 
argument to inform the quantitative element. 
  
The Sample 
 
Sampling for purpose 
 
A purposive sample (Burt & Barber, 1996, p. 222; Hek & Moule, 2006, p. 72) 
met the “the information needs of the study” (Coyne, 1997, p. 630), 
establishing “a good correspondence between research questions and 
sampling” (Bryman, 2004, pp. 333-334). The principal compatibility being the 
deliberate targeting of particular people (Freeman & Tyrer, 2006, p. 81) with a 
“particular purpose in mind” (Jupp, 1989, p. 37). The participants were 
selected because they were considered “the most knowledgeable” (Glaser, 
1978, p. 45), possessing the credentials to “illuminate and inform” (Ritchie, 
Lewis, & Elam, 2003, p. 82).   
 
Content analysis of “written material…using carefully applied rules” (Aaker, 
Kumar & Day, 1995, p. 190), when conducting the literature review facilitated 
the identification of the required sample of academics considered qualified to 
offer informed opinion on “the phenomenon” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005,           
p. 1279). The fraud professionals were identified through a professional 
network (Davies, Nutley & Smith, 2000 p. 366) within which I participate. In  
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summary, by using “subjective judgement” (Schmidt & Hollenson, 2006, p. 
171) the adoption of non probability sampling has achieved a target 
population that meets the requirements of this project (Thomas, 2004, p. 106).  
 
Sample Size 
 
“Nothing is more important than making a  
 proper selection of cases”  
                                      (Stake, 1994, p. 243). 
 
 When determining the sample size, Bernard (1995) suggests that 
researchers should “always collect data on the lowest unit of analysis 
possible” (p. 37). In qualitative research however, “there are no hard and fast 
rules about numbers” (Tuckett, 2004, p.47), suggestions ranging from “12-20” 
(Baum, 2002, p. 176) to “10 to 100” (Rubinstein, 1994, p. 80). Nonetheless, 
commentators observe that qualitative research normally relies on small 
sample sizes with the aim of detailed in depth study (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p.27; Patton, 1990, p. 172; Morse & Mitcham, 2002, p.12).  
 
Drawing upon Baum (2002, p. 176), I therefore decided to conduct twelve 
interviews split equally between academics and fraud professionals who were 
considered suitably qualified to offer informed opinion. This was considered to 
be a sufficient number of participants to evaluate the viability of the research 
argument and inform the content of the questionnaire. The fraud professionals 
were identified through the literature review and drawing upon personal 
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contacts. The six fraud professionals selected represented both sectors and 
were purposively chosen (May, 2011, p. 100) due to their differing 
involvement within the fraud loss measurement process because I considered 
that their collective specialist knowledge would offer valuable informed opinion 
on the proposed options for change outlined in chapter one. As previously 
discussed, the literature review informed the selection of the six academics 
within the sample, who were chosen having been identified as having 
published on fraud losses or fraud loss measurement. The twelve interviews 
were conducted between May and September 2010.  
 
Although twelve interviews may be considered a small sample, “the number of 
people interviewed is less important than the selection criteria” (Wilmont, n.d., 
p. 3). Additionally, I draw upon Wainright (1997) who observes that; 
 
“It is the quality of the insight that is important, rather 
than the number of respondents that share it.”  
                                                                           (p.11). 
 
Because the project was “sampling for meaning” (Luborsky & Rubinstein, 
1995, p. 102), the inclusion and exclusion criteria were carefully linked to the 
research argument (Rowan & Huston, 1997, p. 1445). Furthermore, the 
sample size enabled “intense analysis associated with qualitative research” 
(Mason, 1996, p. 91) of a “precisely defined population” (Arber, 1993, p. 38).   
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Structured Interviews  
 
Structured interviews (Lofland & Lofland, 1995, p. 16; Armstrong, 1998,       
pp. 5-6) were conducted because they were considered the most suitable 
method of obtaining the data required, and permitted “comparability between 
responses” (May, 2001, p. 122). The interviews used “predetermined 
questions with fixed wording…in a pre-set order” (Robson, 2002, p. 270). This 
interview structure was also selected to obtain “an inside view” (Bryman, 
1984, p. 78) and individual perceptions of process (King, 1994, pp. 16-17) on 
fraud measurement, thus generating “rich data” (Agar, 1980, p.11; Lofland, 
1971, p. 76; Charmaz, 2006, p. 76). The interviews were designed as 
conversations “with a purpose” (Kahn & Canell, 1957, p. 149), collecting data 
on the participant‟s views (Marshall & Rossman, 1995, p. 80; Miller & 
Glassner, 1997, p. 100). The primary intention, as previously discussed, being 
to harvest informed opinion of the research argument to ascertain its viability, 
the responses then being used to inform the second research strand.  
 
A structured interview schedule was drafted (Appendix 1), which commenced 
with a list of self instructions for the introduction (Lofland & Lofland, 1995,   
pp. 84-85). To develop rapport (Craig, 2005; Rogers 2001), drawing upon 
practitioner interview skills (Hersen, Turner & Beidel, 2007, p. 84), a sequence 
of questions was drafted, commencing with “warm up, followed by the “main 
body” and concluding with “cool off” (Robson, 2002, p. 277.). To produce 
reliable data (Cicourel, 1964, p. 74) and generate “substantive” theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p.281), a standard interview format was adopted, 
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with targeted questions exploring the subject matter in detail (Aaker, Kumar & 
Day, 1995, p. 190). 
 
Pilot Study 
 
Piloting of the interview schedule was important to address any emerging 
problems (Bryman, 2004, p. 159). Six pilot test interviews were conducted, 
split between fraud practitioners and academic colleagues. This number was 
considered sufficient to ensure the schedule contained appropriate language, 
prompting, and ordering of questions (Wilson & Sapsford, 2006, pp. 104-105). 
Having reflected upon the feedback received, amendments were made to the 
question wording.  
 
Interviewing Respondents 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Participant agreement (Moilanen, 2000, p. 382; Kastman Breuch, Olsen & 
Frantz, 2002, p. 10) was sought from academics and fraud professionals. An 
introductory letter (Appendix 2) explaining the research aims (Sweeney, 
O‟Donoghue & Whitehead, 2004, p. 315) and advising that participation was 
voluntary (Kent, 1996, pp 19-20) was issued by e-mail. Before commencing 
each dialogue, interviewees were again advised that participation was 
voluntary, and informed consent (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 99) obtained. 
Although permission was given by most academics and some fraud 
 164 
professionals to use attributed verbatim quotes, to remove the risk of 
compromising the fraud professionals, and observing the British Society of 
Criminology (2006) ethical guidelines, a decision was made to anonymise all 
quotations (Grinyer, 2002, p. 2). This posed no risk to the rigour of this 
research because interviews were digitally recorded, and anonymised 
quotations used can be validated. Participants were also offered the 
opportunity to view and comment upon the research findings if desired. 
 
Structure and Reflexivity 
 
A reflexive approach was adopted (Trauth & O‟Connor, 1991, p. 133) seeking 
to achieve “full cooperation and participation” (Spradley, 1979, pp. 82-83),  
which is generative in creating new knowledge (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 
2003, pp. 141-142). To extract candid opinion from fraud professionals, on 
occasions it was necessary to “probe” (Zeisel, 1984, pp. 140-154) and 
encourage participants to “amplify their answers” (Hoinville & Jowell, 1987,   
p. 101). Moreover, by applying an inductive approach, theory began to be 
generated during this data collection process (Morse 1991b, p. 121; Morse & 
Field, 1995, p. 10; Risjord, Moloney & Dunbar, 2001, p. 46), which assisted 
subsequent analysis, because themes began to emerge. Whenever possible, 
interviews were conducted “face-to-face” (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004, p113), 
however, due to limited accessibility to certain participants (Brace, 2007,       
p. 27), some were conducted by telephone (Williams, 2003, p. 93). To 
maximise data quality, the interview schedule was sent to respondents in 
advance (Gillham, 2007, p. 95). 
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Audio Recordings and Field Notes 
 
To capture responses to questions accurately, interviews were recorded 
(Lofland, 1971, p. 89), having first obtained consent (Robson, 2002, p. 277). 
To complement recordings, short field notes were compiled (Spradley, 1979, 
p. 74) comprising of “quotes” and “key words” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995,        
p. 90). When evaluating the field notes a “record of analysis and 
interpretation” was constructed (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p.53) thus ensuring 
accurate capture of “factual data” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 46).  
 
Security of data 
 
All data were processed and retained in a manner compliant with the Data 
Protection Act 1998. A record of participants was created using a password 
protected Excel spreadsheet. Each participant was allocated a specific 
anonymous identification number that related to their category (e.g. Academic 
1). This identification number was allocated to each audio recording, interview 
transcript and field notes. All audio files of interviews, interview transcripts and 
electronic versions of field notes were also held within specially created 
password protected files. All data were retained on a password protected 
laptop computer that remained at my home address and backup copies held 
on my password protected workplace computer and a password protected 
memory stick held in a lockable cabinet in my office, along with hard copies of 
field notes. Because I used a transcription service (Fielding, 1993, p. 147), 
which will be discussed shortly, audio recording files were copied to another 
password protected memory stick and delivered in person. To maintain data 
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security, the completed transcriptions were saved on a memory stick, and this 
was collected in person and kept in a lockable cabinet when not being used. 
Data will continue to be stored in a manner compliant with the Data Protection 
Act 1998 until any questions relating to this research have been addressed. 
All data will then be disposed of securely and will not be used for any future 
research. 
 
Transcription and Analysis 
 
Transcribing the interviews 
 
The use of a digital recorder (Branley, 2004, p. 208) produced better quality 
verbatim accounts (Seale, 1999, p. 148), thus assisting transcription accuracy 
(Stockdale, 2002, p. 2). When considering transcription, Klenke (2008) 
observes that it is “common practice for someone other than the interviewer” 
to perform this function (p. 137). Because funding was available, I elected to 
use an outside contractor to transcribe the interviews (Rafaeli, Dutton, 
Harquail & Mackie-Lewis, 1997, p. 14). Once received, careful attention was 
paid to checking the accuracy of the transcriptions (Poland, 1995; Poland, 
2003, p. 268). I listened and re-listened to the recordings (Lapadat & Lindsay, 
1999, p. 82), which was more rewarding than just reading a transcript (Milton, 
2007, p. 73). Consequently, verification of the transcripts was achieved by 
cross checking them against the recordings (Skinner, Biscope, Poland & 
Goldberg, 2003, e32). 
 
 
 167 
Analysing the Interviews 
 
According to Pyett (2003) “analysing interview data involves critical 
assessment and interpretation of the participant‟s narratives” (p. 1173). 
Because qualitative data are not always easily converted into measurable 
units of narrative (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973, p.108), selecting the 
appropriate analytical methodology was crucial. The analysis was therefore 
data driven (Heritage, 1984, p.243), the units being defined at the outset 
(Punch, 1998, p. 153) as identifiable commonalities of attitude towards key 
topics discussed during the interview (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 187).  
To identify recurring themes and patterns (Saks & Allsop, 2007, p.124;        
Re Velle, 2004, p. 200; Boyzatis, 1998, p. 7; Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 223) 
the transcripts were subjected to thematic content analysis (Lumby, 1998, p. 
110; Pierre, 2000, p. 252; Tate & Dobson, 2000, p.221; Green & Thorogood, 
2004, p. 177; Newell & Burnard, 2006, p. 100). This generated emergent data 
categories (Ryan & Coughlan, 2009, p. 193; Ritchie, Spencer & O‟Connor, 
2003, p. 262) in the form of general themes (McLaughlin, McKenna, Leslie, 
Robinson & Moore, 2006, p. 684).  
 
When conducting analysis, computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (Fielding & Lee, 1991) was rejected in favour of Microsoft Word 
(Kelle, 1997, p. 5) because the transcripts were already in this application and 
it offered “excellent functionality for organizing, sorting and retrieving data” 
and enhanced “the rigour of data analysis” (Ruona, 2005, p. 234). Highlighting 
 168 
and tagging (Ryan, 2004, p. 113) using colour codes (Burnard, 1991, p. 463) 
enabled quick retrieval of specific text (Lichtman, 2010, p. 201).  
 
Evaluating the quality of the data harvested from the interviews before 
administering the quantitative instrument was essential. The criteria of validity 
and reliability were therefore applied to these data, which will be discussed in 
more detail later. The findings have been documented in a “readable product” 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 102), incorporating intentional subjectivity to 
capture the explicit meanings constructed by participants (Cho & Trent, 2006, 
p 330), by applying the criteria “is it useful?” (Reason & Rowan, 1981,         
pp. 243-244). 
 
The Quantitative Strand 
 
Introduction 
 
To obtain a „snapshot‟ of extant attitudes to fraud measurement in the 
empirical setting (Brown and Dowling,1998, pp. 82-83) it was essential to 
measure and count this phenomenon (Langdridge, 2004, p. 13) through 
systematic data collection (Mertens & McLaughlin, 2004, p. 52). Informed by 
the proposed number of observations (Mumford, 2006, p. 383) to ensure a 
representative sample of organisations within the public, private and 
charitable sectors, a questionnaire was considered the apposite data 
collection methodology (Denscombe, 2003, p. 145). A questionnaire is 
defined as a data collection instrument completed by the respondent in written 
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format (Polit & Hungler, 1999, p. 201). The advantages of using such an 
instrument were that it afforded respondents greater anonymity (Kumar, 2005, 
p.117), the target audience was clearly defined, and most respondents knew 
what was required of them (Jack & Clarke, 1998, cited by Marshall, 2005, p. 
132).  
 
Questionnaire Design 
 
Introduction 
 
Careful attention was paid to the design of the research instrument (Stone, 
1993, p. 1264), the objective being to collect information for subsequent 
analysis using identical written questions (Denscombe, 2003, pp.144-145).  
The project aims were revisited to ensure that the instrument would collect the 
data required to assess the feasibility of the research argument (Frazer & 
Lawley, 2000, p. 7; Seale and Filmer, 1998, p. 129).  
 
Evaluating Existing Material 
 
The next consideration was the availability of proven material, either from an 
existing instrument or from a question bank (Bryman, 2004, p. 160; Walklate, 
2000, p. 194). The advantages of using a previously validated and published 
questionnaire are that it saves resources and affords the opportunity to 
compare findings with those from previous research (Boynton & Greenhalgh, 
2004, p. 1313; Williams, 2003, p. 247). A thorough search of the University of 
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Surrey question bank (Bryman, 2004, p. 162) and the “U.K. Data Archive” 
(Payne & Payne, 2004, p. 190) failed to identify suitable instruments.  
Nonetheless, this exercise provided guidance on developing questions that 
would gather suitable data for analysis (de Vaus, 1996, p. 81).   
 
Formulating the Questions 
 
Firstly, standard questions were constructed that would obtain data on which  
sector the organisation represented (mandatory), the role of the respondent 
(optional), and the organisation‟s function (optional), together with those 
intended to obtain richer information (Giddens, 1993, p. 687). The instrument 
also contained closed questions (Marshall, 2005, p.132), and filter questions 
(Oppenheim, 1992, p. 111) excluding respondents whose organisation did not 
measure fraud from some questions. The ability to identify the sector 
represented by each questionnaire facilitated the collection of valuable data 
on the extent to which fraud is measured by each category, and any 
significant differences of opinion about the research argument. 
 
Attitude statements in the form of “a single sentence that expresses a point of 
view” (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 174) were included to measure the respondents 
“position on the attitude continuum” (Moser & Kalton, 1971, p. 358). Having 
considered scaling options, Thurstone and Guttman scales (Thurstone & 
Chave, 1929; Guttman, 1944) were discounted because they required 
“complex construction and analysis” (Bell. 1999, p. 185). A pragmatic decision 
was taken to adopt Likert‟s (1932) summated rating approach because it was 
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easy to administer, appeared “interesting to respondents” (Robson, 2002,     
p. 293) and benefited the research by affording swift collection of volume 
data.  
 
Layout 
 
The survey commenced with the most straightforward questions, the 
remaining sequence being carefully drafted to avoid leading the respondent 
towards “inevitable answers” (Denscombe, 2003, p. 154). To obtain attitudinal 
responses, the instrument followed a shortened “funnel approach”, which 
directed respondents to the specific point of the research (Oppenheim, 1992, 
p. 110). The attractiveness of the questionnaire (Dillman, 1983) and its 
apparent ease of completion (Robson, 2002, p. 249) influenced the decision 
to circulate the instrument using „the web‟, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. For the purpose of the pilot however, the instrument was circulated 
electronically as a Microsoft Word document.  
 
The Pilot Study 
 
Having completed the first draft, the instrument was piloted to evaluate the 
clarity of the instructions (Bell, 1999, pp. 127-128) and establish whether the 
questions flowed (Bryman, 2004, p. 160). The principal objective however, 
was to measure the instrument‟s ability to collect essential data (Colton & 
Covert, 2007, p. 139). Six participants from friends and family (Bell, 1999,     
p. 128) provided feedback on readability and ease of navigation. A further six 
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associates from a network of fraud professionals evaluated the 
questionnaire‟s technical content, which ensured the pre-test sample size fell 
within the range of between twelve and fifty considered adequate by 
methodologists (Sheatsley, 1983, p. 226; Sudman, 1983, p. 181). All 
participants were excluded from the final sample. Analysis of responses 
resulted in amendments being made to the content and structure of the 
questionnaire (Frazer & Lawley, 2000, p. 34), a copy of which may be found 
at Appendix 3.   
 
Sampling Strategy 
 
Introduction 
 
For the purpose of the quantitative instrument, a sample is defined as “a 
miniature version of the population” (Fink, 1995, p. 1). The adoption of 
“stratified random sampling” (Bryman, 2004, p. 92) was informed by the 
research objectives and the quantity of data required (Mason, 1994, pp.      
91-92; Weber, 1985, pp. 42-43). The decision making process behind this 
decision will now be discussed. 
 
The Target Population 
 
The “target population” (Bryman, 2004, p. 85) is defined as “the aggregate of 
persons…under investigation” (Moser and Kalton, 1971, p. 5). To identify the 
target population for the survey, an extant publication was selected. 
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Accordingly, the National Fraud Authority‟s (2011) Annual Fraud Indicator was 
subjected to content analysis (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 21; Ezzy, 2002, p 83). 
This confirmed that the public and private sectors were relevant, but data also 
confirmed that voluntary and charitable organisations were also experiencing 
significant losses to fraud. Consequently, a decision was taken to undertake a 
theoretical sample using organisations from all three sectors to “maximise 
theoretical development” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
 
A stratified sampling plan (Neef, Siesfeld & Cefola, 1998, p. 280; Vogt, 2005, 
p. 29) was designed, this being compatible with the type of analysis required 
(National Audit Office, n.d., p. 4), and producing a more representative 
sample (Thrusfield, 2007, p, 231). The population was divided into three 
homogenous groups (Babbie, 2007, p. 205), or “strata” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 
115), and due to size, the public sector was divided into central and local 
government in an attempt to achieve adequate representation from both. 
When reporting the research findings, for consistency within this thesis, they 
are combined and referred to generically as the public sector. The sampling 
frame (Babbie, 2008, p. 221) for organisations within the specified population 
(David & Sutton, 2004, p. 151) was easily obtainable from websites containing 
electronic lists (Denscombe, 2003, p. 17) of central government departments, 
local authorities, the FTSE 100 and 250 companies and charities. Details of 
websites used for the sampling frame can be found at Appendix 4. 
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Sample Size 
 
To determine the sample size, the National Audit Office (NAO) (n.d.) guidance 
on sampling was consulted. Because the population size and likely response 
rate were unknown, a 50% proportion was used (NAO, n.d., p. 8). To achieve 
a manageable sample size for a lone researcher, a precision level of 12% with 
a 95% confidence level was selected. This revealed that the minimum sample 
size for each stratum was 66 (NAO, n.d., p. 9). The confidence level selected 
was to enable “forceful conclusions” to be drawn from the data harvested 
(NAO, n.d., p. 7). 
 
Because non-response rates are a disadvantage of questionnaires (Murray 
Thomas, 2003, p.142; Fitzgerald & Cox, 1987, p. 90; Wiersma, 1975, p.142), 
thought was given to how sufficient units from each stratum (Crocker, Chiu & 
Charney, 1984, p. 165; Foreman, 1991, p. 99) could be harvested. According 
to Bryman (2004, p. 98), the sample should be increased as a contingency for 
possible non-response. To estimate the expected response rate for 
questionnaires, meta-analysis, specifically “the analysis of analyses” (Glass, 
McGraw & Smith, 1981, p. 12) was conducted of relevant literature. This 
indicated that response rates were higher for electronically administered 
questionnaires, these ranging from 60% (Mattick & Bligh, 2005, p. 607) to 
70% (Sproull, 1986). These data were also influential in determining how the 
research instrument was circulated, which will be discussed further later in 
this chapter. Research conducted into response rates in academic studies 
calculated average response rates by managers as 61.8% Baruch (1999). 
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Using these data, the likely non-response rate was estimated at 40%. The 
sample size was adjusted accordingly, resulting in an initial issue of 110 
requests to complete the online questionnaire per sector. To select the 
recipient organisations, a simple random sample was conducted, drawing 
upon the sampling frame already identified for each of these strata (Schofield, 
2006, p. 32), this methodology being considered “fit for purpose” (May, 2001, 
p. 95). 
 
Circulating the questionnaire 
 
There are different options for questionnaire circulation, however current 
practice favours a web based questionnaire (Sapsford, 2006, p. 130), this 
being the most “easily adaptable tool” (Hewson, Yule, Laurent & Vogel, 2003, 
p. 43). One pertinent advantage of circulating a questionnaire electronically is 
reduced cost (Thach, 1995, p. 2787; Kiesler & Sproull, 1986, pp. 403-404). 
Others include a higher response rate (Thach, 1995, p. 31), rapid receipt of 
research data (Erwin & Blewett, 1998, p. 119; Fenton & Morris, 2003, p. 64) 
and ease of completion (Hollingsworth, Frush, Cross & Lucaya, 2003, p. 405; 
Frensch, 2007, p. 365). The principal advantage however, is that it can utilise 
“a much wider variety of embellishments in terms of appearance” (Bryman, 
2008, p. 645).  
 
This project elected to use an electronic survey made available via a “weblink” 
(de Vaus, 2002, p. 124), this being an efficient way of reaching the target 
population (Yun & Trumbo, 2000). There are a number of internet based 
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survey programmes available (Thomas, Nelson & Silverman, 2011, p. 284), 
however, Bristol Online Survey (BOS) was selected because it was used by 
my employer‟s research centre and I was able to draw upon an existing 
knowledge base of experienced users. Additionally, this programme displayed 
survey results in an easy to understand format, and offered a wide range of 
analytical functionality including the cross tabulation of results and cross-
referencing of questions (Bristol Online Survey, n.d., p.1), which simplified the 
data analysis process. 
  
Launching the Questionnaire 
 
Introduction 
 
Having identified the target population, BOS was accessed, an online version 
of the questionnaire created, and the instrument „launched‟ .This created a 
hyperlink to the questionnaire to be issued to research participants. A letter of 
introduction was then drafted which explained the purpose of the research 
and included the hyperlink to the questionnaire (Appendix 5).  
 
Gatekeepers 
 
Because the identity of the individuals responsible for managing fraud or 
internal audit was unknown, a covering letter (Bryman, 2008, p. 647) was sent 
by e-mail to the Chief Executive of each organisation (Appendix 6). This 
requested that they act as “gatekeeper” (Bogden & Bicklen, 1992, p. 116; Lee, 
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1993, p.122; Benton & Cormack, 2000, p. 131) by forwarding the 
questionnaire web link to the person most qualified to respond. Where the 
Chief Executive‟s e-mail address was unavailable, the request was issued to 
the most appropriate e-mail address found on the organisation‟s website. 
Each e-mail sent requested a „delivery receipt‟ to confirm it had reached the 
intended recipient organisation. Contact details were supplied with the 
introductory e-mail, should any clarification have been required to ensure 
respondents understood the content and purpose of the instrument (Brugha, 
1995, p. 9).  
 
Response Rates 
 
Response rates were regularly monitored, however because anonymity had 
been promised, there was no audit trail of respondents, which prevented any 
follow up action being taken (Bell, 1999, p.130). Due to a low response rate 
from the initial cohort, a second list of organisations was created using 
another random sample, applying a different calculation methodology to 
prevent duplication. The public and charitable sector organisations were 
identified using the original sampling frames. Some of the private sector 
organisations were drawn from a random sample of the FTSE 250 list, the 
remainder being taken from a list of members of the Association of British 
Insurers obtained from their website, and from a list of banks obtained from 
the Financial Services Authority website. These industries were selected 
because they had been identified during the literature review as experiencing 
high losses to fraud. Further monitoring of response rates suggested that the 
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required number of responses from the private sector was unlikely to be 
achieved. To address non response bias, the questionnaire was also posted 
to a newsgroup (Hewson, Yule, Laurent and Vogel, 2003, p.82) subscribing to 
the University of Portsmouth‟s Centre for Counter Fraud Studies. This also 
increased the number of public sector responses. Whilst it is accepted there 
may be an element of participant bias, all intended participants were fraud 
practitioners, and thus possessing the required understanding of the 
technicalities of fraud risk and measurement to participate in the survey. 
Furthermore, because members of the newsgroup represented both public 
and private sectors and held a variety of posts within „the fraud arena‟, their 
input was considered valuable to the research. There was a limited risk to 
integrity due to the fact that subscribers to this forum included students with 
no practitioner experience. To address this, each response was individually 
assessed for discrepancies or inconsistencies in answers to ensure that the 
respondent demonstrated appropriate fraud knowledge. This suggested all 
respondents within the sample were legitimate actors. To gather data in 
sufficient quantity to meet the statistical requirement set, there was no option 
but to use this forum. The resultant data, however, has ensured that this is the 
largest survey to date on this subject, thus providing a starting point for the 
development of new knowledge. 
 
Coding and Analysis  
 
According to Stone (1993, p. 165), “advance coding saves time”, therefore 
having completed the survey, the most appropriate coding methodology was 
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identified. Those questions containing scaled fixed choice answers had been 
pre-coded at the design stage (Bryman, 2004, p. 146). As previously 
discussed, the inbuilt functionality within Bristol Online Survey provided a 
significant analytical capability which assisted in making sense of the data 
collected, and incorporated a coding functionality. The online survey package 
also contained the facility to export data for use in other applications. Data 
were therefore exported into “Microsoft Excel” (Denscombe, 2003, p. 237) for 
supplementary analysis. 
 
Rigour  
 
Introduction 
 
There has been much debate concerning the use of validity and reliability 
when conducting naturalistic enquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Sandelowski, 
1986; Mishler, 1990, Lincoln, 1995; Bradbury & Reason, 2001; Morse, 
Swanson & Kuzel, 2001; Atkinson, Coffey & Delamont, 2003). Whilst these 
terms are usually linked to quantitative enquiry (Altheide & Johnson, 1994; 
Leininger 1994; Peck & Secker, 1999; Tobin & Begley, 2004, p. 390), the 
criteria have been considered when evaluating both datasets, because they 
were also considered “pertinent to qualitative enquiry” (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, 
Olson and Spiers, 2002, p. 4). It was not appropriate to borrow rules from one 
to address the rigour of the other (Morse, 2006, p.6), consequently, rules 
specific to each paradigm were applied (Morse et al, 2002, p. 6). 
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Validity  
 
Validity may be defined as trustworthiness (Angen, 2000, p. 387), meaning 
“the extent to which the research findings represent reality” (Morse & Field, 
1995, p. 244). To address “threats to validity” (Whittemore, Chase & Mandle, 
2001, pp. 527-528) in the qualitative strand, the criteria of “description, 
interpretation and theory” were applied (Maxwell, 1992, p. 279). Pilot testing 
of the interview questions achieved “face validity”, by confirming they were “up 
to the job” (Farrall, Bannister, Ditton & Gilchrist, 1997, p. 1). Utilising a digital 
recorder ensured accurate recording of the interview content (Wolcott, 1990, 
p, 132). To reduce interviewer bias “guidance and direction” of interviewees, 
“were kept to a minimum” (Merton & Kendall, 1946, p. 555).  A transparent 
audit trail was achieved by maintaining a research decision log supplemented 
with a research diary recording “activities with dates, details of data collected, 
data analysis and personal reactions” (Cryer, 1996, p. 74).  
 
Increased accuracy and validity of data (Caldwell & Mou, 1995, p. 145) were 
achieved using thematic analysis of interview transcripts which organised data 
into opinions and beliefs using human coding (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 111). 
Furthermore, to ensure “good qualitative inquiry” (Morse, 2006, p. 6), data 
were critically evaluated during analysis, thus enabling “continual evaluation 
of subjective responses” (Finlay, 2002, p. 532). There was a reduced risk to 
validity posed by the telephone interviews, being more impersonal than face 
to face contact they were “less effected by interviewer bias” (Mitchell & Jolley, 
2009, p. 268). Furthermore, these anonomysed data were periodically shown 
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to academic colleagues that teach criminological research as a 
supplementary means of testing validity.  
 
In terms of the quantitative strand, piloting tested the validity of the 
questionnaire (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 171), establishing that the instrument 
measured the concept it aimed to measure (Williams, 2003, p. 249; Gilbert, 
1993, p. 27). A comparison of the responses from the pilot test and those from 
the developed quantitative instrument confirmed that the measure worked “in 
a consistent way” (Proctor, 1993, p. 126). To limit researcher bias (Robson, 
2002, p. 174), all actions and decisions were again recorded in the decision 
log and research diary. Data collected from the quantitative instrument were 
also periodically shown to academic colleagues as a supplementary measure 
to limit threats to validity.  
 
I acknowledge that the interpretation of results could have been influenced by 
personal values and assumptions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003b, p. 703; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 37), which often occurs when the researcher is 
unable to bracket personal biases (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 236).  
This threat was reduced by the application of triangulation (Robson, 2002, p. 
174) through the use of different methods (Denzin, 1988; Moran-Ellis et al, 
2006, p.47), which further reduced the risk of researcher and respondent bias 
(Padgett, 1998, p. 95; Duffy, 1987, p. 132; Mitchell, 1986, p. 21). Furthermore, 
collecting data from several sources using recorded interviews, field notes 
and a quantitative research instrument sought to limit the effects of participant 
bias (Fox, Martin & Green, 2007, p. 17). Triangulation also helped evaluate 
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the accuracy of the conclusions drawn (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993, p. 48). 
Finally, when reporting the project findings, care has been taken “not to 
generalize beyond the groups in the experiment” (Creswell, 2003, p. 162). 
Consequently, the findings acknowledge that any support for the arguments 
underpinning this research is limited to those individuals sampled. It is fair to 
say however, that the responses may be considered a micro sample of 
opinion, which should a larger survey be conducted, might be replicated.   
 
Reliability  
 
According to Morse (1999), “good rigorous research must be reliable”           
(p. 717). Based upon the researcher‟s judgements (Brink, 1991, p. 167-168), 
reliability establishes whether a research technique would yield the same 
results if repeatedly applied (Babbie, 1997; Maxfield & Babbie, 2001, p. 426). 
Within this chapter, I have documented the methods used to collect and 
record data and will draw upon verbatim quotes and field notes in subsequent 
chapters when presenting my findings (Rowan & Huston, 1997, p. 1445). This 
has enabled accurate reporting of data (Lewis, 2009, p. 7), which arguably, 
has strengthened the reliability of the research findings.  
 
One of the principal strengths of the qualitative paradigm is that reliability is 
easy to establish (Alston & Bowles, 2003, p. 205; Byars & Love, 1973, p. 92).  
Equally, the application of scientific procedures increased the probability of 
data gathered being relevant to the question asked (Sellitz, Jahoda and 
Deutsch (1965, p. 2). Furthermore, careful development of the quantitative 
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instrument and its sampling methodology increased the probability that similar 
results would be obtained by others drawing upon the same criteria (Newell, 
1993, p. 99). This was determined through the application of “test-retest 
reliability”, whereby three months after piloting, the questionnaire was          
re-issued to those involved in the pilot test and a comparison of responses 
undertaken to measure stability (Litwin, 1995, p. 8), which demonstrated 
consistency in responses. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
Adherence to the British Society of Criminology (BSC) (2006) ethical 
guidelines was maintained throughout this research to maintain high 
standards, good practice, quality, transparency and integrity throughout the 
research. Consideration was therefore given to my responsibilities towards 
the discipline of criminology, colleagues and research participants (BSC, 
2006, p. 2) which informed the ethical framework of this study. The proposal 
to conduct this research was examined and authorised by the University of 
Portsmouth Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Limitations 
 
I acknowledge that there are limitations inherent in this type of study. For 
example, the decision to focus on a limited number of key informants within 
the qualitative study, arguable places authenticity over reliability (Silverman, 
1993, p. 10). It was important for this research to obtain the views of 
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academics with knowledge of fraud measurement, or the impact of fraud in 
the UK. However, this is an area that has received limited attention from 
academia, thus resulting in a „small pool‟ of potential interviewees. Having 
pre-determined the number of interviews required, and through purposive 
sampling identified potential interviewees, the criteria determining selection 
was willingness to participate and availability for interview. Consequently, 
those interviewed may not be considered totally representative of all 
academic opinion within this field. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that those 
interviewed fully understood the research subject, having all published on 
fraud losses or fraud loss measurement. Accordingly, they were able to 
provide valuable data, which when interpreted and used carefully did help to 
establish an evidence base on the feasibility of this study and the data 
required from the questionnaire. The remaining six interviewees were fraud 
professionals selected upon the basis of convenience, specifically that they 
were known by the researched or known to the researcher via personal 
contacts. Consequently, being a small sample their views may not be fully 
representative of the entire Counter Fraud Specialist population. However, the 
fraud professionals are all practitioners involved in fraud loss measurement, 
and offered informed opinion on the research argument from a practice 
perspective. 
 
Moving on to discuss the quantitative strand of the research, I again 
acknowledge there are limitations with the resultant data in terms of 
representation of the broader population.  However, I do not claim these data 
to be totally representative, rather a „barometer of opinion‟ that may reflect the 
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views of the counter fraud specialist population. It is accepted that the 
respondents do not represent a random sample of the counter fraud specialist 
population due to the selection criteria employed, as previously discussed 
within this chapter. Secondly, self selection to participate also introduced an 
element of bias. Thirdly, by using a „gatekeeper‟ to access some of the 
respondents, I have had to take on trust that the respondent is the most 
suitably qualified person within that organisation, and has sufficient technical 
knowledge to provide reliable answers. Finally, the use of a newsgroup to 
source participants may result in multiple respondents from the same 
organisation, thus again limiting the extent to which the sample may be 
considered representative 
 
In hindsight I also acknowledge that the questionnaire could have been 
improved. Firstly, a question sourcing details of the size of the respondent‟s 
organisation might have provided valuable insight into some of the answers 
provided concerning the fraud loss measurement activities undertaken by that 
organisation. I could also have provided more opportunities to answer „do not 
know‟ to some of the technical questions. By not providing this opportunity 
there is a risk that some respondents may have guessed when providing their 
answers. To limit this risk however, the questionnaire did contain explanations 
about what constitutes a fraud loss measurement exercise, what is meant by 
a British Standard and an explanation of the US Improper Payments 
Information Act 2002. Finally an additional question about how viable it is to 
measure fraud might also have offered an important insight into the 
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practicability of implementing the proposed option for change mandating fraud 
loss measurement 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the methodological and epistemological 
considerations underpinning this research. The research design has been 
outlined and justification offered for the selection of paradigms. The 
methodology for participant selection and the ethical considerations of this 
research have been explored. The data collection, evaluation, collation and 
analysis methodologies have been fully justified. Finally, the limitations of this 
research have been discussed 
 
The following three chapters present the research findings by documenting 
the emergent themes, patterns and attitudes in relation to the research 
argument underpinning this study, commencing with the current standing of 
fraud and its measurement. 
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Chapter 4: What, When, Who, Why, and How?  
 
Introduction  
 
This is the first of three chapters presenting the research findings, and 
concentrates on the questions posed relating to fraud measurement 
methodology, frequency and importance. Initially, characteristics of the 
questionnaire respondents will be presented, offering a breakdown of 
representation by sector, individual position and organisational function. 
Verbatim responses from academics and fraud professionals to the question 
„What do you define as fraud?‘ will be then be discussed. This question was 
only posed to interviewees, because it was considered that semi-structured 
interviews afforded better opportunity to obtain detailed explanations from 
respondents.  
 
Data harvested through the questionnaire are presented using tables and 
charts, supplemented where applicable, with relevant interview responses. 
The percentages shown in all tables are rounded up; consequently in some 
instances the sum may not equal one hundred. Firstly, responses to the 
question on who measures fraud will be reported, followed by explanations on 
why organisations fail to measure fraud. Moving on, this chapter will then 
discuss fraud measurement methodology, before offering opinions on the 
ideal measurement frequency.  Finally, questionnaire respondent‟s 
explanations about what fraud typologies their „organisation‟ measures will be 
discussed.  
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To maintain confidentiality, within all three findings chapters, verbatim 
responses from interview respondents have been allocated the identifier of 
either „A‟ (Academic) or FP (Fraud Professional), combined with a numerical 
identifier (e.g. FP1). It should be noted that fraud professionals one and three 
represent the private sector, and the remainder the public sector. Similarly, 
responses harvested from the questionnaire „free text‟ sections are reported in 
a manner that maintains participant confidentiality, whilst indicating the sector, 
industry or department, and where relevant but with no risk of compromise, 
the respondent‟s position. Finally, within all findings chapters, the 
„voluntary/charitable‟ sector is represented as „VC‟. 
 
The Sample 
 
Sector Representation 
 
The table below details the useable responses received, broken down by 
sector.  
 
Table 3: Please indicate which sector your organisation falls within 
 
 n % 
Public 85 46 
Private 68 37 
Voluntary/Charitable 32 17 
Totals 185  
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The response rate needed to achieve the desired level of statistical 
confidence discussed in the methodology chapter was achieved within the 
public and private sectors. The VC sector response rate is disappointing, but 
consistent with past research, as discussed within the literature review. 
Arguably, this low response rate evidences a reluctance to confront „fraud‟ by 
this sector. I contend however, that the response rate provides sufficient data 
to conduct meaningful analysis, and while generalizability is limited, they offer 
a barometer of opinion that might be considered representative of a wider 
population.  
 
Respondent‟s Position 
 
Analysis of the optional answers to question 2, provided by 60% (n=111) has 
established that posts held by respondents include directors, senior 
management, middle management, investigators and administrators. Data of 
note are provided in the table below: 
 
Table 4: What is your position in the organisation? 
 n % 
Manager 31 17 
Investigator 24 13 
‘Head’ 15 8 
Director 11 6 
‘Senior’ 5 3 
Auditor  4 2 
‘Group’ 2 1 
Other 19 10 
No Response 74 40 
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Respondents selecting the „other‟ option include owner, bursar, analyst, chief 
accountant, managing director, underwriter and lead auditor.  
 
Organisational Function 
 
The 88 responses to the optional question concerning organisational function 
reveal that all major organisations and industries within the public and private 
sectors are represented. The VC sector has not been similarly sub-
categorised, because identification at sector level is all that is required for this 
research. Details of organisational representation from the public and private 
sectors are presented below. 
 
Table 5: What is your organisation’s function? 
 
 n % 
Local Authority 21 11 
Local Government 16 9 
Insurance 15 8 
Welfare/ Benefits 11 6 
Health 8 4 
Banking/ Financial 7 4 
Education 5 3 
Care 3 2 
Retail 2 1 
No Response 97 52 
Total 185  
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Representation and Generalizability 
 
I contend these data suggest that questionnaire respondents offer adequate 
representation of those involved in the fraud environment. Whilst the sample 
size is small, they do represent the public sector organisations and private 
sector industries that are known to experience significant fraud losses, as 
detailed within the Annual Fraud Indicator (NFA, 2012). Consequently, whilst 
there may be limitations on generalizability, in particular because the size of 
the organisations represented is not known, there are sufficient data to enable 
meaningful analysis to be conducted, thus offering some representation of 
opinion on fraud measurement.  
 
What is fraud? 
 
One of the historical issues hampering accurate measurement is the absence 
of a consistent definition of fraud for this purpose. The first objective of this 
research therefore, was to gather data to inform the construction of a 
definition of fraud that is specific, transferable and easy to understand by 
measurement practitioners. Fraud professionals and academics were 
therefore requested to offer their definition of fraud in the context of 
measurement. Predictably, there are varying opinions offered by interview 
respondents, with some contending that extant legislation offers a definition 
suitable for cross sector measurement exercises.  
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The noteworthy responses are detailed below, commencing with two 
contending that existing legislation is adequate. 
 
―The Fraud Act.‖ (A3) 
 
―The Fraud Act offers a universal definition that can 
be used for measurement purpose.‖ (FP4) 
 
Conversely, another interviewee argues that this legislation fails to offer a 
suitable definition for fraud measurement purposes, 
 
―the Fraud Act is as close as we come to having a 
good quality definition. It certainly makes it clear in 
your mind as to what‘s fraud and what‘s not fraud but 
it certainly doesn‘t help the person who is quantifying 
if the case should be counted as fraud for the 
purpose of measurement.‖ (FP2) 
 
One differing opinion of interest is that the civil definition is more appropriate 
for measurement purposes, offering both increased clarity and the opportunity 
to treat fraud as a business cost; 
 
―If you have a criminal law definition then you are 
excluding some losses, which can be recovered and 
taken forward in civil law so we use the civil law 
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concept of fraud which has been prevalent in this 
country since 1889 Derry v. Peak.‖ (FP1) 
 
Interestingly, each interviewee offered their own definition, thus illustrating the 
difficulties previously identified in chapter one concerning lack of a standard 
definition. The definitions offered however, did contain some recurring 
themes, including deliberate intent to deceive and the gaining of advantage, 
as evidenced below; 
 
―It is the obtaining of financial advantage or cause of 
loss by invisible expressive deception. It is the 
mechanism by which a fraudster gains unlawful 
advantage or causes unlawful losses.‖ (A2) 
 
―The deliberate misuse of circumstances with the 
intention of gaining some advantage. Or withholding 
information that should be given.‖ (A4) 
 
―It involves a false declaration, actus reus, with intent 
to deceive, mens rea. In terms of a criminal offence it 
involves dishonest intent to gain an advantage 
through a deception.‖ (FP3)  
 
The themes identified within the opinions offered above are worthy of 
consideration when developing a standard definition of fraud for the purpose 
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of loss measurement.  This chapter will now report the responses to the 
question „do you measure fraud?‟ 
 
Do you measure fraud? 
 
Using questionnaire data, this section now examines the extent of fraud 
measurement by sector, before presenting explanations offered, on why the 
respondent‟s organisation doesn‟t measure fraud. 
 
Who measures fraud? 
 
The table below provides data outlining the levels of fraud measurement by 
sector as indicated by survey participants. 
 
Table 6: Does your organisation measure fraud? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 60 49 14 123 66 
No 25 19 18 62 34 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
 
Within the sample, there is an active level of fraud measurement across all 
three sectors, with of 66% (n=123) of all respondents answering “yes” to this 
question. This is broken down by sector in the chart overleaf, which indicates 
that the highest level of measurement activity within the organisations 
represented falls within the private sector, this being 72% (n=49). 
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Chart 1: Does your organisation measure fraud? (Percentages by 
sector) 
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When drilling down to the micro level however, some very interesting and 
significant responses are identified. For example, the fact that 29% (n=25) of 
respondents from the public sector responded „no‟ to this question is of 
immediate concern, but debatably endorses the arguments that have been 
developed within Chapter One that there is a lack of commitment within the 
public sector to fully embrace fraud loss measurement. Of particular 
relevance, is that of these 25 respondents, 7 indicated they were from Local 
Authorities and another 5 declared their organisational function as local 
government. What is noteworthy is that the declared role within their 
organisations indicates a spread of functions including fraud manager, risk 
manager and senior auditor. It is somewhat paradoxical however, that 
organisations spending public money create such posts, but neglect to 
measure fraud. Analysis of data relating to organisational functions reveals 
that there are central government departments that fail to measure fraud. Of 
further interest are the responses describing organisational function as 
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“regulation of the public sector” and “legal aid”. The latter is of particular 
significance when considering the proposals to reduce the legal aid budget, 
yet this government department has no idea of the extent of losses to 
fraudulent transactions. 
 
Moving on to examine the private sector, one surprising discovery is that 
whilst the ABI are creating an „Insurance Fraud Register‟ documenting proven 
fraudsters, two insurance industry respondents indicated that their 
organisation does not measure fraud. Other examples of lack of fraud 
measurement within parts of the industry, as revealed by the sample, include 
retail and manufacturing. Finally, the results from the VC sector reveal that 
56% (n=18) of respondents indicated that no fraud loss measurement takes 
place. Whilst the response rate from this sector was low, I contend that this 
still offers a starting point for estimating the degree of fraud measurement 
activity within this sector, and suggests an urgent requirement to increase 
fraud awareness and promote the financial benefits of regular measurement 
and the development of informed control strategies. Continuing the theme of 
reluctance to measure, the following section will discuss the responses 
offered to explain why certain organisations do not measure fraud. 
 
Why no Measurement? 
 
I will now explore the question of why some organisations fail to measure 
fraud, commencing with the chart overleaf, which presents the responses to 
this question from sample respondents representing all three sectors. 
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Chart 2: If your organisation does not measure fraud please indicate 
why 
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Analysis of the 75 responses to this question provides some interesting data. 
Of significance are the 11 respondents from the private sector and 7 from the 
VC sector who indicated that there is no fraud in their organisation. One 
noteworthy explanation offered by a respondent from this sector advises that:  
 
―because we are a religious charity there is no fraud.‖  
 
The most significant question raised by these responses is that if the 
organisations do not measure, how can they be certain there is no fraud? 
I maintain there are two possible explanations for these data, firstly a 
continuing lack of fraud awareness within these two sectors, and secondly 
there being a reluctance to accept the existence of fraud, generated by fear of 
the impact such an admission might create. This latter contention is supported 
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by the 5 private sector and 3 VC sector respondents who indicated concern 
about adverse publicity from releasing such information. This issue however, 
could be addressed by being seen to rectify the situation. To ensure all 
organisations measure fraud, let alone to a predetermined standard of 
accuracy, may require implementation of some persuasive strategies, 
particularly when noting that respondents from all sectors indicated that their 
organisation had no need to be aware of fraud.   
 
When studying the „other‟ responses explaining why organisations do not 
measure fraud, there are certain answers that arguably suggest management 
complacency and failure to grasp the full impact of fraud. For example, a chief  
executive of a charity explains that, 
 
―given the nature of my organisation, significant fraud 
is unlikely. Low level fraud is inevitable but we can 
live with it.‖ 
 
Another interesting response offered by the head of internal audit from a  
charity indicates that fraud measurement, 
 
―Is seen as a low priority because the level of fraud is 
perceived to be low and it is so difficult to gain an 
accurate measurement.‖ 
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This suggests there is an urgent need to educate the VC sector about fraud 
risks, and in view of the reluctance to embrace fraud loss measurement, there 
may be a requirement to mandate the process in some way.   
 
Moving on to the public sector, there is evidence within the sample of a 
continuing reluctance by certain departments to acknowledge that fraud exists 
and should be measured. One explanation for lack of fraud measurement is 
offered by a local authority fraud manager, who reveals that, 
 
―Senior management and/or elected members are 
ambivalent towards fraud and corruption.‖ 
 
A similar response is offered by a local government fraud services manager,  
who succinctly advises that fraud is not measured because there is,  
 
―no interest!‖ 
 
This suggests that there is also a requirement for a directed strategy towards 
educating senior local government managers about managing and measuring 
fraud. The issue of elected members being ambivalent to fraud and 
corruption, particularly having regard to the parliamentary expenses fraud 
cases, might suggest that similar fraud typologies are equally prevalent within 
local government. Lamentably, there appears to be a reduction in terms of  
 
 
 200 
fraud measurement within certain healthcare trusts, one fraud specialist 
revealing that 
 
―Other priorities are considered more important.‖ 
 
This response is disappointing when considering the previous work 
undertaken centrally within the NHS to measure fraud. This might however, 
offer an explanation for the lack of recent fraud loss data reported by this 
department, which was discussed in the literature review. Debatably, this also 
supports the argument for direct action within the public sector to introduce 
regular fraud loss measurement exercises across all departments which apply 
common sampling and not just a count of detected fraud. Whilst the cabinet 
office may have some authority, I maintain that even issuing directives may 
not fully address the lack of activity within central government departments, 
something that may only be rectified by creating a statute mandating 
measurement. 
 
In further support of this contention, I offer the response from a manager 
within the department charged with regulating the public sector who reveals 
that: 
 
―the focus tends to be on measuring fraud in 
organisations we regulate rather than our own.‖ 
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Of equal concern is the response from a „manager‟ working within the legal 
aid department, who explains that fraud is not measured due to, 
 
―concern about adverse publicity if results made 
public.‖ 
 
Arguably, this reluctance to confront the fraud problem offers additional 
credence to the argument for mandating measurement by some means, whilst 
also educating senior managers on the business benefits, possibly by using a 
knowledge transfer and best practice exchange network as the conduit.    
 
Analysis of responses also reveals a comparable level of complacency within 
the private sector. While the issue of no fraud present has already been 
discussed within this chapter, of interest is the paradoxical response from the 
managing director of a private sector fraud investigation company who reveals  
that fraud is not measured because there is  
 
―no fraud in the organisation.‖ 
 
Another response suggesting private sector complacency towards fraud 
measurement is provided by the head of fraud training from an insurance  
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company who discloses that 
 
―Although the organization undertakes fraud work for 
other organizations there is little concern that fraud 
may be occurring within.‖ 
 
A further revelation, which suggests there is a requirement to develop a 
culture of responsibility for fraud measurement, is provided by an insurance 
industry counter fraud officer, who maintains that, 
 
―Fraud is not the responsibility of one area and 
therefore there are no consistent factors to enable 
the effective and accurate measurement of fraud 
costs or savings across the business.‖ 
 
Immoral Phlegmatism? 
 
At this point, I consider it worthwhile to discuss the attitudes to fraud 
measurement, both individual and organisational, as evidenced so far within 
this chapter. Analysis of free text responses suggests that within the sample 
population and potentially, assuming this is a barometer of opinion, within the 
wider population, there continues to be a significant group who fail to see 
fraud as a problem at all, or are reluctant to accept the actual size of the 
problem. Analysis further indicates that within questionnaire respondents, this 
attitude is prevalent within all three sectors. 
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Empirical evidence drawn from practitioner knowledge (McLaughlin, 2007,    
p. 7) suggests that the media have a keen interest in fraud. Interestingly, 
Chadee and Ditton (2005, p. 234) assert that much of the population have 
little direct contact with criminality, but read about it in newspapers. 
Historically, media representations of crime often “exaggerate certain risks” 
(Newburn, 2007, p. 93). This style of media representation resulted in the 
development of the concept of a “moral panic” (Cohen, 1972), which occurs 
when “a condition, episode, person or group of persons become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen, 1980, p. 9). Notwithstanding 
regular media reporting of fraud, this equanimity towards a crime typology 
costing the UK “£52 billion per anum” (NFA, 2013, p. 2) is in direct contrast to 
that described by Cohen (1972;1980).  
 
In the context of fraud, this divergent reaction, which is prevalent amongst 
fraud practitioners, let alone senior management, is defined by this research 
as immoral phlegmatism. Something immoral is described as “being wrong or 
bad” (Alvarez, 2010, p. 93), or even “hostile to the welfare of the general 
public” (Words and Phrases, 1959, p. 226). I posit that the ambivalence and 
lack of interest by management towards the fraud problem described by 
respondents, which dispassionately allows the loss of public funds to go 
unchecked in times of austerity, is indeed immoral phlegmatism.  
 
Moving on to consider the private sector, Kleinman et al (2011) argue that 
“institutional immorality will indeed shake the basic ethical values” (p.56). 
Arguably, as previously discussed, the unethical decision by financial service 
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and insurance institutions to recover fraud losses from the consumer rather 
than addressing the problem, combined with responses from the quantitative 
sample suggesting little concern the fraud is occurring within some private 
sector organisations offer further examples of immoral phlegmatism. Finally, I 
suggest that immoral phlegmatism is also prevalent in the VC sector, with 
questionnaire respondents suggesting the fraud risk is perceived as being 
low, and that some organisations “can live with it”. Drawing upon the 
aforementioned definition, I suggest that it is immoral that charitable 
organisations ignore the risk of fraud, thus potentially allowing the money from 
public donations to be stolen by fraudsters rather than reaching the intended 
recipients.  
 
Interestingly, similar attitudes towards fraud have been identified within the 
Fraud Advisory Panel working party paper which reports upon interviews 
conducted with senior auditors and forensic accountants on whether their 
clients reported fraud (Higson, 1999). One interviewee identified a reluctance 
to acknowledge fraud, suggesting that “People don‘t want to know the full 
extent of the problem” (p. 8). Another respondent identified complacency at 
director level suggesting that “there is an enormous hurdle of the board saying 
it can‘t happen here” (p. 14). One final response of note from another 
respondent is that reporting fraud is “pointless-there is nothing in it for the 
company” (p. 8). 
 
I also contend that this complacent attitude to fraud is an international issue. 
Turning to the US, and evidence concerning the financial crisis, the National 
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Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United 
States (2011) clearly demonstrated there was much concern in organisations 
at the scale of the fraud problem. However, those decision makers in a 
position of power to define the response failed to act, even though signs of the 
coming crisis were there several years before its impact.  News reports 
suggested mortgage fraud was an increasing problem and a news conference 
held by a senior FBI investigator claimed mortgage fraud had the potential for 
an „epidemic‟. Yet former US Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales,  
 
“who served from February 2005 to 2007, told the 
FCIC he could not remember the press conferences 
or news reports about mortgage fraud. Both 
Gonzales and his successor Michael Mukasey, who 
served as attorney general in 2007 and 2008, told 
the FCIC that mortgage fraud had never been 
communicated to them as a top priority. “National 
security . . . was an overriding” concern, Mukasey 
said.” (p 15) 
 
 
Indeed the commission also discovered those who did note what was  
happening and tried to address the issue did not fair well. For example, 
 
“the former head of Ameriquest‟s Mortgage Fraud 
Investigations Department, told the Commission that 
he detected fraud at the company within one month 
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of starting his job there in January 2003, but senior 
management did nothing with the reports he sent.” 
(p12).  
 
I therefore contend that the build up the financial crisis in the USA and the 
reaction to it has been phlegmatic. There has been denial and under-
estimation of the size of the problem, and given the damage it has caused to 
the financial sector and wider society, this response is immoral.  
 
It is further suggested that the results of the NFA‟s (2013) private sector 
perception survey also provides evidence to support the argument of immoral 
phlegmatism being developed within this thesis. The fact that certain private 
sector businesses refused to participate in the perception survey using the 
argument that “they had no fraud” even after being advised that “their input 
was critical” (p. 62) could suggest a reluctance to acknowledge the existence 
of fraud and measure losses. I draw this conclusion based on the inference 
that, if they already measured fraud, it is unlikely that they would refuse to 
participate. 
 
The reluctance to view fraud and those who perpetrate it as a serious 
business risk is also in direct contrast to the concept of deviancy amplification, 
whereby an act of deviancy is considered worthy of attention and “responded 
to punitively” (Cohen, 2002, p. 8). This concept of decriminalising, or even de-
labelling the fraud by affording it low priority is identified by Button and Gee 
(2013) and defined as “deviancy attenuation”   (p. 55). The authors identify a 
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deviancy attenuation process, whereby fraud is not seen as a problem in 
general and is therefore afforded low priority; as a consequence there are 
limited numbers of convictions which are reflected in crime statistics, thus 
reinforcing the view that fraud is not a problem (p. 55). Decision-makers 
approach to the problem can be further influenced by naïve belief in the 
attenuated problem in front of them, or that it actually suits their interest not to 
challenge the evidence in front of them. The consequences of the 
phlegmatism, however, whether naivety, self interest or commercial interest is 
an immoral response to fraud in many organisations as well as state 
institutions. 
 
I suggest that the immoral phlegmatism identified within this research, may in 
fact contribute to the deviancy attenuation process described. Furthermore, I 
maintain that the attitudes towards fraud defined as immoral phlegmatism and 
deviancy attenuation provide evidence that, in addition to developing the 
options for change, there is a need to cultivate an attitude adjustment 
whereby fraud is allocated the business priority it requires. This theme will be 
explored further within subsequent chapters. I will now discuss the level of 
importance placed upon fraud measurement by respondents. 
 
Is Measurement Important?  
 
Before offering the views of the qualitative interviewees, the questionnaire 
responses are presented, commencing with the table overleaf which 
documents opinion by sector. 
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Table 7: How important do you think the accurate measurement of fraud 
is? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not important at all 0 0 1 1 1 
Not important 1 0 0 1 1 
Neither important nor 
not important 
4 3 2 9 
5 
Important 27 23 15 65 35 
Very important 53 42 14 109 59 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
The responses indicate a high level of support for accurate fraud 
measurement, with 59% (n=109) considering it „very important‟ and 94% 
considering it either „important‟ or „very important‟ (n=174). Examination of 
responses presented in the chart overleaf reveals little difference between the 
two principal sectors, whereas only 44% of VC sector respondents believed it 
to be „very important‟ (n=14). When combining these responses with those 
selecting the „important‟ option however, 91% of respondents from this sector 
fall within these two categories (n=29). Whilst only a small representative 
sample, this does suggest there is some level of acknowledgement within the 
VC sector that accurately measuring fraud is important. 
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Chart 3: How important do you think the accurate measurement of fraud 
is? (Percentages by sector) 
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Opinion on the importance of measuring fraud within each individual sector 
will now be presented, commencing with the public sector, the responses 
being outlined in the table below. 
 
Table 8: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the public 
sector? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not important at all 0 0 0 0 0 
Not important 0 0 0 0 0 
Neither important nor 
not important 
3 2 1 6 3 
Important 17 15 12 44 24 
Very important 65 51 19 135 73 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
These data suggest that collective opinion recognises the need to measure 
public sector fraud losses, with 73% of respondents considering it „very 
important‟(n=135) and 97% believing it to be either important or very important 
(n=179).  
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The chart below presents responses by sector, illustrating that the results are 
very similar, with 96% of respondents from the public sector selecting the 
„important‟ or „very important‟ options (n=82), compared with 97% from the 
private (n=66) and VC sectors (n=31).  
 
Chart 4: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the public 
sector? (Percentages by sector) 
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Moving on, the table below documents opinion on the importance of 
measuring fraud within the private sector. 
 
Table 9: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the private 
sector? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not important at all 0 0 0 0 0 
Not important 0 1 0 1 1 
Neither important nor 
not important 
5 6 4 15 
8 
Important 34 27 20 81 44 
Very important 46 34 8 88 48 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
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Interestingly, the opinion of all respondents reveals that only 48% consider it 
to be „very important‟ (n=88), this figure rising to 92% when incorporating 
those who selected „important‟ (n=169), which does suggest some level of 
support for measuring private sector fraud. Interestingly, the chart below 
indicates that a higher proportion of public sector respondents (94%) consider 
it to be either „important‟ or „very important‟ (n=80), compared to those 
representing the two alternative sectors.  
 
Chart 5: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the private 
sector? (Percentages by sector) 
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This chapter will now examine the opinion on measuring fraud within the VC 
sector as detailed in the table overleaf. 
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Table 10: How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the 
voluntary/ charitable sector? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not important at all 0 0 1 1 1 
Not important 0 0 0 0 0 
Neither important 
nor not important 
3 2 2 7 
4 
Important 25 23 13 61 33 
Very important 57 43 16 116 63 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
A total of 63% of all respondents (n=116) considered measurement to be „very 
important‟, which is 15% higher than responses selecting this option in 
respect of the private sector. When adding those indicating it to be „important‟ 
this increases to 96% (n=177), which 1% lower than the views on the 
importance of measuring public sector fraud, and is 4% higher than responses 
relating to the private sector. 
 
Interview participants were asked their opinion on the importance of fraud loss 
measurement when developing fraud strategies, with collective opinion 
believing it to be essential to underpin counter measures with reliable 
accurate data. Some noteworthy responses are detailed below, commencing 
with a fraud professional who maintains that fraud measurement is, 
 
―essential, because if you don‘t know the nature of 
the scale of the problem how on earth are you going 
to put in place the right solution?‖ (FP1) 
 
 213 
Two opinions from academics offer a similar viewpoint, 
 
―It is imperative that fraud is measured accurately so 
that it provides a yardstick of the success of counter 
strategies.‖ (A5) 
 
―If you can‘t measure the success or evaluate what 
you‘ve done to any degree of certainty… you can‘t 
verify whether there was value for money in that or 
whether this is actually working.‖ (A1) 
 
Before moving on to discuss how fraud is measured, this section closes with 
the words of another academic, who offers an interesting perceptive, 
 
―accurate data enables you to stop people 
committing fraud and prevents the media from 
making it up.‖ (A4) 
 
 How do we Measure Fraud? 
 
Drawing upon questionnaire responses, this section will discuss the 
methodologies applied when measuring fraud, seeking to identify 
commonalities, which might inform a cross sector standard of measurement, 
which will be discussed in chapter 6. This question also sought to identify 
examples of fraud only being partially measured, thus failing to capture the full 
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extent of potential losses. The findings commence with the table below which 
outlines responses by sector from the 123 participants who indicated their 
organisation measures fraud, as detailed earlier in the chapter at table six. 
  
Table 11: How does your organisation measure fraud? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Received incidents 
of fraud(detected) by 
number of cases 
51 42 11 104 
 
34 
Received incidents 
of fraud(detected) by 
total monetary value 
of losses 
45 44 7 96 
 
31 
Fraud loss 
measurement 
exercise by number 
of suspected cases 
21 21 5 47 
 
15 
Fraud loss 
measurement 
exercise by total 
monetary value of 
suspected losses 
19 20 3 42 
 
14 
Other 9 6 1 16 5 
Totals 145 133 27 305  
 
Sample data reveals that the organisations represented are predominantly 
reactive in terms of fraud measurement, with 65% (n=200) of the confirmatory 
answers to this question, indicating that measurement regularly focuses upon 
detected cases rather than sampling. It should be noted that multiple 
responses were permitted, thus indicating that some organisations 
represented adopt a combined approach, using both methodologies.  
 
The percentage of confirmatory answers to this question (excluding „other‟) by 
sector is reported in the table overleaf, offering an insight into organisational 
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practise within the sample. I further contend that, if it is accepted that this 
sample offers a measure of opinion within the wider population, this 
prevalence of a reactive approach to fraud measurement within the sample, 
must be addressed if a more accurate representation of fraud losses is to be 
achieved. 
 
Table 12: Percentage proactive/reactive approaches to fraud 
measurement by sector (based upon confirmatory responses) 
 
 
Public 
(%) 
Private 
(%) 
VC 
 (%) 
Reactive 71 68 69 
Proactive 29 32 31 
 
Analysis of free text responses from questionnaire respondents 
also reveals a leaning towards reactivity, evidenced by the response from a 
public sector team leader, whose organisation‟s measurement methodology 
adopts the following process, 
 
―Every single example of fraud is rigorously checked 
and recorded for both numbers, type and financial 
loss.‖ 
 
Similarly, a public sector fraud prevention and detection manager suggests 
that measurement is reactive, advising that, 
 
―We also include a measure of frauds prevented 
because of checks we have in place.‖ 
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There is however, evidence of some common sampling to inform loss 
measurement, as revealed by a head of financial services from the public 
sector, who indicates that in addition to loss measurement, the department 
conducts 
 
―Systematic compliance checks…in high risk areas.‖ 
 
Maintaining the good practice previously established, responses indicate that 
the NHS are still conducting some loss measurement exercises at the micro 
level, as evidenced by a „regional anti-fraud lead‟ who reveals that they 
conduct, 
 
―locally run measurement exercises.‖ 
 
This chapter will now explore the ideal frequency that fraud measurement 
exercises should be performed. 
 
How often should we Measure Fraud? 
 
Having established from questionnaire responses and interview transcripts 
that collective opinion acknowledges the importance of measuring fraud, the 
optimum frequency of these loss measurement exercises is also pertinent. 
The answer to this question is likely to be determined by the way 
organisations use their fraud loss data, the comparative costs of 
measurement against losses, and organisational turnover or budget. By 
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drawing upon responses to closed and open questions from the 
questionnaire, combined with narrative extracted through analysis of interview 
transcripts, this chapter will now seek to address this question. 
 
When examining the frequency of loss measurement exercises within the  
sample, the preference appears to be for yearly exercises. The table below 
provides details of the percentage of respondents from each sector indicating 
which typology of measurement exercise they conduct on an annual basis. 
 
Table 13: Percentage of fraud measurement exercises by typology 
conducted annually by sector 
 
 
Public 
(%) 
Private 
(%) 
VC 
 (%) 
Received incidents of 
fraud(detected) by 
number of cases 
69 73 42 
Received incidents of 
fraud(detected) by total 
monetary value of 
losses 
70 76 33 
Fraud loss 
measurement exercise 
by number of suspected 
cases 
58 64 50 
Fraud loss 
measurement exercise 
by total monetary value 
of suspected losses 
65 62 42 
 
These data encapsulated in the above table, support the contention that 
within the VC sector organisations sampled, there is less inclination to 
measure fraud on a regular basis. 
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Having established that within the sample, organisational preference is for 
annual exercises, this chapter will now present the opinions of questionnaire 
and interview respondents on the ideal measurement frequency.  
 
Commencing with questionnaire responses, the table below presents data 
reporting the opinion of those sampled on the most appropriate intervals 
between fraud loss measurement exercises. 
 
Table 14: How often do you think fraud should be measured? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Annually 64 50 23 137 74 
Every two years 11 8 2 21 11 
Other 10 10 7 27 15 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
The response to this question is reasonably conclusive, with 74% of 
respondents (n=137) indicating that, in their opinion, fraud should be 
measured annually. Analysis of responses by sector displayed in the chart 
overleaf reveals a level of consistency in opinion favouring measurement 
annually, with a range of three percent between the most positive (public 
sector), and the least positive (voluntary/charitable sector). 
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Chart 6: How often do you think fraud should be measured? 
(Percentages by sector) 
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The 27 questionnaire participants selecting the „other‟ option also offer some 
informative data, with responses suggesting a wide variation in preferred 
measurement timescales. Interestingly, some respondents suggest that 
measurement frequency should vary by sector. For example, a private sector 
senior fraud analytical consultant argues that, 
 
―Fraud should be measured as often as possible - in 
the public sector this is monthly as there is a direct 
impact on the financial performance of the 
organisation. In the private sector, the systems and 
processes are geared towards fraud prevention rather 
than fraud detection. However, in the insurance 
sector, this is more akin to public sector due to the 
lengthy investigation time and the "claim" being the 
focus rather than the insurance policy (think of 
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national insurance as a home insurance policy and a 
incapacity claim as a home insurance claim).‖ 
 
The above response is interesting, specifically the comparison between fraud 
detection processes within public sector benefit delivery and the insurance 
industry in terms of dealing with „claims‟. This suggests both organisations 
might learn from each other‟s best practice, which could be facilitated by a 
knowledge transfer forum incorporating all sectors. Equally, if fraud 
prevention is prioritised, there is a need for accurate loss measurement to 
identify where to focus control strategies. 
 
One refreshing response from the VC sector indicates some awareness of the 
need to measure fraud consistently. Interestingly, the respondent 
recommends shorter intervals, suggesting that, 
 
―this should be a continuous measure - monthly 
would be appropriate and then an annual review as 
well.‖ 
 
A further pertinent observation is offered by a local authority head of audit, 
observing that, 
 
―the frequency would depend on the reason why you 
are trying to measure fraud in the first place and how 
accurate the measurement is likely to be.‖ 
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I maintain that the key objectives for measuring fraud are to identify risk and 
subsequently implement a control strategy, which can then be evaluated. If an 
organisation considers the principal aim of re-measurement is to utilise new 
loss data to assess the success of strategies informed by an earlier exercise, 
frequency may be determined by what is a realistic timescale for these to 
impact. 
 
This however, is only one rationale of regular fraud measurement, an equally 
important principle being the identification of new emergent risks, which then 
inform future control strategies. Accordingly, the frequency of measurement 
should not be linked to detection, but informed by the knowledge that 
fraudsters are always developing new modus operandi, and infrequent 
measurement exercises could enable these to become lost or embedded 
within organisational processes. In sum, there are varying reasons why fraud 
is measured, and it is important to set a realistic frequency that meets 
business needs, but responses suggest that annual exercises are the 
preferred option. 
 
One final questionnaire response is offered in support of the contention that 
directed strategies are required to progress VC sector fraud measurement. 
The respondent, a finance director of a VC organisation, remarks that 
frequency of measurement is 
 
―a matter for stakeholders to decide, shareholders, 
trustees etc.‖ 
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Nevertheless, when an organisation is reliant upon public donations, it does 
have a corporate responsibility, aside from any moral or ethical obligation, to 
ensure all donations are used for the intended charitable purpose and not lost 
to fraudsters. Furthermore, because there is an increased public awareness 
about fraud, in the longer term, questions are more likely to be asked of 
organisations failing to conduct any loss measurement exercises. 
Moving on, analysis of the opinion of interview respondents reveals 
unreserved agreement that loss measurement exercises should be conducted 
annually. This collective opinion is summed up by one academic, who advises  
that, 
 
―measurement frequencies have to be realistic, 
but annual exercises would be the most 
appropriate as demonstrated by key public sector 
departments.‖ (A6) 
 
What is Measured? 
 
This chapter will now examine what is measured by each sector. The chart 
overleaf details fraud typologies measured by each sector. It should be 
recognised that because this question offered multiple selection options, the 
totals will not be consistent with the number sampled by sector. It should also 
be noted that 62 respondents offered no answer to this question, which 
equals the number of respondents indicating that their organisation does not 
measure fraud. 
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Chart 7: What types of fraud does your organisation measure? 
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Analysis of these data suggests that there is consistency within the VC sector 
of what fraud typologies are measured, the array of responses falling between 
eight and ten for each specified category. Although this is a limited 
representation of this sector, it does offer an indication of practice, which I 
infer may be representative of a greater population.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the public and private sectors concentrate on overall losses 
and customer fraud, whereas the most frequently measured typology within 
the VC sector is expense and subsistence fraud, which indicates that other 
significant risk categories are not addressed, whilst also suggesting a need to 
educate senior managers in fraud risk awareness.   
 
One typology, which responses indicate may be measured consistently by 
each sector, is procurement fraud, suggesting there is at least some level of 
risk awareness present within each sector. Analysis of responses also 
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suggests a requirement to increase the number of public exercises measuring 
internal fraud within public and private sector organisations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented findings from the two sample populations, which 
advocate that collective opinion considers it essential that organisations 
measure fraud losses accurately, and at a consistent and appropriate 
frequency. Furthermore, many respondents indicate that annual 
measurement is the optimum frequency for fraud loss measurement 
exercises. Explanations have been offered about why certain organisations 
fail to measure fraud, which suggests that there is more work to be done in 
terms of education, but also that rules may need to be introduced whereby 
measurement is mandatory within certain organisations or sectors. This 
attitude has been defined as immoral phlegmatism, which has been 
evidenced by indifference and complacency toward the fraud problem. Details 
of what typologies are measured within each sector have also been outlined, 
which is of value when developing a standard measure. 
 
Before moving onto the next chapter, which presents views on the creation of 
statute mandating the measurement of fraud, I will return to the question 
„what is fraud?‘, upon which a persuasive consensus of opinion has not been 
achieved. On a positive note however, the responses from the qualitative 
interview respondents have provided material that can be used to inform the 
development of a standard measure, should the findings of this research 
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suggest this is appropriate. The following chapter will discuss the need to 
mandate fraud measurement. 
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Chapter 5: Laying Down the Law 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the responses relating to the issue of mandating the 
measurement of fraud through the creation of a statute. The data analysed 
incorporates questionnaire responses and opinion offered by academics and 
fraud professionals when interviewed. Opinion has been sought on the 
creation and implementation of a statute that mandates fraud measurement. 
Views on whether such a statute should prescribe what is measured, how it is 
measured, and frequency of measurement will also be presented. Attitudes 
towards the release of what may be sensitive data into the public domain will 
also be discussed.  Finally, the chapter will examine the negative responses 
to the proposed creation of a statute mandating measurement, and evaluate 
the reasons offered why this is not considered a feasible option. I commence 
however, by discussing opinion on mandating fraud loss measurement and 
the possible arguments that may be offered against such a proposition. 
 
Mandating Measurement  
 
This section presents respondents opinions on the creation of a statute 
mandating fraud measurement, and what they consider the potential 
arguments against this proposal might be, commencing with the table 
overleaf. 
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Table 15: Should a statute be created to mandate fraud measurement in 
the UK? 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 59 58 24 141 76 
No 26 10 8 44 24 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
 
 
The evidence presented reveals that just over three quarters of survey 
respondents are supportive of a statute mandating fraud measurement. 
Interestingly, the highest level of support emanates from the private sector, as 
detailed in the chart below, with 85% of those sampled answering in the 
affirmative (n=58), as opposed to 69% (public sector) (n=59) and 75% (VC 
sector) (n=24). I further contend that if these participant responses were 
considered to be representative of the wider population, the creation of such a 
statute would have the support of counter fraud practitioners, which may be 
used to influence decision making at ministerial level. 
 
Chart 8: Should a statute be created to mandate fraud measurement in 
the UK? (Percentages by sector) 
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One interview respondent offers a very positive response to this question, 
demonstrating knowledge of US legislation, arguing that, if a statute was 
being considered, it should be, 
 
―Something like the IPIA. As long as the detailed 
guidance is right it will be great for the public sector, 
and for the private sector it will be the best route for 
the government to change accounting standards‖ 
(FP1) 
 
The subsequent table details the arguments against mandating fraud that 
questionnaire respondents suggested may be offered. 
 
Table 16: Arguments against mandating fraud measurement 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
None 7 6 1 14 3 
Current measurement 
statistically valid 
13 23 2 38 9 
Do not need to 
measure fraud losses 
so accurately 
16 11 9 36 
 
9 
Too Bureaucratic 59 51 25 135 33 
Too Costly 69 52 24 145 35 
Other 21 17 3 41 10 
Totals 185 160 64 409  
 
 
 
Analysis of the responses reveals that cost and bureaucracy were considered 
to be the most likely arguments against the creation of a statute. 
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Debatably, these responses offer further evidence of immoral phlegmatism 
towards fraud and its measurement, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
particularly those indicating that cost is an issue. This complacent attitude, to 
what has been demonstrated as a high value crime nationally, may only be 
addressed by developing a culture whereby fraud is seen as a problem that 
needs to be addressed.  It should therefore be treated as a business cost, 
which can be reduced through regular measurement, the application of 
informed control strategies and pursuing recovery of identified losses, thus 
ensuring savings exceed costs.  
 
Those questionnaire participants offering individual responses have also 
provided some valuable data. One public sector respondent suggests that to 
encourage fraud measurement, a change in attitude is required, observing 
that, 
 
―Fraud measurement has traditionally been used as 
a stick to beat organisations with (think DWP). There 
needs to be a cultural change to make fraud 
measurement a positive experience.‖ 
 
 
This view is offered in support of the argument presented within this research 
that there should be no stigma attached to an admission that fraud exists 
within an organisation as long as there evidence of positive steps being taken 
to address the issue. This could include creating a risk register, developing an 
investigative resource or changing processes to reduce vulnerability. This 
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suggested cultural change would help address the immoral phlegmatism and 
“deviancy attenuation” (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 55) previously discussed. 
 
Maintaining this theme, a private sector respondent observes that there 
should be a recognisable link between fraud measurement and a risk register,  
suggesting that organisations,  
 
―Only need to measure when it has been identified 
as a business risk.‖ 
 
Further opinion, which arguably may be used in support of mandating 
measurement, is offered by a public sector financial investigator who suggests 
central government may be reluctant to mandate public sector fraud 
measurement due to, 
 
―Potential political embarrassment and the desire to 
conceal the truth‖ 
 
Debatably, this belief supports the contention that whilst appearing to promote 
public sector fraud measurement, in reality, previous governments may not 
have been fully committed to this strategy. In support of this argument, I return 
briefly to the discussion within the literature review indicating that H M 
Treasury has accepted nil fraud returns from a number of central government 
departments. Unfortunately, there is currently insufficient evidence on the 
activities of the Coalition‟s Counter Fraud Taskforce to make an informed 
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decision on the present government‟s commitment to improving the accuracy 
of fraud loss measurement. Until there is an acceptance that more than just 
detected fraud can be measured, I suggest that nil returns will continue. 
 
The opinion of a local government head of audit also suggests there may be 
resistance within the private sector to mandating fraud measurement, 
manifesting itself in the form of, 
 
―Lack of co-operation from private sector e.g. fear of 
adverse publicity.‖  
 
A regional head of fraud in the private sector offers another potential counter 
argument to the mandating of fraud, identifying that potential commercial 
compromise may generate resistance because of, 
 
―sensitive information that an organisation may be 
unwilling to disclose.‖  
 
An insurance industry counter fraud specialist offers a similar view, 
considering that measurement exercises may produce, 
 
―Information that may be business sensitive‖   
 
Continuing this theme, an explanation for this reluctance to disclose these  
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data within the private sector is offered by a senior fraud analytical consultant, 
who suggests that, 
 
―the private sector sees fraud as a commercial, 
competitive issue.‖ 
 
A further concern is offered by an insurance industry compliance manager, 
who observes that,  
 
―Data created would be sensitive or subject to 
misuse.‖  
 
These are valid concerns because fraud loss data may be commercially 
sensitive and release may have an adverse impact on the company, such as 
a reduction in share value, or in certain industries such as banking and 
insurance for example, may even result in the consumer going elsewhere.  
 
The following observation offered from a public sector respondent recognises 
these concerns, thus highlighting the need to address the uneasiness within 
the private sector over publication of fraud loss data; 
 
―the private sector and in particular financial 
institutions, would regard such measurements, if 
published, as a risk to their business and 
competitively damaging.‖ 
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Before developing this discussion further, I offer two contrasting responses 
that reject the mandating of fraud measurement. The first is from an audit 
manager from the VC sector, who indicates that internal organisational 
procedures may remove the need for specific measurement exercises, 
contending that, 
 
―Internal procedures may cover this requirement.‖ 
 
The second, is offered by a private sector investigations manager who  
presents a very negative view on fraud measurement, posing the questions, 
 
―What value does it add? What use will it be? May 
have an adverse affect on a company standing?‖ 
 
I contend that, if these opinions represent the views of a wider population, 
they further illustrate an urgent need to address immoral phlegmatism through 
cultural change that embraces accurate fraud loss measurement. This goal, 
however, may only be achieved through legislation mandating measurement. 
Furthermore, in support of the argument for mandating outside the public 
sector, I contend that it is unethical for private sector businesses to make 
good fraud losses by transferring these costs to the customer; something 
which the insurance industry has admitted is common practice. Similarly, it is 
even more important during a period of financial constraint that charities 
ensure that losses to fraud are kept to a minimum. 
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When developing such a policy however, one important consideration relevant 
to all sectors is organisational size and capability to comply with directives 
from such a statute, a view offered by a public sector manager who argues 
that,  
  
―Mandating will not be fair on all organisations. 
Account needs to be taken of their size, resources 
and vulnerability to fraud.‖  
 
A similar opinion is offered by a public sector team leader, who suggests that, 
 
―loss is very different across different sectors. To 
hold my own organisation to the same criteria as a 
bank or a charity would simply not work as we are 
completely unique and have little in common with 
other sectors.‖  
 
These comments are of particular relevance when considering how fraud 
measurement could be mandated, what should be measured, and which 
organisations or even sectors might be included. It may be that outside the 
public sector, organisational size and annual turnover might be determining 
factors, and an appropriate de-minimus limit established which is realistic in 
terms of which organisations it encapsulates.  
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Proactive Measurement 
 
Of concern is the finding that many questionnaire respondents consider that 
detection is the only fraud loss indicator. Consequently, much work is required 
to develop a cultural change in approaches to fraud measurement including a 
better understanding of options such as common sampling, and the 
development of a culture accepting that, anticipating fraud and changing 
processes, is a more cost effective option than existing prevention and 
detection methods. The following response from a chief executive in the VC 
sector is offered in support of this argument for a cultural change. 
 
―It would be better to put money into improving 
methods of detecting and countering fraud.‖ 
  
Unfortunately, this view suggests a limited understanding of the value of 
accurate fraud measurement. For example, how does an organisation know 
what to counter and what strategies to develop if it is not measuring? I offer a 
similar opinion from a local government manager; 
 
―Can only measure known fraud - impossible to 
quantify unknown (successful?) fraud. So stats are 
meaningless.‖  
 
Once again, this exemplifies the limited understanding of what can be 
measured through the use of statistically valid sampling. If as previously 
contended, the opinions of the questionnaire respondents reflects the views of 
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the wider population, there is an urgent requirement for a directed educational 
strategy on measuring fraud and the associated business benefits. In support 
of this argument, I offer the views of one interviewee who  
contends that, 
 
―it‘s important for people to start thinking of fraud as a 
cost and understanding that all fraud losses can be 
measured. I guess we just need to get that 
information out there. The more that can be got out 
to people, the more they understand.‖ (FP1) 
 
This chapter will now explore respondent‟s views on the creation of legislation 
that mandates fraud measurement and whether this is considered to be the 
only means of ensuring accurate and consistent measurement. 
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Creating a Statute 
 
Table 17: Arguments against the creation of a statute 
 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Fraud Measurement 
Should Be Voluntary 
6 6 1 13 13 
Current Measurement 
Statistically Valid 
5 0 3 8 8 
Do Not Need to 
Measure Fraud 
Losses So Accurately 
3 1 4 8 8 
Too Bureaucratic 19 8 7 34 33 
Too Costly 17 8 4 29 29 
Other 6 3 1 10 10 
Totals 56 26 20 102  
 
The above table details questionnaire respondent‟s views on potential 
arguments against creating legislation compelling organisations to measure 
fraud. Interestingly, although this question offered the similar option of multiple 
answers, the total responses to the fixed choice answers are considerably 
lower than the previous question. Debatably, an inference that may be drawn 
is that there may be fewer arguments presented against the creation of a 
statute mandating fraud than just a policy change attempting to enforce 
compliance with a new process. The generalizability, is however somewhat 
limited, because these data represent only 24% of the sample (n= 44), these 
being the respondents who do not agree with the creation of a statute. 
Analysis reveals that the perceived counter arguments against creating a 
statute are again bureaucracy and cost. These recurring themes are relevant 
to all sectors involved, however as discussed in earlier chapters, the financial 
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benefits of measurement and re-measurement exercises should outweigh any 
costs. This is particularly important in times of government spending cuts, as 
identified by a public sector fraud manager who suggests that,    
 
―protecting public funds is very important, 
Government cut backs on staff resource will make 
this increasingly difficult in the future.‖  
 
Whilst embracing the importance of advocating fraud measurement, the issue  
of cost is again raised by a public sector fraud manager, who suggests that, 
 
―Whilst it would be useful to encourage fraud 
measurement in high risk areas in other areas the 
costs may outweigh the benefits.‖ 
 
The issue of costing is particularly relevant to small and medium private 
sector enterprises, however, when considering the estimated fraud losses of 
£780 million (NFA, 2011a, p. 36) experienced by these businesses, some 
form of  positive action to measure fraud is required. To address the issue of 
cost implications, I draw upon the opinion of one interviewee, who suggests 
that, 
 
―You don‘t want to spend lots of money measuring 
fraud, but you do want to spend the right amount so 
that you end up with a good quality figure that allows 
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you to justify all the other spend on fraud prevention 
and detection.‖ (FP2) 
 
Therefore, any statute introduced may have to incorporate different standards 
of measurement for private and VC sector organisations, possibly based upon 
annual turnover or number of staff employed. A mechanism for implementing  
such a directive is offered by one academic, who contends that, 
 
―something akin to a national code of practice would 
be essential. With rankings so you can have three 
levels of quality. Such as, this is the highest quality 
data. This is the lowest quality because you only met 
this many quality standards. One kite mark but 
different rules that you adhere to depending on the 
type of data that you‘re collecting.‖ (A1) 
 
The following response also identifies the need for a flexible measurement 
standard, which in turn may generate increased compliance. The view offered  
being that, 
 
―if we just have one standard then some people will 
shy away from it. They need to have some options to 
choose.‖ (FP1) 
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These observations are significant, and whilst relevant to the creation of a 
statute, also offer an informed view on how a British Standard of fraud 
measurement could be framed. This concept will be revisited in the next 
chapter. 
 
When developing a statute, it is important to emphasise that significant 
returns on investment can be achieved by regular measurement exercises; 
therefore costs will be offset by reduced business losses. In support, I offer  
the response of one interviewee, who contends that, 
 
―Think of it as an investment, and a return on the 
investment. You have to think about the cost of the 
work as the investment and then look at what you get 
back from it. If you are measuring accurately you can 
see the loss figure coming back because fraud hasn‘t 
happened.‖ (FP1) 
 
Furthermore, in terms of financial return from mandating the process, the  
same interviewee observes that, as evidenced by personal practice based 
experience, it represents, 
 
―a twelve to one return on investment.‖ (FP1) 
 
Two positive views are offered by interview respondents, the first being  
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offered by an academic who argues that creating a statute is, 
 
―the only way forward to ensure proper and accurate 
fraud loss data.‖ (A3) 
 
A slightly more reserved opinion is offered by a fraud professional who  
maintains that, 
 
―I think argue for it, but I think we should give people 
a chance to do this optionally first in the private 
sector, see where we get.‖ (FP2) 
 
In terms of bureaucracy, this is a recurring argument levelled at government; 
however, this can be addressed by educating organisations on the financial 
benefits of regular fraud measurement. Although this may not negate the 
need for legislation, it will at least go some way to challenge what is perceived 
as officialdom. 
 
Finally, I offer a contrasting response from an interviewee, who again raises  
the issue of commercial sensitivity, revealing that, 
 
―I am not persuaded immediately that compulsory 
legislation is needed for the public sector. I would 
need to think about it more. When considering the 
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private sector, I have a real problem with the 
commercial sensitivity of data‖ (A4) 
 
The issue of sensitivity may be addressed within the private sector by 
requiring organisations to demonstrate compliance, but permitting them to 
keep resultant data out of the public domain, but supplying it to the NFA for 
inclusion in the national measure. This chapter will now explore the opinions 
offered on which sectors should be incorporated into legislation mandating 
fraud measurement, commencing with the table below which reports the 
opinions of those sampled electronically. 
 
Table 18: Which sectors should this proposed legislation apply to? 
 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Public Sector 59 57 24 140 99 
Private Sector 40 19 7 66 47 
Voluntary/Charitable 
Sector 
51 42 11 104 74 
Total potential 
responses for each 
variable 
59 58 24 141 
 
 
 
The above table illustrates responses from the 141 respondents in agreement  
with the creation of a statute. The total potential responses per variable are 
taken from the „yes responses‟ detailed in Table 15. Analysis reveals that 99% 
(n=140) of respondents in favour of the creation of a statute suggest that this 
should be applied to the public sector. What is noteworthy is that a higher 
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proportion of respondents are in favour of applying such a statute to the VC 
sector as opposed to the private sector. 
 
Interestingly, when analysing responses by sector, as detailed in the chart 
below, with the exception of the public sector, there is limited support for the 
inclusion in the proposed statute of the sector from which respondents 
emanate. In fact only a third of the respondent‟s from the private sector 
indicated they were in favour of the proposed statute applying to this sector. 
Similarly, respondents from the VC sector offer limited support for this sector 
being incorporated into the statute, with only 46% (n=11) being in favour.  
 
Chart 9: Which sectors should this proposed legislation apply to? 
(Percentages by sector) 
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This question was also posed to interviewees; the responses indicate a high 
level of support for the creation of a statute. There are however, differing 
opinions on which sectors this legislation should apply to. Initially, I offer two 
opinions suggesting that it should be applied to both the public and private  
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sectors; 
 
―I would basically say that if there was gonna be 
legislation then it would have to apply to both the 
public and private sectors.‖ (FP5) 
 
―It could become legislation that relates to the public 
sector, but surely everyone should be equally 
accountable, and just because you‘re making money 
rather than serving the public good doesn‘t mean 
that you should be held to a different account. You‘d 
be lucky to get it passed as legislation in regards to 
the private sector but if there was enough pressure 
from the right places you could.‖ (A1) 
 
One additional positive response is offered with regard to mandating public 
sector measurement, which arguably also supports the proposed information 
exchange matrix and development of doctrine, which will be discussed in the  
following chapter. The respondent suggests that; 
 
―Yes you mandate it as it will help them benchmark 
themselves against other departments, but provide 
support, make it work for them.‖ (FP1) 
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Additional opinion suggests that the public sector is a good starting point, and 
compliance would put pressure on the private sector to embrace this concept, 
one interviewee arguing that; 
 
―the public sector is a very good start and then the 
private sector might think, well that seems to be 
working. So rather than compelling  them, if they see 
the standards of measurement are better, and the 
figures more accurate, they may conclude that we 
should follow that model.‖ (A2) 
 
The consensus of opinion is that mandating public sector fraud measurement 
may be a realistic option, but incorporating the private sector may be one step 
too far. To illustrate this, I commence with two responses  
from academics; 
  
―I believe that a statute would be a positive move in 
terms of the public sector as it would ensure 
transparency within all departments. It may prove 
difficult to persuade the private sector to publish 
results, but at least persuading them to measure 
accurately and then do something about it is 
important. So why not include them in the statute but 
include in the drafting something that says they have 
to measure but they only have to demonstrate to 
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somebody, not sure who, that they have measured.‖ 
(A5) 
 
―It is essential that in times of cuts the public sector 
ensure that losses are minimised. A statute 
compelling measurement and publication hopefully 
would ensure that public sector losses are 
addressed. I am not convinced that the statute 
should cover the private sector although large 
organisations should demonstrate that they 
measure.‖ (A6) 
 
In relation to these sectors, I offer one additional opinion that suggests the 
proposed legislation should be restricted to the public sector, maintaining that, 
 
―I believe that the creation of a statute may be the 
only option to develop an accurate national picture 
which can then inform a national control strategy. 
This should be limited to the public sector if it has 
any chance of being passed as legislation. There is a 
chance that with MPs having connections to the 
private sector it is unlikely that ministers would be 
willing to support such a bill if the private sector were 
included which might the put at risk the chances of it 
being passed for the public sector.‖ (FP4) 
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Finally, whilst the initial interview schedule only raised the issue of mandating 
fraud within the public and private sectors, using a semi structured interview 
revealed that there were certain respondents who demonstrated an 
awareness of the evolving issue of fraud and its impact on the VC sector. 
Whilst not supporting the incorporation of this sector within any proposed 
statute, it was suggested that there is an urgent need for a fraud 
measurement strategy that embraces this sector in some manner. One  
interviewee observes that, 
 
―Charities need to maximise every penny they 
receive so measuring fraud is important. It may prove 
sensitive to legislate that they measure but perhaps 
they could be persuaded in some way to embrace 
this idea.‖ (A5) 
 
Prior to exploring what should be contained within the proposed statute, I 
offer one further response which supports the need to measure fraud within  
the VC sector, but recommends a soft approach initially, observing that; 
 
―Charities are a delicate area, but let‘s face it, every 
organisation is at risk to fraud so there needs to be a 
positive move towards measurement. But legislation 
may be too much before they have been given the 
opportunity to measure voluntarily.‖ (A6) 
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Legislating Measurement: When, What and How? 
 
 
Frequency of measurement has already been discussed in the context of 
organisational policy; this section will now consider the appropriate 
measurement frequency for mandatory exercises. Subsequently, the views of 
questionnaire respondents on the extent to which a statute should specify 
what is measured and the methodology to be applied will be reported. 
 
The table below details the responses from those sampled by instrument on 
the frequency of measurement. 
 
Table 19: How regularly should mandated fraud measurement exercises 
be conducted? 
 
 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Annually 42 49 21 112 79 
Every two years 15 8 2 25 18 
Other 2 1 1 4 3 
Total potential 
responses for each 
variable 
59 58 24 141 
 
 
The previous table illustrates responses from the 141 respondents in 
agreement with the creation of a statute. The total potential responses per 
variable are taken from the „yes responses‟ detailed in Table 14. There is little 
doubt that annual measurement is considered the ideal frequency with 79% 
(n=112) of respondents offering a response selecting this option. 
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This question was also posed to interviewees, and analysis of opinion 
indicates that the preferred frequency for fraud measurement exercises is 
yearly. I offer three of responses below in support of this contention. 
 
―Annual makes sense to me. You want to look at 
your other types of cost annually; you need to know 
what your forecast is annually.‖ (FP1) 
 
―Annually sounds quite sensible for specific fraud 
measurement exercises.‖ (A4) 
 
―On an annual basis, particularly if you are looking at 
detail changes over time. If you‘re trying to have an 
impact then that kind of regularity in measurement is 
essential.‖ (A1) 
 
Interestingly, some responses justify the selection of annual data collection by 
arguing that that the requirement to measure should be linked to both the 
development and subsequent evaluation of control strategies, and the 
identification of themes, risks and patterns. Moreover, this offers evidence to 
support the argument that to develop accurate measurement, there needs to 
be consistency to ensure comparability. The pertinent views of two fraud  
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professionals are documented below.  
 
―Measuring fraud annually provides sufficient 
frequency to track the impact of new strategies 
without leaving too much of a gap that enables new 
frauds to target the organisation.‖ (FP6) 
 
“Annual is reasonable. Monthly would be too much of 
a burden, every two years seems a bit infrequent for 
fraud measurement to look at trends which in turn will 
inform counter measures.‖ (FP 2) 
 
Equally, to permit fraud losses to be treated as a business cost, an identical 
frequency of measurement should be applied to these data that is used to 
measure all other costs falling within this category. One interviewee actually  
raises this point, suggesting that, 
 
―most companies report annually, most government 
departments report annually so I think annually is 
definitely the best so that fraud losses can be 
included in annual reports.‖ (A2) 
 
The next segment will consider whether legislation should be prescriptive in 
terms of the fraud typologies measured. 
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Directing Measurement 
 
The table below illustrates responses from the 141 respondents in agreement 
with the creation of a statute. The total potential responses per variable are 
taken from the „yes responses‟ detailed in Table 15. 
 
Table 20: Should legislation prescribe what types of fraud are 
measured? 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 46 51 21 118 84 
No 13 7 3 23 16 
Total potential 
responses for each 
variable 
59 58 24 141 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the responses to this question indicate a level of support for 
legislation being authoritarian, with 84% (n=118) of the 141 participants 
offering a response answering in the affirmative. 
 
The same 141 questionnaire respondents were then asked whether the same 
legislation should influence any measurement methodology. The findings are  
documented below. 
 
Table 21: Should legislation prescribe what fraud measurement 
methodology is employed? 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 47 48 18 113 80 
No 12 10 6 28 20 
Total potential 
responses for each 
variable 
59 58 24 141 
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The results are not dissimilar to the preceding question, with 80% (n=113) of 
the 141 participants responding to the question indicating that they believe a 
statute mandating fraud measurement should include a directive on the 
methods to be employed when conducting such exercises. I will now present 
the findings relating to the release of fraud loss data into the public domain. 
 
Reporting Findings 
 
 
This section explores opinion on publishing fraud loss data, commencing with 
the views of questionnaire respondents on whether this should be mandatory. 
 
 
Table 22: Should legislation also mandate the publication of fraud loss 
data? 
 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 57 52 21 130 92 
No 2 6 3 11 8 
Total potential 
responses for each 
variable 
59 58 24 141 
 
 
Data in the above table indicates there is even more support for the 
publication of fraud loss data, with 92% (n=130) of the 141 questionnaire 
respondents in favour of creating a statute indicating that they believe the 
resultant data should be released into the public domain. The highest level of 
support is offered from public sector respondents, as detailed in the chart 
overleaf. 
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Chart 10: Should legislation also mandate the publication of fraud loss 
data? (Percentages by sector) 
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This question was also posed to interviewees and generated some 
informative responses. One fraud professional when discussing the US IPIA, 
suggested that apart from mandating measurement, the statute has other 
commendable features in relation to the public sector, specifically, 
 
―All of the information has to be published so that the 
public can see it, get angry and increase the 
pressure to reduce it. It‘s the level of transparency 
and accountability that makes it powerful, not just the 
measurement.‖ (FP1)  
 
Collective opinion however, offers less support for mandating the publication 
of private sector fraud loss data with the recurring theme of commercial 
implications being offered as the principal reason for these data being 
retained „in confidence‟. The response detailed below is offered as an 
example of these shared views. 
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―Commercial sensitivity is important to consider when 
debating the publication of private sector data.‖ (FP 3) 
 
Interestingly, one academic offers a potential solution, suggesting that, 
 
―An external group could validate the measurement, 
reviewing and checking that some form of consistent 
standard has been applied. Legislation that enables 
these validation teams get access might be 
sufficient.‖ (A1) 
 
Arguably, a statute could compel the private sector to measure to a British 
Standard, present their data and the NFA, NAO or an independent academic 
institution could then adopt an auditing role and publish a certificate of 
validation, similar to that mandated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, which 
proves the legislation has been complied with. These data may then be 
incorporated into the NFA‟s Annual Fraud Indicator, but organisational 
identities remain in confidence. This idea of a validation team will be 
discussed in more detail later when considering the creation of a fraud 
measurement agency. 
 
The research instrument also included a question that asked participants what 
the perceived risks to publishing fraud loss data might be. This question  
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offered fixed choice answers but also provided a „free text‟ option. The results 
are documented in the table below. 
 
Table 23: What are the perceived risks to publishing fraud loss data? 
 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
None 1 2 5 8 6 
Organisational 
Embarrassment 
55 51 19 125 89 
Ministerial Embarrassment 44 38 11 93 66 
Commercial Risk 31 35 4 70 50 
Protection of Shareholder's 
Interests 
25 29 4 58 41 
Protection of Head of 
Organisation 
19 14 7 40 28 
Other 9 4 4 17 12 
Total potential responses for 
each variable 
59 58 24 141 
 
 
 
The results are yet again unsurprising; with 89% (n=125) of the 141 
participants in favour of creating a statue offering a response indicating that 
organisational embarrassment is considered to be the most likely reason for 
resistance to publishing data. These are followed by ministerial 
embarrassment (n=93), commercial risk (n=70) and protection of 
shareholders interests (n=58). When examining data at sector level, 
interestingly 93% (n=55) of participants from the public sector offering a 
response indicated that organisational embarrassment is the most likely 
reason that might be offered in resistance to publication, compared to 88% 
(n=51) of private sector respondents and 79% (n=19) representing the VC 
sector. The complete dataset is produced in the chart overleaf. 
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Chart 11: What are the perceived risks to publishing fraud loss data? 
(Percentages by sector) 
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The collective opinion of interviewees also suggests that organisational 
embarrassment is a culture that is prevalent but also need addressing. An  
example is offered below from one respondent, who maintains that, 
 
―yes there is embarrassment, particularly in the 
public sector. Nobody wants to be the person to 
admit that substantial public funds are going astray. 
But the first stage to solve a problem is to stop being 
in denial about it.‖ (FP1) 
 
This culture of organisational embarrassment is also believed to be prevalent 
within the private sector and is likely to be linked to company stability and the 
potential impact on value. An issue identified by two interviewees as detailed  
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below; 
 
―There is obviously going to be an element of 
organisational embarrassment within the private 
sector. Particularly when management have to 
answer to shareholders.‖ (FP6) 
 
―Private sector companies may well be embarrassed 
by the publication of fraud losses. Mainly because of 
the commercial impact in terms of share value and 
market confidence.‖ (A5) 
 
Debatably, these responses further support the earlier contention that 
measurement may be mandated by statute that incorporates the public and 
private sectors, but compulsory publication of data be limited to just the public 
sector. As discussed earlier, private sector companies may be allowed to 
simply obtain a certificate of validation to prove compliance. Equally, this 
could even be applied to some of the very large VC sector organisations, 
once they have been persuaded to measure. 
 
A Fraud Measurement Agency? 
 
One additional option for change originally considered was the creation of a 
fraud measurement agency with a peripatetic team conducting measurement 
exercises in private and VC sector organisations with insufficient capacity to 
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conduct them „in house‟. Having canvassed the opinions of interviewees 
however, it became apparent that this was not considered a feasible option, 
as evidenced by the following responses;  
 
―You need to have one that is relevant to each sector 
and the danger is that it‘s not just one expert but 
several experts which will impact on costings.‖ (A2) 
 
―There are problems with consistency, but a fraud 
measurement team may be too costly.‖ (A3) 
 
When indicating that this option had been considered as a result of learning 
that within the US measurement teams are paid a bonus based upon the 
amount of fraud identified, and this might be a consideration, one respondent 
remarked that; 
 
―I don‘t think I‘d encourage that conflict of interest, 
even if it‘s independently validated.‖ (FP 1) 
 
I conclude this section with the views of two respondents who suggest that a  
validation team might be a more viable option; 
 
―A cheaper alternative would be a validation team 
similar to what is used within the public sector who 
could examine a random sample of loss 
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measurement data from the private or charitable 
sectors. This could actually be a workable 
alternative to creating a measurement team.‖ (A5)                                                                      
 
 
―I think that some sort of auditing team that ensures 
that the measurements have been conducted would 
be a better option. Maybe the NFA could be funded 
to do this.‖ (FP6) 
 
Drawing upon these observations, one option might be the creation of a static 
validation team that examines methodology rather than data. In the interest of 
probity, they would assist in policing compliance of any prescribed standard of 
measurement. This is a preferred workable option than roving measurement 
teams on commission. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has presented findings suggesting there is some support within 
the sample population for mandating fraud measurement, whilst also 
identifying potential arguments against such a proposal. The dogmatic and 
equanimous arguments offered against such a proposal from some 
respondents have been cited as additional evidence of immoral phlegmatism 
towards the fraud problem. 
 
 Opinion has also been presented relating to the creation of a statute, and to 
which sectors this should be applied to. Respondent‟s views reveal more 
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support for creating a statute mandating fraud measurement in the public 
sector than in the remaining two sectors. The views of all respondents have 
also been documented relating to the mandatory publication of fraud loss 
data. These indicate a high level of support for releasing public sector data, 
but opinion was cautious about the publication of loss data from the private 
and VC sectors. Finally, this chapter discussed the creation of a fraud 
measurement agency with a roving measurement team. Having reviewed 
opinion, it is apparent that the proposal to create a static validation team 
would meet less resistance. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the quality and accuracy of fraud data. It will 
also report opinion on the creation of a British Standard of fraud 
measurement and an information and knowledge exchange infrastructure. 
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Chapter 6: The Doctrine of Measurement 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will initially examine the level of statistical confidence of fraud 
measurement data disclosed by questionnaire respondents. Opinions from 
interview respondents on the accuracy of these data will also be presented. 
Moving on, questionnaire responses and views of interviewees concerning the 
creation of a British Standard of measurement will be presented. When 
considering the value of this option for change, its feasibility will be examined 
at both macro and micro levels. Finally, opinions relating to the creation of an 
information exchange and knowledge transfer infrastructure will be examined, 
including views upon the likely participation in this process by organisations 
from all sectors. 
 
Reliability of Measurement 
 
The findings presented within previous chapters indicate that fraud losses are 
measured by certain organisations within all sectors. Whilst acknowledging 
this is good practice, it is imperative that these data accurately reflect losses, 
and can be validated accordingly. I therefore posed the question “How 
accurate do you consider current fraud loss data to be?” to all interviewees. 
The majority indicated that they have limited confidence in fraud loss data,  
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the following two responses are offered as an example of this viewpoint; 
 
―Not very accurate due to the iceberg phenomenon.‖ 
(A3) 
 
―The reality of it is, despite many reports identifying 
the same issues, very little progress has been made 
in terms of improving accuracy to a reliable level.‖ 
(A6) 
 
Two respondents did offer an opinion on reliability by sector, observing that; 
 
―There‘s no doubt that in terms of accuracy, data 
produced by some public sector organisations that 
do measure is relatively accurate. Because the 
private sector has a commercial agenda, there is 
always a concern that this may compromise 
accuracy.‖ (A5) 
 
―The public sector has got more accurate information 
than the private sector. Overall measurement would 
have been a lot further advanced in the NFA if the 
British Banking Association hadn‘t been so nervous 
about not wanting everything properly measured.‖ 
(FP1) 
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Arguably, these observations suggest there may be a requirement to create 
some form of standard measure to which all organisations comply. This will 
address the issue of uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of some fraud loss 
data, particularly that produced by some private sector organisations. 
 
Two further extracts from the interview transcripts do raise some concern 
about exactly how much progress in improving accuracy of measurement has 
been achieved. Both interviewees place limited value on existing data 
produced by the National Fraud Authority, as detailed below; 
 
―Based upon data I have seen I don‘t think the NFA 
data is terribly accurate.‖ (FP1) 
 
―Some data will stand up to scrutiny such as DWP 
and NHS. I do have concerns though about some of 
the combined loss data such as that produced by 
NERA. Likewise I am cautious of NFA data. The 
overall loss data produced, when you actually read 
their report, doesn‘t come across as being 
particularly accurate. You are left with the impression 
that as long as they receive something that can be 
added to their running total, they are not too fussy 
about how it has been measured.‖ (FP5) 
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I maintain these final two responses offer additional evidence that if credible 
fraud loss data is to be produced, either by individual organisations or as a 
collective measure such as that offered by the NFA, it is imperative that 
consistency is achieved. This may only be attained by the creation of a 
universal standard of measurement which is supported by the NFA and the 
National Audit Office, and embraced by all sectors. The next section will 
explore the level of statistical confidence of extant fraud loss data. 
 
Statistically Valid Measurement? 
 
This section will initially present data from 123 questionnaire respondents who 
indicated their organisation measures fraud (see table 6). The table below 
presents responses detailing the level of statistical confidence these fraud 
loss data carry. 
 
Table 24: What is the level of statistical confidence of your 
organisation’s fraud loss data? 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Between + or -1%-
4% 
13 8 1 22 18 
Between + or -5%-
9% 
7 18 0 25 20 
+ or -10% or Above 3 1 2 6 5 
No Statistical 
Confidence 
7 11 3 21 17 
Do Not Know 30 11 8 49 40 
Totals 60 49 14 123  
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The level of response to this question, whereby 40% (n=49) of the 123 
respondents, who had previously indicated that their organisation does 
measure fraud, were unaware of the level of statistical confidence applied to 
their organisation‟s fraud loss data, is a little disappointing, but not 
unexpected because the questionnaire was circulated via a gatekeeper. 
Consequently, some respondents, whilst offering valuable opinion, may not be 
fully conversant with the fraud measurement process applied by their 
organisation. Alternatively, the number of responses selecting „do not know‟ 
may be a reflection on the limited value placed upon fraud measurement by 
the respondents, or that fraud loss measurement is not considered a priority 
by their organisation. Equally, it could suggest that some of the respondents 
are unaware of this information because it does not impact directly on their 
specific organisational role, and therefore a more appropriate answer may be 
„do not need to know‟. Empirical evidence that I can offer as a former DWP 
fraud practitioner supports this contention, specifically, some fraud 
investigators are interested in fraud loss data, but not necessarily how they 
have been calculated. Arguably the business benefits of fraud loss 
measurement are in the interests of fraud investigators because the 
information provided enables focused targeting of the tactical resource 
following a risk assessment and it may actually supply them with 
investigations where there is a higher probability that fraud is occurring, and 
consequently improve their performance outcome figures. On a positive note 
however, these data do indicate that the 49 respondents are actually aware 
that fraud loss measurement does take place, and thus potentially afforded 
some priority within their organisation. 
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A total of 74 respondents were aware of the level of statistical confidence 
carried by the data produced by their organisation. Within these responses, 
38% (n=47) indicated that the level of statistical confidence was below + or – 
10%, with only 18% (n=22) of respondents indicating it to be between + or – 
1% to 4%. Of interest is that of those 74 respondents demonstrating an 
awareness of this figure, 21 revealed that there is no statistical confidence in 
their organisation‟s fraud loss data. Analysis of all responses reveals that, 
should they be representative of the wider population, it enables the 
conclusion to be drawn that as a starting point, there is some reliability in 
extant fraud loss data, but much additional work required to improve the 
robustness of these data across all organisations. Specifically, an urgent 
requirement to improve accuracy, which may only be achieved by the creation 
of a universal standard of measurement. 
 
When suggesting potential arguments against mandating fraud measurement, 
some „free text box answers‟ from questionnaire respondents contained 
observations more relevant to this chapter. In particular, concerns have been 
expressed that statistical validity standards might be used as an argument 
against mandating fraud measurement. Some responses are not unexpected, 
for example an internal auditor, a group chief accountant and a chief 
executive officer from the VC sector collectively suggest that it is not essential 
to measure fraud losses so accurately. Should these views be indicative of 
wider opinion within this sector, much work is required to educate this sector 
about the financial value of regular and accurate fraud loss measurement to 
assist in the development of control strategies. 
 267 
I accept that when developing a loss measurement strategy, the requirements 
of each sector are different, as highlighted by a manager in retail banking   
observing that there are; 
 
―Too many variables across different industry sectors 
- could have a core mandatory reporting in line with 
CIFAS guidelines but would need to allow flexibility 
across all sectors. For public sectors, important that 
there is some consistency across fraud to public 
funds.‖                
 
Another interesting opinion is offered by a regional anti fraud lead from the  
health sector, who suggests that; 
 
―I do not think that it is possible to compare fraud 
types across the sectors effectively, fraud in the NHS 
is so diverse, you would need a large number of 
categories and sub categories to have any accurate 
meaning.‖ 
 
A similar view is offered by a public sector fraud manager who observes that;  
 
―How you measure fraud will depend on the area that 
you are looking at - so quality, frequency, etc of 
measurement will be determined by that and what is 
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possible in some areas will simply not be possible in 
others. Therefore, whilst having some general 
principles to guide fraud measurement would be 
useful, it would be very difficult for prescriptive in all 
potential areas.‖ 
 
I contend these are not acceptable rebuttals, because many organisations 
deal with a variety of fraud types. Certainly, one important means of 
addressing these refutations on the ability to measure consistently throughout 
all three sectors is through the development of a universal definition of fraud 
which is incorporated into any benchmark of measurement. This British 
Standard could inform both what is measured and how it is measured, and 
there is no reason why it could not contain classifications that are applicable 
to all organisations within all three sectors. 
 
The views of interviewees were sought on the ideal level of statistical 
confidence of fraud loss data. Those canvassed offered some varying 
opinions, however there was some collective agreement amongst 
respondents that there does need to be an elevated level of confidence 
carried by fraud loss data. One respondent suggesting that; 
 
―You want it to the 1% plus or minus.‖ (A2) 
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Another respondent offers a similar view suggesting that; 
 
―It‘s possible to be very accurate. Individual exercises 
that have taken place around the world can be very 
accurate with high levels of statistical confidence. 
Plus or minus 1% in Europe. Outside Europe and the 
US plus or minus 2.5% is the standard with 95% 
statistical confidence outside the US and 90% in the 
US.‖ (FP1) 
 
One respondent was more relaxed about accuracy levels suggesting that; 
 
―There should be tolerance of plus or minus 10%.‖ 
(A3) 
 
A final opinion worth discussing is that offered by an academic who argues 
that there are more important considerations than just a figure when 
attempting to judge the reliability of data, the contention being that; 
 
―You have to understand how the meta-data is 
collected, what it represents and what you think the 
strengths and weaknesses are. I think this approach 
is more valid than getting caught up in percentages.‖ 
(A1) 
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These responses are of value when developing a standard of fraud loss 
measurement. Arguably, there is scope to combine high levels of accuracy 
and statistical confidence with a robust data collection methodology based 
upon common sampling that offers both confidence in the process and the 
reported figures. Before developing a British Standard measure, I considered 
it important to canvass reaction to such an instrument. The next section will 
therefore present the views of those sampled on this important criterion of 
measurement.  
 
Creating a Standard 
 
The table below presents the views of questionnaire respondents on the value 
they place upon the creation of a British Standard of fraud measurement. 
  
Table 25: How important is the creation of a British Standard of fraud 
measurement? 
 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not very important 3 1 2 6 3 
Not important 1 1 3 5 3 
Neither important 
nor not important 
17 6 10 33 18 
Important 44 40 13 97 52 
Very important 20 20 4 44 24 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
Analysis of these data indicates a satisfactory level of support for the creation 
of a British Standard of fraud measurement, with 76% (n=141) of all 
respondents considering it to be either „important‟ or „very important‟.  
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Responses shown as percentages by sector are presented in the chart below. 
 
Chart 11: How important is the creation of a British Standard of fraud 
measurement? (Percentages by sector) 
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The sector offering the highest level of support was the private sector, with 
88% (n=60) of respondents indicating that they believed it to be either 
„important‟ or „very important‟, compared to 76% (n=64) of public sector 
respondents and only 54% (n=17) from the VC sector. As discussed 
previously, should this sample be representative of the views of a wider 
population, the survey results indicate there would be support for a British 
Standard of fraud measurement within the public and private sectors. 
Arguably, the lower percentage response rate from the VC sector arguably 
offers further evidence of the need to develop increased awareness of the 
value of accurate fraud measurement. 
 
Moving on to the analysis of interview transcripts, the majority of interviewees 
were in agreement, proffering the view that a British Standard would be a 
positive move towards improving the accuracy of measurement data. One  
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participant suggested that; 
 
―I do think having a standard would be helpful. It‘s 
good practice, not best practice and in my ideal world 
the British Standard means that you do statistical 
sampling.‖ (FP2) 
 
Another interviewee offers a similar viewpoint; 
 
―Having a kind of gold standard and agreed set of 
definitions that an industry will sign up to makes 
sense. So we know that this bank has lost this much 
money through fraud. Also if you‘ve got a 
comparable measurement across banks then surely 
that‘s an incentive to get more industry wide 
cooperation and understanding.‖ (A4) 
 
The same participant offers another pertinent argument, observing that; 
 
―Unless you can see where and how the data have 
been collected then you shouldn‘t necessarily rely on 
it anyway.‖ (A4) 
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An additional argument I offer, is that the creation of a British Standard could 
guarantee data integrity, and without a prescribed standard, data quality 
would become; 
 
―Discretionary, and all statistics would be unsafe.‖ 
(A3)  
 
One interesting observation offered is that a standard measure should not just 
be confined to the UK. The argument presented is that this standard should 
be international, specifically that; 
 
―A global standard should be defined because I don‘t 
like the idea of countries going their own way 
because then you don‘t have comparability.‖ (FP1) 
 
Some questionnaire participants also offered an opinion on this topic. Of 
particular interest is the response from the head of fraud in a banking 
organisation, who acknowledges the business benefits of statistically valid  
fraud loss measurement exercises by revealing that; 
 
―The Banking industry has agreed fraud 
measurement definitions for many fraud types, and 
shares data via UK Payments so a BS would not add 
too much value to Banking.  That said, the data 
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captured by banks really demonstrates the power of 
accurate measurement.‖  
 
Before concluding this aspect of the research findings, two further pertinent 
observations are offered from interviewees, who arguably provide 
observations that may be considered supportive of this project. The first 
interviewee, when discussing developing a standard of accurate 
measurement observes that, 
 
―Yes you are on the right lines in terms of the 
questions you ask about measurement. The biggest 
problem in measurement is how you achieve 
consistency of measurement.‖ (A3) 
 
The second response is even more specific, suggesting that; 
 
―If we were to try and develop a British Standard, it 
probably should be somebody from academia. That 
way you would develop something that wasn‘t just a 
commercial project.‖ (FP1) 
 
Furthermore, the same interview participant believes that the research 
proposals are attainable, suggesting that combining all proposals, the ideal 
outcome would be a statute mandating measurement, supplemented by  
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secondary legislation in the form of; 
 
―A UK IPIA british standard instrument about how to 
implement it, and then a validation agency to ensure 
that the measurements have been conducted.‖ (FP1) 
 
The Fraud Loss Calculation 
 
This chapter will now explore what, in the opinion of interviewees, should be 
incorporated into fraud loss data. Specifically, whether this should include 
prevention and detection costs. There are varied opinions, with some 
respondents suggesting that unequivocally these costs should be included. 
Firstly, the responses of two interviewees in favour of this methodology of loss 
calculation are offered, the first participant, when asked if prevention and  
detection costs should be included answered; 
 
―Yes definitely, but the problem is calculating the cost 
and data description should be specific about what 
has been included.‖ (A3) 
 
The second noteworthy response, whilst supportive of the inclusion of 
prevention and detection costs, raises the question of public sector  
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accountability, suggesting that; 
 
―Having data on the cost of prevention and detection 
would be useful and would increase our 
understanding of what value for money we are 
getting from public sector counter fraud 
organisations. All would be useful to inform more 
sensible policy making.‖ (A4) 
 
 There are however, other interviewees who suggest these costs should be 
excluded, one fraud professional arguing that; 
 
―Whilst costs of prevention and detection are 
important when looking at budgets, they are not 
specifically fraud losses. By including prevention and 
detection costs you are creating data that does not 
offer a true reflection of the actual monetary losses 
that have been experienced as a result of individual 
or group fraudulent activity, which are the most 
important data.‖ (A6) 
 
Having considered the arguments for and against, I suggest it is feasible that 
these costs may be offset by fraud that is not committed, because having 
weighed up the perceived risk of detection, the potential fraudster decides not 
to pursue this activity. Consequently, I contend that these costs should be 
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excluded from any fraud loss measures. This chapter will now explore the 
probability that a British Standard of measurement would be adopted by each 
individual sector. 
 
Adopting the Standard 
 
The table below details the responses from questionnaire respondents on 
whether their organisation would adopt such a standard. 
 
Table 26: Would a British Standard of fraud measurement be adopted by 
your organisation? 
 
 
 Public Private VC   n % 
Not likely at all 4 2 3 9 5 
Not likely 6 4 5 15 8 
Neither likely nor 
unlikely 
23 22 15 60 32 
Likely 35 30 7 72 39 
Very likely 17 10 2 29 16 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
These responses suggest there is a need to educate organisations about the 
value of a consistent and accurate measure. The overall response is relatively 
encouraging, with 55% (n=101) of those surveyed indicating that a British 
Standard of measurement would be adopted by their organisation. This does 
however fall significantly below the 76% (n=141) of respondents who 
indicated that they considered the creation of a British Standard of value. 
These data might be explained by the fact that certain organisations may be 
represented by more than one respondent, and thus there is no direct 
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correlation between both datasets. What is of note however is that the 
affirmative responses of 61% (n=52) (public sector) and 59% (n=40) (private 
sector), as detailed in the chart below, offer more encouragement for 
advocating the adoption of a prescribed standard measure.  
 
Chart 12: Would a British Standard of fraud measurement be adopted by 
your organisation? (Percentages by sector) 
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The affirmative response rate to this question of 28% (n=9) of VC sector 
representatives is disappointing, unsurprising given the reluctance to confront 
fraud and embrace its measurement. I contend this attitude has contributed 
towards the development of the concept of immoral phlegmatism within this 
research project. Once again, these data, whilst only being a small sample, 
suggest that there may be a need to develop a better understanding of the 
value of fraud measurement within this sector. It is however, worth 
considering alternative options to mandating the publication of organisational 
loss data from this sector, it being apparent that fear of adverse publicity is the 
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main driver behind this reluctance to embrace measurement and adopt a 
universal standard.  
 
A further question was then posed within the questionnaire, seeking opinion 
on which sectors any British Standard should be applied to. The results are 
documented in the table below; 
 
Table 27: Which sectors should a British Standard of fraud 
measurement be applied to? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Public Sector 
Organisations 
84 68 30 182 98 
Private Sector 
Organisations 
73 38 16 127 69 
Voluntary/Charitable 
Organisations 
79 56 25 160 86 
Total potential 
responses for each 
variable 
85 68 32 185  
 
These responses signify that accurate fraud measurement is considered to be 
most important within the public sector, with 98% (n=182) of all respondents 
indicating that a British Standard of measurement should be applied. 
Interestingly, the fact that 86% (n=160) of respondents indicated that such a 
standard should be applied to the VC sector and 69% (n=127) considered it 
appropriate to the private sector offers further persuasion that this option for 
change is worth progressing. The higher response in respect of the VC sector 
could be explained by the fact that respondents recognise the important role 
that charities perform, particularly during a time of significant public sector 
cuts. Another finding of interest, as presented in the chart overleaf, is that 
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99% (n=84) of public sector respondents and 100% (n=68) of private sector 
respondents indicated that in their opinion, a British Standard of fraud 
measurement should be applied to the public sector. Once again it could be 
suggested that, should these data reflect the opinion of a wider population, 
then the argument that a standard of fraud measurement should be created 
appears persuasive to representatives from all sectors. The responses 
concerning the private sector suggest limited support for imposing such a 
standard, particularly from private and VC sector respondents, who actually 
offer more support for applying this to Voluntary and Charitable organisations 
than the aforementioned sector. 
 
Chart 13: Which sectors should a British Standard of fraud 
measurement be applied to? (Percentages by sector) 
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Analysis of the responses from interviewees has provided some interesting 
data, the consensus of opinion being that a British Standard of Measurement 
should be embraced by all sectors. I commence by offering the views of one  
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respondent who argues that; 
 
―A British standard of measurement is a good idea if 
it was applied by all sectors. Fraud data would then 
have more credibility.‖ (A6) 
 
Another participant, supportive of such a standard measure, raises the 
importance of comparability, suggesting that; 
 
―A British Standard would enable more accurate 
longitudinal studies to be conducted. Simply because 
you would be able to compare like for like.‖ (A5) 
 
I close this section by presenting a persuasive argument that the NFA should 
be more influential in policing the fraud measurement process, specifically 
that; 
 
―If there was a consistent standard of measurement 
that was adopted by organisations, and more 
importantly, insisted upon by the NFA, then the data 
available would facilitate better informed decision 
making.‖ (FP4) 
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The next section will explore opinion from all respondents on whether 
compliance with any standard of measurement should be mandated within 
any sector. 
 
Mandating Standards 
 
The following three tables and charts report the views of questionnaire 
respondents on the mandating of compliance with a British Standard of 
measurement within each sector, commencing with the public sector. 
 
Table 28: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the public sector? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 65 65 27 157 85 
No 20 3 4 27 15 
No Answer 0 0 1 1 1 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
 
Chart 14: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the public sector? (Percentages by sector) 
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Table 29: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the private sector? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 41 27 9 77 42 
No 43 39 20 102 55 
No Answer 1 2 3 6 3 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
Chart 15: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the private sector? (Percentages by sector) 
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Table 30: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the voluntary/charitable sector? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Yes 56 49 14 119 64 
No 28 18 16 62 34 
No Answer 1 1 2 4 2 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
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Chart 16: Should compliance with a British Standard be mandatory 
within the voluntary/charitable sector? 
 
66
72
44
33
26
50
1 1
6
0
20
40
60
80
Public Private VC
Sector respondent's organisation falls 
within
%
 o
f 
s
a
m
p
le
Yes
No
No Answer
 
 
These data indicate that 85% (n=157) of respondents believe that compliance 
with a British Standard should be mandatory within the public sector, thus 
suggesting that this option for change should be progressed. Of note 
however, is that analysis of affirmative responses by sector reveals that the 
percentage of those representing the private sector (96%) (n=65) and the VC 
sector (84%) (n=27) exceed the percentage emanating from the public sector 
(76%) (n=65).This indicates a significant level of concern that public funds 
may be at risk from fraud, and thus the implementation of a structured 
measurement standard is worth pursuing.  
 
Moving on to the private sector, the level of support within those sampled is 
significantly lower, with only 42% (n=77) of respondents indicating that such a 
standard should be mandatory within this sector. The level of support by 
sector differs, the highest percentage of respondents by sector originating 
from the public sector with 41 of the 85 respondents (48%) answering in the 
affirmative.  
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Analysis of the data relating to the VC sector indicates a more positive stance; 
whereby 64% (n=119) of respondents indicated that compliance with a British 
Standard should be mandatory. When examining responses by sector, this 
overall figure is skewed by the lowly 44% (n=14) of VC sector respondents 
answering in the affirmative, compared with 66% (n=56) of public sector and 
72% (n=49) of private sector respondents. Arguably, this further supports the 
inference that there is a reluctance to embrace fraud risks within the VC 
sector. 
 
Before exploring the development of core doctrine, in support of the argument 
for open and transparent fraud measurement, I offer an observation that 
suggests losses may be concealed by certain private sector industries, the  
respondent arguing that; 
 
―Banks will often call a lot of their mortgage fraud, 
losses. They will not call it fraud, it‘s just impairment, 
they will settle it as bad debt.‖ (FP2)  
 
Developing ‘Best Practice’ 
 
Those sampled electronically were asked what value they placed on the 
creation of an information and best practice exchange matrix, and if their 
organisation would participate in such an infrastructure. Firstly, the opinions 
sourced from questionnaire respondents on the creation of such a network  
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are reported in the table below.  
 
 
Table 31: How important is the creation of a knowledge management 
infrastructure for sharing best practice? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not important at all 1 0 2 3 2 
Not important 1 1 0 2 1 
Neither important 
nor not important 
10 10 11 31 17 
Important 45 41 18 104 56 
Very important 28 16 1 45 24 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
 
These data represent a positive response to the creation of a knowledge 
management infrastructure, with 80% (n=149) of all respondents considering 
it either „important‟ or „very important‟. As presented in the chart overleaf, 
individually, the views of representatives from the public and private sectors 
are also encouraging, with 86% (n=73) of public sector and 84% (n=57) of 
private sector respondents selecting either of the aforementioned options. The 
opinion of VC sector respondents is also encouraging, with 59% (n=19) 
selecting the same two options. If this response were to reflect the views of 
the wider population from this sector, it would offer a good starting point, in 
terms of support, for incorporating this sector in any fraud measurement 
knowledge transfer process, and the development of core doctrine. 
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Chart 17: How important is the creation of a knowledge management 
infrastructure for sharing best practice? (Percentages by sector) 
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Interviewees collectively supported the development of best practice, to  
evidence this, the narrative of one participant is presented, who argues that; 
 
―I certainly think there is an argument made for good 
practice, and I think that should be made readily 
available.‖ (FP2) 
 
This respondent further qualifies their contention by suggesting that; 
 
―I do think an organisation like the National Fraud 
Authority should act as a repository for good practice, 
where people can access it as a resource.” (FP2) 
 
The development of this concept should be driven by a specific, but impartial  
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organisation, the same respondent suggesting that; 
 
―People need important guidance for measuring their 
losses. There has to be an authority and a definitive 
measurement. There should be someone 
responsible in Government for ensuring that fraud is 
consistently and accurately measured.‖ (FP2) 
 
Arguably, the collective views reported suggest that the development of 
doctrine and sharing of good practice would garner support. What is equally 
important however, is that „ownership‟ of this proposed strategy is allocated, 
and the organisation charged with this responsibility actively encourage 
participation. 
 
The responses to the question on the likelihood of respondent‟s organisations 
participating in such a process are detailed in the table below. 
 
Table 32: Would your organisation participate in a knowledge 
management infrastructure? 
 
 Public Private VC n % 
Not likely at all 1 1 3 5 3 
Not likely 5 2 7 14 8 
Neither likely nor 
unlikely 
28 27 14 69 37 
Likely 36 29 7 72 39 
Very Likely 15 9 1 25 14 
Totals 85 68 32 185  
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The total „positive‟ response by only 53% (n=97) of those sampled is 
somewhat disappointing, but it should be noted that the overall response 
figure is lowered by the fact that only 25% (n=8) of VC sector respondents  
answered positively, as revealed in the chart below.  
 
Chart 18: Would your organisation participate in a knowledge 
management infrastructure? (Percentages by sector) 
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Arguably, this yet again supports the contention that, should this reflect the 
views of the wider population, there needs to be a significant marketing thrust 
directed towards this sector; something that could be undertaken by the NFA, 
or an impartial academic institution. The responses from participants 
representing the remaining two sectors suggest that this option for change is 
worth developing further. Specifically, 60% (n=51) of public sector 
respondents and 56% (n=38) of private sector respondents indicated that their 
organisation would participate in a knowledge management infrastructure. 
 
Finally, one interesting response offered earlier in the questionnaire, but of 
relevance to this discussion, is provided by an insurance industry counter  
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fraud specialist, who suggests that, 
 
―Some businesses operate in a silo mentality and do 
not see fraud as a shared problem‖ 
 
I maintain that if this attitude is replicated throughout the industry, then it casts 
doubt upon the effectiveness of the ABI as a conduit for information 
exchange. Equally, if this is representative of the private sector in general, 
then I suggest it evidences a need to educate this sector on the sharing of 
good practice and further supports the need for some form of knowledge 
transfer matrix that is open to all sectors, and managed by either the NFA or 
an academic institution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the views of those sampled on the subjects of 
reliability of fraud measurement data, including the level of statistical validity, 
the creation of a British Standard of fraud measurement and the development 
of a knowledge management infrastructure. The findings suggest that 
collective opinion believes there is an urgent need to improve the statistical 
validity of fraud loss data. Equally, there is a high level of support for the 
creation of a standard measure of fraud losses from those sampled 
representing the public and private sectors. The views of participants of both 
data collection methodologies also support the proposal to develop doctrine 
which is supported by the creation of an information exchange matrix. 
Evidence has also been presented of immoral phlegmatism towards accurate 
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fraud measurement, which may only be addressed by a cultural change, as 
discussed within the two preceding chapters. The following chapter will 
present the conclusions and recommendations. These being informed by 
analysis of the responses obtained from all research participants, utilising 
both data collection methodologies outlined within chapter three. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Introduction  
 
This thesis has explored the theme of developing a more accurate measure of 
fraud. The aim of this Professional Doctorate research has been to offer an 
original contribution of new knowledge to theory and practice. This project 
commenced with a critical position that fraud can be measured more 
accurately, but in order to do so, certain criteria and processes have to be put 
in place. To empirically test the validity and feasibility of this research 
argument, the opinion of both academics and fraud practitioners from the 
public, private and VC sectors was sought. The use of semi structured 
qualitative interviews enabled specific topics to be explored in detail, the 
resultant data then being used to inform the quantitative research instrument. 
The resultant electronic questionnaire facilitated the gathering of volume data 
on all topics covered within the research argument. Additionally, the use of 
free text boxes enabled the collection of supplementary qualitative data by 
offering respondents the opportunity to expand upon the answers provided to 
certain closed questions within the questionnaire.  
 
Following critical analysis of responses provided by research participants, this 
chapter will now explore the key enablers for the development of a more 
accurate measure of fraud. Before doing so however, I once again 
acknowledge that there are limitations regarding the extent to which the 
findings from the electronic questionnaire can be generalized to broader 
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populations, however I maintain they do offer a barometer of opinion 
suggesting the research argument is worthy of progression. Moving on, I will 
now discuss the phenomenon of immoral phlegmatism and the need to 
facilitate a cultural change in attitudes towards fraud, and more specifically its 
measurement.  
 
Addressing Immoral Phlegmatism 
 
Throughout the three findings chapters I have developed an argument that 
both individual and organisational attitudes towards fraud in general, but 
specifically fraud measurement, may be described as immoral phlegmatism. 
This phenomenon may be described as an „anti moral panic‟, namely a very 
relaxed, even complacent attitude to all aspects of fraud. Firstly the problem in 
many areas goes through a process of de-labelling, it is not measured 
effectively and there are not enough resources dedicated to dealing with it. 
Decision-makers approach to the problem can be further influenced by naïve 
belief in the attenuated problem in front of them, or it actually suits their 
interest not to challenge the evidence in front of them. The consequences of 
the phlegmatism, however, whether naivety or self interest is an immoral 
response to fraud in many organisations as well as state institutions. 
 
This viewpoint is evidenced by some of the explanations offered as to why 
certain organisations fail to measure fraud. Two in particular worth revisiting 
are from respondents that evidence this approach is prevalent within the VC 
sector, the first suggesting that because the organisation is a religious charity, 
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there is no fraud and the second advising that fraud measurement is afforded 
a low priority because the risk is perceived to be low. I contend this suggests 
a very complacent attitude when a not for profit organisation makes such a 
statement without at least attempting to look for the existence of fraud, 
particularly when current estimates, which potentially may undercount losses, 
indicate that fraud costs registered charities £147 million per anum (NFA, 
2013, p. 21). Evidence has also been presented of similar attitudes within the 
public and private sectors, with a local authority fraud manager suggesting 
that senior management are ambivalent towards fraud and a respondent 
representing the insurance industry advising that there is little concern that 
fraud is occurring within the organisation. 
 
When examining the quantitative data, 29% of respondents indicating that 
their organisation failed to measure fraud offered the explanation that this is 
because there is no fraud in their organisation.  This is a somewhat 
paradoxical situation, because if they do not measure, then how do they know 
there is no fraud? A further 10% suggested that fraud was not measured 
because the organisation did not need to know, thus evidencing a somewhat 
naïve attitude towards fraud and its associated risks. Further confirmation of 
the need for a cultural change is provided by the argument offered against 
mandating measurement that such exercises may be too costly.  
 
Within chapter one the cost of measuring fraud was discussed and arguments 
presented that this can be a cost effective process with associated business  
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benefits; these being: 
 
 A potential 12:1 return in investment (Gee, 2009b, p. 20). 
 Regular measurement exercises reduce loss by up to 40% within the first 
year (Button & Gee, 2013, p.187). 
 “Taken as a proportion of the measured losses, this equates to two per 
cent being added to the „bottom line‟ within a year” (Gee, 2010a, p. 13).  
 Empirical evidence suggests that regular measurement can potentially 
result in an average increase in profitability of “almost 36 per cent” (Button 
& Gee, 2013, p.187). 
 
Evidence in the form of case studies has also been presented within 
preceding chapters supporting the argument that the costs of regular fraud 
loss measurement exercises can be offset by the savings resulting from 
informed use of the resultant data to develop control strategies, implement 
focused deployment of any investigative resource, and undertake recovery 
action of identified losses. To summarise, the following case studies evidence 
the cost effectiveness of regular fraud loss measurement exercises: 
  
 “As a result of IPIA, by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2012, the US 
Administration avoided $50 billion in improper payments” (Payment 
Accuracy, n.d.c).  
 In Fiscal Year 2011 over $4 billion dollars of improper payments were 
recovered, which represents “the single largest health care fraud 
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recovery in history” (US Energy and Commerce Committee 
Subcommittee on Health, 2012, p. 1). 
 The NHS, which had a budget of £87.2 billion for 2005/06, reduced 
losses by up to sixty per cent during the period 1998 and 2006 
(National Health Service Counter Fraud and Security Management 
Service, 2007). 
 The US Department of Agriculture reduced losses by twenty eight per 
cent within a £12 billion dollar program between 2002 and 2004 (United 
States Department of Agriculture, 2002; 2003; 2004). 
 The Department for Work and Pensions reduced losses in the two 
means tested benefits Income Support and Jobseekers Allowance that 
have an annual expenditure of £11.4 billion by fifty per cent between 
1997/8 and 2005/6 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2007).  
 
Therefore to address this mindset, it is imperative that there is a cultural shift 
towards embracing the value of measurement, so that if any form of 
mandating occurs, this would be met with less resistance due to organisations 
having been educated in the financial benefits of accurate fraud 
measurement. I therefore suggest that to progress this strategy, there needs 
to be a proactive marketing campaign that delivers fraud awareness training 
about both organisational vulnerability to fraud, and a positive message about 
the benefits of active measurement. In support of the latter argument, I proffer 
the view of one respondent who suggested the need for a cultural change to 
make fraud measurement a positive experience. This is a valid point, and can 
be achieved by emphasising the business benefits in terms of stemming 
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losses through regular measurement. Equally, the proposed marketing 
campaign should incorporate the message that there is no organisational 
stigma attached to being the victim of a fraudulent attack. The issue however, 
is that the message needs to emphasise that acknowledging the existence of 
fraud is not injurious, but not actually measuring it and then implementing 
counter strategies is. Within the private sector there may be a concern that an 
admission of the existence of fraud may be counter productive to the business 
through adverse publicity. I further contend that even worse adverse publicity 
would be that which identifies an organisation that has identified the 
prevalence of fraud, but fails to acknowledge this and continues to be in 
denial, or just blatantly refuses to implement fraud loss measurement 
exercises. Consequently, I maintain that where these complacent and indolent 
attitudes are identified, the solutions should be persuasively emphasised, in 
order that immoral phlegmatism is eradicated. 
 
This strategy requires government support, which may take some persuasion 
due to the costs involved. One option might be for the „Counter Fraud Task 
Force‟ led by Francis Maude MP to undertake this role. It could take the form 
of an electronic campaign by e-mail, direct „mail shots‟ to organisations, or 
even newspaper and television advertisements. An alternative option might be 
to task the NFA, in their capacity as owners of the Annual Fraud Indicator, 
with implementing an awareness campaign on the business benefits of 
accurate measurement and how this information can then be used to inform 
counter fraud strategies. This would actually serve two purposes; firstly 
achieve the primary objective of raising the profile of the benefits of accurate 
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measurement, and secondly, improve the accuracy and volume of reliable 
data that they receive. Having considered these two options, debatably, a 
more suitable alternative would be for the government to task an academic 
institution to undertake this marketing campaign. This option could improve 
the potential for cooperation, because any message coming from academia 
may be seen as being impartial. Before a final decision is made however, it 
may be appropriate to conduct additional research examining existing 
academic and government partnerships to aid identification of the most 
suitable institution to be tasked with the remit of facilitating such a network. 
I also conclude that there is a need for supplementary qualitative based 
research within the VC sector on awareness of, and attitudes towards fraud, 
with a view to developing a marketing strategy to develop a better 
understanding of vulnerability to fraud within this sector. The research 
conducted by the Fraud Advisory Panel (2009) into fraud within this sector 
offers a model that can be used as a starting point to inform and direct the 
proposed research project. Arguably, this research would enable a strategy to 
be developed to increase fraud awareness, reduce immoral phlegmatism 
within this sector, and more importantly, incentivise these organisations to 
measure.  
 
The next section will discuss the creation of a standard definition of fraud for 
measurement purposes, which the subsequent recommendations are reliant 
upon to achieve the primary objective of accurately identifying the full extent 
of fraud losses across all three sectors. 
 
 299 
Defining Fraud for Measurement Purposes 
 
To progress the development of a more accurate fraud measure, I suggest a 
standard definition for this purpose is necessary. Whilst I accept it may not 
totally remove individual interpretation, it will restrict this and provide all 
organisations with a common starting point. This individual interpretation 
could be further reduced by the development of core doctrine supported by a 
manual of guidance, which will be discussed later in this chapter. When 
developing a standard definition, this must be suitable for application trans-
sector, and one which may be applied to any unit within the statistically valid 
sample. This definition should be legally based to prevent any inconsistency 
in measures, thus removing any doubts on the reliability of data outputs. 
Whilst the Fraud Act is informative, this statute is not considered suitable for 
the purposes of measurement because it only provides definitions of how 
fraud may be perpetrated. 
 
Consequently, when seeking to develop such a classification, the civil 
definition Derry V Peek (1889) is worthy of consideration because it is based 
upon the balance of probabilities, which offers a less stringent test than 
criminal law. This concept of civil fraud occurs where someone knowingly or 
recklessly obtains resources to which they are not entitled. An alternative 
option considered was the Audit Commission (2010) definition of fraud, which 
encompasses both internal and external fraud, defining it as “any intentional 
false representation, including failure to declare information or abuse of 
position which is carried out to make gain or cause loss or such as disciplinary 
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action has been taken” (p. 10). This definition was considered appropriate 
because it seeks to offer commonalities relevant to local government on a 
national basis. 
 
Both of the aforementioned are suitable because they offer a conceptual 
definition rather than focusing on enforcement. This is important, because it 
enables any measurement decision making process to be based upon the 
balance of probabilities, rather than the criminal law requirement of beyond 
reasonable doubt. I contend that, applying one of these definitions for the 
purpose of fraud measurement would enable the calculation of a more 
realistic loss figure. I have previously argued against fraud measurement 
being based upon detected cases, because lack of evidence to support a 
criminal sanction would result in these being discounted, even though there 
may be a strong suspicion of fraud. Furthermore, from inception, “fraud takes 
3.4 years to detect” (KPMG, 2011, p. 6), therefore solely relying on detected 
fraud would further increase the inaccuracy of any loss data. Whereas, 
applying a test based upon the balance of probabilities may facilitate inclusion 
in any measurement exercise, thus resulting in more accurate data output. 
Therefore, in terms of adopting a definition of fraud that would improve the 
accuracy and reliability of data generated, having considered the feasibility of 
both options, I contend that to progress accurate measurement there needs to 
be a legally based definition of fraud. Consequently, I advocate that the 
accepted civil definition of fraud Derry V Peek (1889) should be adopted as a 
standard definition for fraud loss measurement purposes. Furthermore, this 
could then form the basis for developing an International standard of 
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measurement, whilst also facilitating the opportunity for more measurement, 
which will now be discussed. 
 
Who should Measure? 
 
I contend that subject to statistical validation through the creation of a British 
Standard of measurement, with the exception of the NFA‟s Annual Fraud 
Indicator, „hybrid‟ style fraud loss data measurement reporting should be 
discontinued. I further maintain that each individual organisation should be 
responsible for their own individual loss measurement exercises, conducted to 
a prescribed standard, and the resultant data be subjected to validation by a 
mutually appointed third party on a random sample basis, who could be an 
impartial auditor, being part of the organisation charged with developing 
information exchange and doctrine. These validated data should then be 
transferred to the National Fraud Authority who is responsible for collating and 
publishing these data in the Annual Fraud Indicator. I accept that this research 
has been critical of what have been defined as hybrid reports; however, I 
maintain that the way forward is the construction of an amalgam of fraud loss 
data, providing that there is consistency of methodology applied in all 
measurement exercises. 
 
Increasing Measurement Consistently 
 
Analysis of the questionnaire data suggests there is a need for increased 
measurement. Firstly, there are organisations from all three sectors 
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represented within which no fraud measurement takes place. I accept that this 
may be an organisational decision, based on the perception that no fraud 
exists, however evidence has been presented within this thesis that when 
conducting a fraud loss measurement exercise for the first time “fraud losses 
will be in the region of 5.7 per cent” (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 75). When 
examining responses from representatives of organisations across all three 
sectors, 34% indicated that no fraud measurement took place. The sector 
which requires most attention in terms of increased measurement is the VC 
sector, where responses indicate that 57% of organisations represented failed 
to carry out any measurement exercises whatsoever. Nevertheless, this is 
actually a problem that needs to be addressed across all sectors, but 
particularly within the aforementioned sector. I maintain that the 
recommendations contained within the remainder of this chapter, if 
implemented, will address this issue. 
 
Before closing this section, it is worth pausing to consider opinion on the 
frequency of measurement. Whilst 74% of respondents indicated annually, 
this still leaves 26% who do not consider that this is an ideal frequency for 
measurement exercises. Interestingly, some responses suggested that 
annually was too infrequent. I embrace this positive attitude, but realistically it 
is not cost effective, or of value to measure fraud too frequently, specifically 
because the impact of changes to counter strategies on losses take time to 
evidence. 
 
 303 
In conclusion, when advocating increased measurement, I suggest this should 
be directed towards those organisations that fail to measure, and those that 
measure less frequently than yearly. Therefore, as will be discussed within the 
section arguing for a British Standard of fraud measurement, there needs to 
be a consistent frequency of measurement, which I suggest should be 
annually. By adopting this policy, whilst it may be seen as „no change‟ by 
those already measuring annually, overall it would result in more 
measurement which in turn would generate a more accurate calculation of 
overall losses.   
 
Mandating Measurement 
 
The research instrument posed the question “does you organisation measure 
fraud?”. The responses, whilst offering some encouragement, did give cause 
for concern. Chapter 4 presented data outlining the percentage of 
respondents whose organisation measured fraud. I will now explore the 
negative percentages as a means of introducing the argument for mandating 
measurement. The data reveal that within organisations represented by the 
sample, when extrapolated to sector level, fraud is not measured by 30% 
(public), 28% (private) and 57% (VC). Should this sample reflect the attitude 
of the wider population, then I contend that these data offer the support for the 
arguments presented for the mandating of fraud measurement. Analysis of 
the free text responses also reveals that there is no measurement within 
some local and central government departments and within certain 
organisations within the private sector industries of insurance, retail and 
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manufacturing. Further evidence was obtained relating to opinion on the 
importance of measuring fraud, with 96% of questionnaire respondents 
considering it „important‟ or „very important‟. Arguably, this suggests there is 
support within organisations for a stronger focus on measurement, which in 
reality, may be only achieved through some form of mandating. I argue this 
because whilst questionnaire respondents answered favourably to this 
question, this stance may not be representative of senior influential 
management within the respondent‟s organisation. 
 
Having considered views on the general mandating of fraud measurement, 
this research then analysed the reaction to the principle research argument, 
which proposes the creation of a statute that mandates fraud measurement. 
The quantitative research participants indicated significant support for creating 
a statute, with 76% being in favour. There was also encouraging levels of 
support from both fraud professionals and academics, however opinion was 
divided with regards to which sectors this proposed legislation should apply 
to. 
 
This level of support is encouraging; however there is some division between 
support for developing a more accurate measure of fraud losses across all 
three sectors and creating a statute compelling organisations within all of 
these sectors to conduct measurement exercises to a prescribed standard.  I 
have therefore firstly considered the option of persuasion as an alternative to 
regulation. 
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The Art of Persuasion 
 
According to Braithwaite (2006b) “law enforcers should be responsive to how 
effectively...corporations are regulating themselves before deciding whether to 
escalate intervention” (p. 886). I have therefore explored whether persuasive 
tactics could be used to encourage the development of a more accurate 
measure of fraud. Firstly, when considering the public sector, as discussed 
within the literature review chapter, historically this has already been 
attempted by HM Treasury within central government, but with very limited 
success. A more recent development resulting from the escalating scale of 
public sector losses to fraud has been the creation of the Cabinet Office‟s 
Fraud, Error and Debt (FED) Taskforce which seeks to “reduce the impact of 
fraud and error” within the entire public sector (HM Government, 2012, p. 6). 
Whilst the Cabinet Office may have some authority,  as discussed in chapter 
one, they have not been given sufficient power to compel the public sector to 
conduct fraud loss measurement exercises and are only able to offer 
incentives to measure. As a consequence, I suggest that even the issue of 
persuasive directives may not fully address the limited activity within central 
and local government. Furthermore, when attempting to influence the public 
sector to measure fraud, the FED Taskforce are still advocating the 
measurement of fraud by examining detected cases rather than compelling 
central government departments to undertake “proactive” fraud loss risk 
measurement exercises” (p.17).  
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Equally, the first FED Taskforce publication which discusses areas of priority 
including “the independent assessment of the accuracy of estimated and 
reported losses” only makes reference to the consistent estimate of “spend 
metrics” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.14). Whilst this criterion is important, the fact 
that there is no reference to consistent fraud loss measurement gives cause 
for concern that inconsistencies in the way fraud losses are measured, 
including what is counted and the methodology employed, will remain across 
the whole of this sector.  
 
Finally, I return to the empirical evidence offered by the US example, whereby 
failed attempts at persuasion the US government necessitated the creation of 
the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 which requires public 
agencies to publish statistically valid estimates of the levels of fraud within 
their programs and activities. I therefore suggest that persuasion is not an 
option for the UK public sector and regulation through the creation of a statute 
is the only viable option to obtain consistently accurate fraud loss 
measurement data. 
 
Moving on to consider the private sector, there is evidence that fraud loss 
measurement takes place; however this activity does not always take place 
on a consistent basis, as evidenced within the NFA (2013) Annual Fraud 
Indicator which contains data for the latest year that figures are available, this 
ranging from 2006 to 2013 (p. 4). This suggests that despite the 
commendable efforts by the NFA, there are still organisations within the 
private sector that cannot be persuaded to supply extant data, or fail to 
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measure regularly. In support of this contention, I draw upon evidence from  
the regional fraud summits held by the NFA (2009b), within which 
representations were made that certain industries will only provide fraud loss 
data if compelled to do so by their regulator or by legislation.  
 
Evidence from the NFA‟s Annual Fraud Indicator also suggests that there is a 
reluctance to provide fraud loss data. As discussed within chapter one, the 
fraud loss estimate for the private sector (excluding financial and insurance 
industries) was obtained through an online questionnaire. Respondents were 
asked to provide an estimate of fraud against their organisation as a 
percentage of annual turnover, however “almost half of respondents chose 
the option „prefer not to say‟” (NFA, 2012, p. 16). This does offer an 
explanation for the NFA only allocating an average level of confidence to 
these loss data from all private sector industries (excluding financial services), 
and again suggests that to obtain a more accurate picture of fraud within this 
sector, alternative options require consideration. In further support of the 
argument that persuasion is not a viable option for the private sector, I offer 
the observations of the NFA (2012) who identify limitations in the private 
sector fraud loss data resulting from “the potential bias of organisations self 
selecting to participate” (p. 6). The findings from the 2012 qualitative survey 
also reveal a lack of knowledge about the extent of fraud losses, with many 
organisations suggesting it was “too difficult to place a precise figure on an 
activity they did not know about” (NFA, 2013, p. 20). 
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Moving on to consider the financial services industry, I suggest that the 
reluctance to supply current and accurate mortgage fraud data also evidences 
that persuasive tactics have not worked. As a consequence, the estimate for 
mortgage fraud is given a poor level of confidence by the NFA and the figure 
has not changed since 2009 (NFA, 2013, p. 42). I further suggest that in order 
to control this sector, state intervention as opposed to persuasion may be the 
only viable option, as evidenced by the necessity for the state to intervene 
during the baking crisis resulting from irresponsible practices, and the 
subsequent regulation imposed to control the future activities of these 
institutions. Of equal concern is the fraud loss data supplied by the insurance 
industry, which is only given an average confidence rating (NFA, 2013, p. 39). 
This is because the industry only supplies partial fraud loss data for the 
general insurance market, and excludes the long term market. Arguably, this 
again suggests there may be a need to consider alternatives to persuasion to 
obtain full and accurate fraud loss data.  
 
Finally, I return to the Bribery Act 2010 which I suggest offers empirical 
evidence that private sector organisations may only comply with government 
imposed and procedures through regulation. As discussed earlier in this 
thesis, the aforementioned statute imposes a legal requirement for the 
implementation of a significant number of internal processes at a cost to the 
organisation to limit the risks of bribery taking place. It could therefore be 
suggested that if the state needs to intervene to ensure that profit making 
organisations put costly measures in place to remove the risk of financial 
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impropriety through bribery, then why not for fraud losses which reduce 
profitability? 
 
Moving on to consider the VC sector, it is imperative that this sector further 
develop an understanding of fraud, but most importantly, acknowledge the 
importance of accurate measurement. Because the VC sector is still at the 
early stages embracing the concept of fraud measurement, I suggest there is 
scope to persuade „not for profit organisations‟ to implement fraud loss 
measurement programmes without resorting to mandating the process. 
Furthermore, regulating the VC sector may be viewed as too draconian, and 
thus create resistance to any proposed statute, which may not be so 
vehement should they be excluded. 
 
To emphasise the importance of fraud loss measurement, and as a 
consequence, improve the quality of loss data from this sector being fed to the 
NFA, the government could task a specialist accounting firm, for example 
BDO, to conduct fraud measurement exercises within a sample of VC sector 
organisations. Whilst the identity of the organisations involved would remain 
anonymous, the results of the exercise could be circulated to the 1,599 
charities with an income in excess of £100,000 (NFA, 2013, p. 8). Arguably, 
should the results of these exercises indicate the prevalence of fraud as 
research suggests, sight of these data will incentivise other „not for profit‟ 
organisations to measure.  
 
 310 
Furthermore, I suggest that to improve the accuracy of VC sector loss data, 
organisations with a minimum turnover of £10 million are persuaded to 
conduct measurement exercises on a voluntary basis, with a 95% level of 
statistical confidence but a less stringent accuracy level of +/- 2.5%, but with 
the aim of improving accuracy levels in time similar to those within the 
proposed British Standard of Measurement, which will be discussed later in 
the chapter. A small sample of these proposed voluntary loss measurement 
exercises could be independently validated on behalf of the NFA and these 
data submitted to the NFA in confidence. These figures could then be 
extrapolated to provide a more realistic estimation of fraud losses throughout 
this sector. Arguably, once the benefits of regular loss measurement are 
evidenced by those organisations participating, this may in turn persuade 
more organisations within this sector to undertake loss measurement 
exercises thus further improving the accuracy of fraud loss data. Until 
business saving are evidenced, this could be achieved by offering incentives 
to at least convince charitable organisations that they need to measure fraud. 
To do this, I suggest that appropriate incentives are offered. These might  
include the following;  
 
 Increasing the value of „gift aid‟ that charities claim back from the 
government. 
 No business tax. 
 Free advertising via government networks to generate additional 
donations. 
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The next section will discuss the proposals for creating a statute mandating 
measurement within the public and private sectors.  
 
Creating a Statute 
 
Having discounted the option that the public and private sectors can be 
persuaded to measure fraud accurately and consistently, I suggest this may 
only be achieved through mandating measurement and creating a standard to 
ensure consistency by prescribing what is measured and the methodology 
employed. I therefore propose that a statute similar to the US IPIA 2002 
should be created. The statute should incorporate the proposed British 
Standard of Measurement, thus ensuring consistency of data accuracy, and 
stipulate that all organisations encapsulated by this legislation apply the 
model. Without such a standard to accompany the proposed statute, there 
would be no guarantee of data consistency; therefore I conclude that the 
proposed statute and British Standard are interdependent. Consideration has 
also been given to whether the proposed standard could be pursued 
independently and I will discuss this in more detail later in the chapter. Initially, 
I contend that such legislation should be directed towards the public sector at 
central and local government levels and large private sector organisations. 
 
When considering which private sector organisations should be included in 
the proposed statute, one option is to include all those with shareholders, thus 
incorporating public limited companies, private limited companies and private 
unlimited companies. The statute could then offer shareholders a vote on 
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whether the business should comply with the statute, but with a caveat that 
should they vote against, they must inform the regulating authority and details 
of organisations that fail to comply following a shareholder vote are made 
public via the National Fraud Authority/Cabinet Office website. However, I 
have discounted this option because it does not take account of company size 
and therefore might include businesses without the capacity to fulfil their 
obligations under the proposed statute. 
 
I therefore advocate inclusion of all private sector organisations excluding 
those classed as small and medium-sized enterprises (European 
Commission, 2005), because they may have problems self-regulating in any 
form (Aalders & Wilthagan, 1997; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p. 121) due to 
limited capacity. The inclusion criteria for the proposed statute are therefore 
all private sector organisations with a minimum headcount of 250 and whose 
annual turnover is ≥ €50 million (sterling equivalent) or annual balance sheet 
is ≥ €43 (sterling equivalent) (European Commission, 2005).  
 
The National Fraud Authority could be charged with overseeing the regulation 
of the statute and funded accordingly. Whilst it may be considered that any 
savings as a result of conducting these proposed exercises will only benefit a 
commercially driven enterprise, it is worth remembering that, as previously 
discussed, certain organisations pass on these losses to their customers. 
Therefore, a reduction in fraud losses resulting in increased profits could 
potentially benefit the consumer should these organisations be encouraged to 
pass on these savings in the form of reduced insurance premiums or bank 
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charges for example. Secondly, the financial benefits of reducing fraud losses 
could also have a positive impact on the UK economy due to the anticipated 
increase in consumer disposable income and increased company profits 
which could result in expansion, more employment opportunities and 
increased contributions to HM Treasury through business taxes.    
 
To facilitate the proposed regulatory model, a state funded fraud loss 
measurement training programme brokered by the National Fraud Authority 
could be offered to ensure that those businesses without the expertise can 
recruit and train staff in fraud loss measurement in preparation for the 
commencement of enforced self regulation. The evidence provided in terms of 
business returns discussed earlier in this chapter suggests that these 
additional costs can be met from the potential savings achieved from 
eliminating the vulnerabilities identified once fraud loss measurement 
exercises commence. The probable increase in company profits, and the 
resultant increased revenue to the treasury are offered as justification for this 
proposed state funded intervention. 
 
I have also considered the potential resistance from the private sector to 
publishing these data; I accept that as a commercial organisation, 
representatives of the private sector may be reluctant to comply. To reach a 
compromise, I suggest that private sector organisations impacted upon by this 
legislation demonstrate that they have complied with their statutory 
obligations, offer their data for independent scrutiny on a random sampling 
basis. This would prevent private sector organisations citing commercial self 
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interest as an argument against the creation of such a statute. To facilitate 
this proposal, I advocate the creation of a validation team that examines 
methodology and signs off any data as being statically valid in accordance 
with the statute, and produces a certificate of compliance which evidences 
that fraud has been measured in accordance with proposed standards. These 
data would then be submitted to the NFA for inclusion in the Annual Fraud 
Indicator, but remain „commercial in confidence‟ and only incorporated into the 
industry specific loss calculation. 
 
In further support of this proposal, I contend that in terms of costs, these will 
be offset by potential savings as discussed  in chapter one and summarised 
earlier in this chapter, and should certainly be factored into any public sector 
departmental business plan. In terms of the private sector, these mandating 
proposals may actually have a positive effect on the economy, by reducing 
business losses and increasing profitability. Once a British Standard has been 
created, private sector accounting and auditing organisations could in fact 
generate income by offering their services as a peripatetic measurement team 
to private and VC sector organisations that may prefer to invest in an external 
service rather than employ permanent measurement staff. Any organisation 
undertaking this function, would of course need to prove themselves as 
competent, by evidencing compliance with the „kite mark‟, and undergo 
periodic auditing to ensure consistency of standards.  
 
The next section will discuss the proposed regulatory models for each sector 
including how these will be framed to maximise the potential for compliance. 
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Regulating the Sectors  
 
Regulating the Sectors 
 
Having reached the conclusion that the proposed statute should incorporate 
both the public and private sectors, drawing upon the scholarly work 
reviewed, I have examined the options for a regulatory model to implement 
this legislation. The primary distinction between public and private sector 
organisations is ownership (Rainey, Backoff & Levine, 1976, pp. 236-7), with 
private sector companies being owned by entrepreneurs or shareholders 
(Boyne, 2002, p. 98) rather than the state, which may necessitate some 
variance in the models proposed. 
 
Public sector 
 
Regulating the public sector poses less of a problem because the core 
executive which includes that Treasury and the Cabinet Office (Dunleavy & 
Rhodes, 1990, p. 4) has a range of “rule making powers” (James, 2005,        
p. 326) to facilitate implementation and seek compliance. Furthermore, the 
IPIA provides a working model which can be used to inform the development 
of the regulatory procedure of the proposed statute. The implementation of 
IPIA by public sector bodies relies upon independent regulation from within. 
As discussed in chapter one, each Federal Agency conducts loss 
measurement exercises and reports their findings to the OMB via the 
Agency‟s Performance and Accountability Report or Annual Financial Report 
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(Executive Office of the President, 2011, p. 9). In terms of auditing, each 
agency‟s Inspector General reviews the organisation‟s improper payment 
reporting and accompanying materials to ensure compliance with IPIA. 
 
The regulatory model proposed for ensuring public sector compliance with the 
proposed UK statute is drawn from the US. I suggest each public sector body 
is made responsible for conducting fraud loss measurement exercises and 
reporting findings direct to the NFA via the Cabinet Office. The auditing of 
central government fraud loss measurement reporting is allocated to the 
National Audit Office, and that of local government and other public sector 
bodies such as NHS trusts conducted by the Audit Commission and 
transferred to the National Audit Office following implementation of the 
proposed closure of the former. If any public sector organisation is found not 
to have complied with the statute, a referral is made to the Committee of 
Public Accounts who will seek an explanation from the organisational head.  
 
To supplement this process, consideration has been given to the imposition of 
sanctions for non compliance. It is important that these are similar in terms of 
impact to those applied to the private sector to maintain equality and remove 
the risk of allegations of unfair treatment. Drawing upon the IPIA, the first 
option is a letter to the organisational head advocating implementation of the 
required measurement programme within six months, with the resultant 
penalty for consistent failure to comply being public disclosure of this material 
fact. By allowing public scrutiny, I suggest that organisations may be 
persuaded to comply rather than risk the possibility of adverse publicity and 
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backlash from taxpayers. The sanction for a second offence would be linked 
to budgets. As discussed in chapter one, central government departments are 
allocated funding based upon performance in the previous two years. Failure 
to comply with the statute could therefore result in a funding freeze until the 
organisation has demonstrated compliance. Arguably, the potential threat of 
funding being capped at existing levels should be sufficient motivation for 
organisational heads to comply. 
 
I maintain the observations discussed in chapter one that direct government 
regulation is most appropriate when the activities monitored are on a small 
scale (Peters & Hoornbeek, 2005, p. 96) offer a compelling argument that this 
option is inappropriate for regulating the proposed statute. It would not be 
financially viable to create a regulatory agency with the capacity to audit all 
the departments falling under the jurisdiction of this statute, because of the 
human resource required to perform this function timeously and to the 
required standard. 
 
Whilst self regulation does have advantages, including flexibility and the 
potential for a higher rate of compliance (Coglianese, Healey, Keating & 
Michael (2004, p. 6), this option was discounted because one major 
disadvantage is an insufficient level of accountability (p. 8). This is particularly 
relevant to the proposed statute as it is anticipated there may be some public 
sector resistance, and self regulation does not facilitate adequate opportunity 
for the policing of compliance. 
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Private Sector  
 
When considering the proposed regulatory model for private sector 
organisations, the IPIA also provides a working model upon which this can be 
based because many US public services are delivered by „for profit‟ 
organisations, particularly within healthcare. Additionally, I have drawn upon 
the scholarly work discussed in chapter one that debates how organisations 
can be motivated to obey the law. I have firstly considered the goal setting of 
businesses. When framing the legislation and subsequent regulation this 
needs to play to the primary goal of economic impact in terms of the reduction 
of business losses resultant from fraud. Compliance with the proposed 
regulation can be garnered by making businesses aware that through regular 
fraud loss measurement “private sector companies can be more financially 
stable, profitable and healthy” (Button & Gee, 2013, p. 73). Similarly, the 
promotion of business benefits can reinforce legitimacy, which as a 
consequence, may result in organisations embracing the proposed regulation 
and willingly comply. 
 
Simpson (2002) argues “regulators must have the capacity to convince people 
that regulatory offences represent shared values” (p. 614). In terms of 
mandating the measurement of fraud, one option might be to garner public 
opinion through an awareness campaign concerning the risk that businesses 
simply accept fraud losses as a foreseeable cost, and may pass these on to 
customers. By educating the consumer that economic business benefits can 
be achieved through regular fraud loss measurement, and the subsequent 
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business savings may result in a reduction of customer costs may generate 
pressure towards organisations to comply with the regulation. A further 
consideration is lack of technical knowledge, which can result in resistance to 
the imposed regulation from organisations. Arguably, the proposed knowledge 
exchange infrastructure may assist in addressing this issue. In the short term 
however, there may be a requirement to incorporate some form of assistance 
to address this within the framing of the legislation. 
 
When regulating the private sector I propose an enforced self regulatory 
model in which the government write the rules in terms of the measurement 
process based upon the proposed British Standard, which will be discussed in 
the next section.  This process will assist companies that do not have 
sufficient expertise to write their own processes. Each individual business 
then selects all appropriate specified transactions and performs fraud loss 
measurement exercises using their own staff and appoints an internal 
compliance group who audit and issue a certificate of compliance. The 
government appoints a team of inspectors who conduct random audits of 
companies. Embracing the spirit of market testing, this function could be 
performed by a contracted private sector accounting company who are 
overseen by the NFA. Any unacceptable accounting practices within the 
measurement exercises identified by the independent auditors would 
constitute a violation of the regulations and the appropriate sanction applied. 
All fraud loss measurement data are sent to the NFA for inclusion in the 
Annual Fraud Indicator but individual organisational data are not released into 
the public domain. The advantages of this model are that it is easier and more 
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efficient to perform than direct government regulation and enables simplified 
comparable accounting.  
 
When considering the appropriate sanction for non compliance, the nature of 
what is being imposed necessitates that any proposed penalty should differ to 
that which might normally be imposed when regulating businesses. The 
options of incapacitation and restorative justice are not considered 
appropriate for regulating fraud loss measurement because non compliance 
may be considered to have limited impact on society compared to legislation 
perceived as benefiting the common good, for example environmentally 
friendly based regulation.  
 
I therefore propose a sequence of sanctions based on the lower half of the 
enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite, 2002a, p. 20) that provides the options of 
persuasion, warning letter and civil penalty. The decision to adopt this 
bespoke compliance strategy is informed by Braithwaite‟s (2006a) contention 
that “most activity of the regulatory authority should occur at the base of the 
pyramid” (p. 4). Braithwaite (2002b) further argues that by the adoption of 
responsive regulation, the regulator is more likely to find softer targets that 
can be motivated by moderate deterrent penalties or by the shame of being 
implicated in wrongdoing (p. 110). In terms of non compliance, one essential 
component of the Improper Payments Information Act 2002 is that details of 
all organisations that fail to comply are made public. This is a deterrent option 
that I consider should be incorporated into the proposed statute. The first 
stage of the process would be a letter advising the business that they have a 
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set period to comply, and should they fail to do so, their details will be 
included on a published list of „non compliers‟.  The next section will discuss 
the creation of a British Standard of measurement. 
 
Setting a Standard 
 
As reported, data analysis reveals that within the sample, 69% of confirmatory 
answers indicate that the respondent‟s organisation is reactive when 
measuring, just focusing on detected cases rather than sampling. Equally, as 
previously outlined, there is a disparity between the VC, public and private 
sectors in terms of the percentage of measurement exercises conducted 
annually. This suggests that there needs to be some form of commonality. 
The previously discussed analysis of questionnaire responses reveals that 
74% of all questionnaire respondents indicated that they considered yearly 
measurement to be appropriate. Another issue identified is what exactly 
should be measured, due to organisations focusing on different fraud 
typologies. This can also be addressed by the creation of a British Standard. 
Firstly, to create data that may be considered accurate, but more importantly 
to develop data that is comparable on an industry and sector basis, and 
looking further ahead, on a supra national basis. 
 
I therefore contend that there is a requirement for a prescriptive standard of 
how fraud should be measured which includes specific direction on the  
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following: 
 
 Sampling criteria. 
 The level of statistical confidence to ensure consistent high standards of 
accuracy. 
  What is measured, thus providing consistency of data and enabling 
comparability by sector, industry, and fraud typology. 
 The frequency of these measurement exercises.  
 
Compliance with these instructions should be mandatory, which may be 
achieved by incorporating the proposed standard into the previously 
discussed statute. Government departments that already have prescribed 
measurement methodology such as DWP and HMRC will be required to 
amend their processes accordingly. As previously discussed, I suggest that 
this standard should form the basis for the future development of an 
international standard, which would then facilitate trans-national 
comparability. 
 
This research sought to obtain opinion on the feasibility of creating such a 
standard, and the responses received indicate a high level of support. The 
lower affirmative response rate to the question on whether this would be 
adopted by the respondent‟s organisation leads to the conclusion that the only 
way to ensure compliance is by incorporation into the mandating legislation, 
as previously discussed. In further support of this argument, I draw upon the 
NFA (2010c) document on combating fraud in the public sector, within which 
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the NFA suggest that to improve measurement accuracy, the public sector 
should develop “a more comprehensive understanding of fraud losses and the 
causes of such losses across the whole sector” (p. 5). The creation of a 
British Standard of measurement would facilitate achievement of this goal 
across all sectors. Furthermore, the sought after comprehensive 
understanding can be achieved through the development of a knowledge 
management infrastructure which will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Having concluded that there is a requirement for a consistent standard of 
measurement; I have considered what should be prescribed by this 
benchmark. It is crucial that any standard of measurement should stipulate 
what is measured and the methodology employed. Furthermore, this standard 
should advocate a move away from the ineffective outdated and inefficient 
concept that fraud may only be measured through the examination of 
prevented and detected cases. I therefore recommend that this proposed 
standard should incorporate the following criteria: 
 
 Measurement should only include fraud and exclude losses resulting from 
error. 
 All internal and external fraud losses are measured. 
 Guidance should be proffered on what typologies should be measured 
including customer fraud, procurement fraud, payroll fraud, 
expenses/subsistence fraud, major company expenditure. This would 
enable cross sector comparative analysis by typology. 
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 All loss measurement exercises should focus on the risk of losses and not 
just reported or detected fraud. 
 The accuracy level should be +/- 1% with 95% statistical confidence for all 
government departments and large private sector organisations. 
 Due to cost implications, an alternative option is offered to private sector 
organisations which evidence inadequate financial capacity to apply the 
higher accuracy standard. The proposed alternative being an accuracy 
level of +/- 2.5% with 90% statistical confidence, which is less robust in 
terms of accuracy, but still provides valuable data. 
 The measurement methodology should employ statistically valid sampling, 
with the results being extrapolated to reflect the total extent of estimated 
losses. 
 Measurement exercises should be based upon a standard definition of 
fraud for this purpose, underpinned by a „balance of probabilities‟ 
determination (Derry v Peek 1889) which offers better recovery options, 
thus contributing to the cost effectiveness of the excercise. 
 Measurement exercises should be subjected to independent scrutiny and 
validation to ensure accuracy, probity and transparency.  
 Where private sector organisations do not offer their fraud loss data to the 
public domain but only to the NFA, following validation a certificate of 
compliance is issued to evidence that losses have been measured to the 
prescribed standard. 
 
Consideration has been given to whether a British standard could be created 
as a standalone option if the proposal for a statute failed to gain ministerial 
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and subsequent parliamentary support to progress this through the legislative 
process. There are organisations that currently measure fraud; however as 
evidenced within the literature review, there are varying standards of 
accuracy. Therefore, whilst a British Standard would promote consistency of 
measurement, and if adopted by organisations with poor quality data would 
contribute to improving the overall picture of fraud losses within the UK, 
however, without regulation to ensure compliance, there is no guarantee it 
would be adopted by all organisations. Consequently, as a stand alone option 
a British Standard may have minimal impact upon improving the quality of 
fraud loss data, and is therefore considered to be an integral component of 
the proposed statute mandating measurement. 
 
Knowledge Management 
 
To improve the quality and robustness of fraud loss data collection and 
reporting there is an urgent need for a steer from academia in the form of 
developing doctrine. This input would raise the level of expertise in conducting 
measurement, and would also improve the quality of reporting by offering 
guidance in the construction of reports that stand up to academic scrutiny. To 
achieve openness and transparency, they should include a discussion of the 
data collection methodology, details of the analytical process these data were 
subjected to, frankness in disclosing any data limitations and a clear and 
concise written style which presents the facts in a medium that can be 
understood by fraud professionals, strategists and policy makers. Additional 
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support from academia could take the form of facilitating a knowledge transfer 
forum, which will now be discussed. 
 
Analysis of the questionnaire responses regarding the creation of a 
knowledge management infrastructure indicates a favourable response to this 
proposal. The answers to the question enquiring if their organisation would 
participate in such an information exchange matrix were less favourable. That 
said, I maintain this is a feasible option because the creation of a statute 
mandating fraud, supplemented by the creation of a British Standard of 
measurement will address the issue of organisational participation and create 
a knowledge requirement. The development of such a network could be 
incorporated into any marketing campaign to promote the benefits of such an 
infrastructure.   
 
I therefore propose the creation of a knowledge management infrastructure 
that promotes the development of best practice to ensure compliance with the 
recommended British Standard of measurement. I recommend that this 
proposed conduit would take the form of regular three monthly meetings, 
populated with fraud measurement practitioners from all three sectors. The 
primary focus of this forum would be to discuss issues relating to compliance 
with the British Standard. Additionally, the network will discuss best practice, 
share experiences and disclose any new and innovative processes adopted 
which have improved the accuracy of measurement, or acted as an enabler to 
ensure compliance with the proposed British Standard. I also advocate that by 
regularly reviewing processes, empirical learning can be used to create a 
 327 
„Manual of Guidance‟ to support compliance with the British Standard. 
Furthermore, this proposed manual will be „owned‟ by this forum and updated 
as and when there are positive developments in measurement processes. 
 
It is vital that this proposed knowledge management infrastructure is seen to 
be neutral, and should therefore be overseen by an appropriate organisation. 
Whilst the NFA might be considered to be the ideal facilitator, the most 
feasible option for this proposal might be a forum that is sponsored and 
funded by government, but managed and overseen by an academic 
institution. This would ensure probity, facilitate the unification of practitioners 
and academics when developing best practice, and ensure theoretical and 
practice based input into the creation of any „manual of guidance‟. Before 
progressing this recommendation, I propose that further research is 
conducted to identify an appropriate organisation to oversee the creation of 
the proposed knowledge infrastructure.  
 
I have also considered whether this proposed infrastructure is interdependent 
of the other two proposed options for change. The development of core 
doctrine of measurement and best practice would offer support and guidance 
to those currently measuring fraud losses. However, participation would be 
voluntary and without the implementation of the proposed statute and British 
Standard of measurement and taking account of the previously discussed 
immoral phlegmatism, I consider there may be minimal incentive to 
organisation that do not measure fraud to engage. Consequently, I maintain 
that this proposal would have limited impact on improving the accuracy of 
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fraud loss measurement as a standalone option, and should be treated as 
interdependent upon the other two proposed options for change. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined the recommendations suggested based upon 
analysis of all data collected during this research project. I maintain that 
sufficient opinion has been collected to evaluate the viability of the research 
argument. I further contend that sufficient encouragement from respondents 
has been harvested to support the contention that the proposals outlined 
within this chapter are worthy of development collectively. The option for 
interdependent development of a standard of measurement and a knowledge 
exchange infrastructure has been considered, but discounted because to 
ensure participation there would still be the need for some form of regulation.  
 
I have acknowledged the limitations of these data in terms of generalizability, 
however I contend that the support proffered for the proposals may be 
considered to be a barometer of a wider population. In sum, I conclude that 
the creation of a statute mandating fraud measurement, incorporating a British 
Standard underpinned by a transferable definition of fraud for measurement 
purposes, is worthy of development. Therefore, the next step will be to identify 
an appropriate government minister and canvass support for these proposals. 
Additionally, this project has evidenced the requirement to establish a 
knowledge management infrastructure to support the implementation of the 
aforementioned proposals through the development of core doctrine of 
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measurement and the production of a manual of guidance. The facilitation of 
such a forum requires additional research, but at this point, I consider the 
most suitable option to be an academic institution, thus ensuring impartiality 
and probity. 
 
The research has also identified the phenomena of immoral phlegmatism 
within all three sectors, which manifests itself in the form of complacency 
towards vulnerability to fraud and resultant losses. The data garnered 
however, suggests it is most prevalent within the VC sector, and strategies 
have been proposed to bring about a sea change of attitude towards fraud 
losses. In terms of this sector, I have also recommended that further research 
is conducted into why there is such a complacent attitude to fraud, which in 
turn would inform the proposed awareness strategy discussed within this 
chapter. 
 
I close this chapter, and thesis, by summarising the core proposals of this  
research: 
 
 The creation of statute mandating the accurate measurement of fraud 
throughout all public and private sector organisations. 
 The creation of a British Standard of measurement comprising of two 
different levels of accuracy. 
 The creation of a knowledge management infrastructure to support the 
development of core fraud loss measurement doctrine.  
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Postscript: Reflecting on Research 
 
How am I Reflecting? 
 
The purpose of my reflection has been to use the learning experience as a 
means of „building reflexive links between past, present and future actions 
(Crawford, Dickinson & Leitmann, 2002, p. 187). Initially, the most important 
consideration was to decide exactly which aspects of my research to reflect 
upon (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002, p.18; Schön, 1991, p. 343).  Whilst 
conducting the project, I reflected on all aspects of the research process 
“freely and informally” (Fox, Martin & Green, 2007, p. 184), whenever 
practicable recording field notes for subsequent analysis (Leslie & McAllister, 
2002, p.710). I transferred these field notes into a research journal (Potter, 
2002, p. 38; Murray, 2006 p. 189), documenting what went well and what I 
could have done better. Accordingly, this record became an invaluable tool for 
“researcher development” (Borg, 2001, p. 159). Drawing upon analytic 
methodology normally applied to descriptive data (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p. 9), I used reflection to update my learning journal (Holly, 1987), seeking to 
address the learning requirements identified when conducting the small 
research project which forms part of the taught element of the Professional 
Doctorate. Furthermore, I have drawn upon reflection in action (Schön, 1983, 
p. 69; Eraut, 1994, p.147), which enabled me to further develop my 
researcher skills during the project (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 1996, p. 49). 
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The purpose of this reflection was to identify how best to approach future 
academic research, as evidenced by Seymour (2001, p. 165) who contends 
that “it is only by reflecting on our mistakes that we will learn how to do things 
differently in the future”. Fook (1996, pp. 4-5) offers an interesting 
observation, when arguing that a reflective approach rejects some of the basic 
beliefs of positivism, rather affirming “the importance of experiential and 
interconnected ways of knowing the world” (pp. 4-5). Arguably this contention 
proffers an accurate description of the research methodology adopted, and 
the conflict I experienced between philosophical and practitioner researcher 
considerations, which I will return to later. 
 
My Reflections 
 
I will now discuss my reflection on the project, using a structured approach 
which considers what I have researched, my behaviour, my feelings about the 
project, what I learned, its impact on me as a researcher and how this 
experience will shape future academic research projects (Fox, Martin & 
Green, 2007, p. 184). Reflecting upon the project aims, and what was 
researched, I am satisfied they have been achieved, and that the argument 
that fraud can be measured more accurately has been supported by research 
participants. The research however, provided interesting reactions to the 
argument that a statute is required to fully mandate measurement. 
 
On revisiting my actions, I believe the research structure adopted was correct, 
thus demonstrating my strengths as a researcher through the application of 
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knowledge gained from practitioner experience. Interviewing academics and 
fraud practitioners proved a challenging experience. For me, it was essential 
that I conveyed professionalism, combined with subject and theoretical 
knowledge, thus demonstrating my researcher credentials to secure 
participant respect. Having reflected whilst analysing the interview transcripts 
and recordings, I am satisfied that the necessary data were obtained to 
critically assess the viability of the research argument. In the spirit of the 
reflective process however, I am already considering how things might be 
done differently in the future, for example conducting all qualitative interviews 
face to face because I found it easier to develop rapport than when speaking 
to participants by telephone. Also it would have been useful, should access 
have been obtained, to have interviewed somebody involved in the 
development and implementation of the IPIA. 
 
One major churn that occurred whilst conducting this research was a personal 
career change, whereby I moved from being an organised benefit fraud 
criminal intelligence analyst to an academic. This had always been my 
intended career path; however, I did underestimate the impact it would have 
on my research. The requirements of this new role resulted in less time being 
available to devote to this thesis. Consequently, I had to restructure my 
project timetable and increase the key milestone dates by 12 months. I have 
no regrets about my career change, and during Easter 2012, I found myself in 
a position which may be described as the calm after the storm. By then, I had 
discharged most of my teaching commitments, thus facilitating the opportunity 
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to complete the remaining chapters, which in turn finds me sitting at my laptop 
completing this reflective account. 
 
When reflecting upon my learning experience during this research, I consider 
the principle achievement has been to successfully address my personal 
conflict between epistemological considerations and my beliefs and 
assumptions as a researcher in the practice setting. When commencing this 
research, I believed epistemological considerations to be a personal 
weakness within my researcher skills. Whilst employed as a criminal 
intelligence analyst, I was required to adopt a research method appropriate to 
the task, the primary objective being to complete the project timeously and 
within budget. Consequently, this required decision making on method as 
opposed to methodology, with no consideration of researcher assumptions. 
These have been factors dictating current research methodology. Accordingly, 
I believe pragmatism is a justifiable epistemological stance, reflecting my 
practitioner researcher influence, which has enabled me to adopt a research 
methodology that embraced a “what and how” approach to research 
(Cresswell, 2003, p. 12). I suggest that a pragmatic approach respects both 
acknowledged research paradigms for what they are, whilst also reflecting 
contemporary thinking, whereby research design is influenced by technical 
decisions (Bryman, 2006, p. 117).  
 
In conclusion, I believe that these reflections have enabled me to fully 
evaluate my research and learn from the experience, which in turn will 
facilitate my personal development as an academic researcher when 
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embarking on future projects. I am satisfied that by drawing upon this 
reflective process, I have fully embraced the ethos of professional doctorate 
study. 
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‘Fraud Expert’ Interview Schedule 
 
 
1. What do you define as fraud, and what evidence is this based upon? 
2. How important do you consider the accurate measurement of fraud is 
in terms of developing and implementing counter fraud strategies? 
3. How accurate do you consider current fraud loss data to be? 
4. How accurate in terms of statistical confidence do you believe fraud 
measurement should be? 
5. Do you consider public or private sector data to be most reliable? 
6. In your opinion, are there any organisations that have a particularly 
robust fraud measurement mechanism? 
7. What impact do you think the creation of a National Fraud Reporting 
Centre will have on the accurate measurement of fraud? 
8. Should figures for the cost of prevention and detection of fraud be 
included in overall loss figures? 
9. Over what frequency do you believe fraud measurement exercises 
should be conducted? 
10. Are there any other improvements to the collection and reporting of 
national fraud data you can suggest, for example do we need 
compulsory legislation to ensure organisational compliance?  
11. Should there be a „British Standard‟ of fraud measurement? 
12. Should a fraud measurement agency be created to conduct 
measurement exercises to ensure consistency?  
Appendix 1 
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Dear 
 
I am conducting research into the measurement of fraud, which forms part 
of the assessment process for my professional doctorate in Criminal 
Justice Studies. I am undertaking this project in my capacity as a 
research student with the University of Portsmouth who are sponsoring 
the research. The purpose of my research is to identify best practice 
within existing fraud measurement methodology with a view to developing 
a mechanism for measuring the economic cost of fraud more accurately. 
 
The purpose of this email is to request some of your time (no more than 
one hour) in order to seek your opinion as someone who has made a 
significant contribution to the academic debate on fraud measurement. 
The full details of this request are documented in the attached letter. 
I also enclose a copy of the interview schedule to provide you with 
advance notification of the question content. 
 
I am willing to conduct this research at a time and location convenient 
to you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Martin Tunley 
Fraud Investigator (Analyst), 
Fraud Investigation Service (Intelligence), 
5th Floor, Birmingham City JCP, 
65-77 Summer Row, 
Birmingham, B3 1LB 
 
Tel 07778 393315 (Mobile) 
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Mandating the Measurement of Fraud Questionnaire 
 
Your Organisation: 
 
1. Please indicate which sector your organisation falls within (Please tick)   
Public Private Voluntary/ 
Charitable 
   
    
 
2. What is your position in the organisation? (Optional)............................ 
 
3. What is your organisation‟s function (e.g. welfare, health, insurance, 
charity etc.? (Optional)……………………………………. 
 
Fraud Measurement 
 
4. How important do you think the accurate measurement of fraud is? (Please 
indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important    Important   Very important 
 
5. How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the public sector? (Please 
indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important    Important   Very important 
Appendix 3 
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6. How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the private sector?      
(Please indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important   Important   Very important 
 
7.  How important do you think it is to measure fraud in the voluntary/charitable 
sector? (Please indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important   Important   Very important 
 
8. How often do you think fraud should be measured? (Please indicate your 
response) 
 Annually 
 Every two years  
 Other (Please state)………………………………………………………… 
 
Fraud and Your Organisation 
 
Before moving on to the questions in this section, if you are unfamiliar with 
what constitutes a fraud loss measurement exercise, please read below, 
otherwise please proceed directly to question 9. 
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For information purposes, a fraud loss measurement exercise consists of         
the following stages: 
1. A statistically valid selection of activity is taken from one or more budgetary          
areas;  
2. Each case within the sample is then examined and evidence of fraud, error or 
correctness is sought; 
3. A judgement is then made based upon your organisation‟s definition of fraud       
(this may be the civil law concept of Derry v. Peek 1889, Fraud Act 2006 or       
other statute), error or correctness;                               
4. All cases are subjected to rigorous, independent statistical analysis which        
allows the production of loss figures with a high degree of accuracy for each 
budgetary area. 
 
 
9. Does your organisation measure fraud? (Please tick) 
 Yes (please go to question 10) 
 No (please proceed to question 14) 
 
10. How does your organisation measure fraud? (Please tick all that apply) 
 Received incidents of fraud (Detected) by number of cases 
 Received incidents of fraud (Detected) by total monetary value of losses 
 Fraud loss measurement exercise by number of suspected cases 
 Fraud loss measurement exercise by total monetary value of suspected losses 
 Other (please state)……………………………………………………………. 
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11. How often does your organisation measure fraud?                                 
(Please tick all that apply) 
         Type        Annually 
              
     Every Two Years 
              
          Other  
    (Please state) 
Received incidents 
of  fraud by number             
of cases 
   
…………………………. 
…………………………. 
Received incidents 
of  fraud by monetary 
value of loss 
   
………………………….. 
…………………………. 
…………………………. 
Loss measurement  
by number of  
suspected cases 
   
………………………….. 
…………………………. 
 
Loss measurement 
by monetary value of 
suspected losses 
   
………………………….. 
…………………………. 
…………………………. 
Other…………….….   ………………………….. 
……………………… 
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12. What types of fraud does your organisation measure?                          
(Please tick all that apply) 
 
Type      
Overall Losses  
Customer Fraud  
Procurement Fraud  
Payroll Fraud  
Expenses/Subsistence Fraud  
Major Company Expenditure  
Other Internal Fraud                           
(please state   …………………….……) 
 
Other Types of Fraud                          
(please state…………………………....) 
 
 
13.  If your organisation conducts measurement exercises, what is the level of 
statistical confidence? (Please tick which applies) 
 
 Between + or- 1%-4% 
 
 Between + or -5%-9% 
 
 + Or -10% or Above 
 
 No Statistical Confidence 
 
 Do Not Know 
 
 
Please now proceed to the next section (Question 15) 
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14.  If your organisation does not measure fraud please indicate why (tick any 
box that applies) 
 No fraud in organisation 
 Do not need to know 
 Concern about adverse publicity if results made public 
 Protection of shareholder‟s interests 
 Other (please state………………………………………………………….) 
 
 
British Standard of Fraud Measurement 
A British Standard of fraud measurement would specify a methodology for fraud 
measurement including data collection, data analysis, and frequency of 
measurement exercises and level of statistical confidence.  
 
15.  How important is the creation of a British Standard of Fraud Measurement? 
(Please indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important   Important   Very important 
 
16.  If a British Standard was created, how likely is it that the benchmark would be 
adopted by your organisation? (Please indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important   Important   Very important 
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17.  If created, which sectors should a British Standard of fraud measurement be 
applied to (tick all that apply)  
   Public Sector Organisations 
 Private Sector Organisations 
 Voluntary/Charitable Organisations 
 
18.  If a British Standard of fraud measurement was created, should compliance 
be mandatory? (please tick relevant box for each sector) 
             Sector      Yes 
        
     No 
      
Public   
Private   
Voluntary/Charitable    
 
 
19.  What do you think the arguments against mandating fraud measurements 
might be? (Please tick whichever apply)  
 None 
 Current Measurement Statistically Valid 
 Do Not Need to Measure Fraud Losses So Accurately 
 Too Bureaucratic  
 Too Costly 
 Other (please state………………………………………………………….) 
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Best Practice and Knowledge Sharing Infrastructure 
 
The measurement of fraud is still being developed and in order to progress 
more accurate measurement, one option would be the creation of an 
infrastructure for knowledge management through the sharing of best 
practice using either the National Fraud Authority or an Academic 
Establishment such as the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at the 
University of Portsmouth as the conduit. 
 
20.  How important is the creation of a knowledge management infrastructure for the 
sharing of fraud measurement best practice? (Please indicate your response) 
 
Not important at all   Not important   Neither important nor not important   Important   Very important 
 
21.  If a Knowledge management infrastructure was created, how likely is it that your 
organisation would participate? (Please indicate your response) 
 
Not likely at all   Not likely   Neither likely nor unlikely   Likely   Very likely 
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The US Improper Payments Information Act 2002 
 
In the US, the increased prevalence of fraud led to Government intervention 
mandating its measurement in certain public bodies through the Improper Payments 
Information Act (IPIA) of 2002. This statute also mandates publication of fraud loss 
data in order to generate public pressure for organisations to address these losses. 
 
22.  Do you consider that a similar statute should be created in the UK to 
mandate fraud measurement? (please tick relevant box) 
 Yes (Please proceed to question 24) 
 No  
 
23.  If you answered „NO‟, why do you not favour such a statue? (tick whichever 
apply)  
 Fraud Measurement Should Be Voluntary 
 Current Measurement Statistically Valid 
 Do Not Need to Measure Fraud Losses So Accurately 
 Too Bureaucratic  
 Too Costly 
 Other (please state………………………………………………………….) 
 
Please proceed on to question 30 
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24.  If fraud measurement was mandated by legislation, should this apply to? 
(tick any that apply)  
 Public Sector 
 Private Sector 
 Voluntary/Charitable Sector 
 
25.  How regularly do you believe that mandatory measurement exercises should 
be conducted? (please tick relevant box) 
 Annually 
 Every two years  
 Other (Please Specify……………………………………………………………) 
 
26. Should legislation specify what types of fraud are measured? (please tick 
relevant box) 
 Yes  
 No 
 
27. Should legislation specify what fraud measurement methodology is 
employed? (please tick relevant box) 
 Yes  
 No  
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28. Do you believe that any legislation should also mandate the publication of 
these data? (please tick relevant box) 
 Yes  
 No  
 
29.   What do you perceive the risks of fraud data being made public to be? (tick 
any that apply)  
 None 
 Organisational Embarrassment 
 Ministerial Embarrassment 
 Commercial Risk 
 Protection of Shareholder‟s Interests 
 Protection of Head of Organisation 
 Other (Please State…………………………………………………………….) 
 
 
30.  If there are any comments you would like to make concerning the 
measurement of fraud or any of the associated topics detailed within the 
questionnaire please leave them below: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………….
...................................................................................................................................... 
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Websites used for sampling frame 
 
 
 
FTSE 100 
 
http://www.ftse.co.uk/objects/csv_to_table.jsp;jsessionid=3243B2A4E4D36EA
E47BAEC95F5C4D80C?infoCode=100a&theseFilters=&csvAll=&theseColum
ns=Mw==&theseTitles=&tableTitle=FTSE100IndexConstituents&dl=&p_encod
ed=1 
 
FTSE 350 
 
http://www.ftse.co.uk/objects/csv_to_table.jsp;jsessionid=3243B2A4E4D36EA
E47BAEC95F5C4D80C?infoCode=350a&theseFilters=&csvAll=&theseColum
ns=Mw==&theseTitles=&tableTitle=FTSE350IndexConstituents&dl=&p_encod
ed=1 
 
 
Public Sector (Central Government) 
 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Dl1/Directories/A-ZOfCentralGovernment 
/index.htm 
 
 
Public Sector (Local Government) 
 
http://www.localgov.co.uk/index.cfm?method=directory.SearchOfficers&orderb
y=organisation&PersonName=&off_functionid=72966&Officers=1 
 
 
Charities 
 
http://www.charitiesdirect.com/ 
 
 
Association of British Insurers Members  
 
http://www.abi.org.uk/MemberSearchResults.aspx?searchQuery= 
 
 
 
List of Banks 
 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Other_publications/Banks/index.shtml 
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PRIVATE and CONFIDENTIAL     
       
        Room 422 Dawson Building, 
Birmingham City University, 
417 Franchise Street, 
Perry Barr, 
Birmingham, 
B42 2SU 
 
0121 331 5272 
   
<Date>  
 
My Ref: MJT/1 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
Re: Mandating the Measurement of Fraud   
 
I am writing to you concerning research project on the measurement of fraud amongst 
the largest public, private and voluntary sector organisations which forms part of the 
assessment process for my Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice Studies. I am 
undertaking this project in my capacity as a research student with the University of 
Portsmouth in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Criminology at Birmingham City 
University. 
 
As part of this research project I would be obliged if you find time to complete a 
questionnaire by Tuesday 31
st
 May 2011.  
 
This questionnaire is anonymous and should take no more than 15 minutes to 
complete. It can be accessed via the link is below 
http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/bcu/fraud 
 
The proposal for this research has been reviewed and approved by the University Of 
Portsmouth Faculty Of Humanities Research Ethics Committee. Participants will receive 
an advance copy of the findings from the project if requested. 
 
I would also like to reassure you that all information will be anonymized in my thesis.   
 
If you require any further information please contact me on 07778 393315 or email me at 
martin.tunley@bcu.ac.uk  
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Martin Tunley 
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PRIVATE and CONFIDENTIAL     
           
 
        Room 422 Dawson Building, 
Birmingham City University, 
417 Franchise Street, 
Perry Barr, 
Birmingham, 
B42 2SU 
 
0121 331 5272 
07778 393315 (mobile) 
   
<Date>  
 
My Ref: MJT/1 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
Re: Mandating the Measurement of Fraud   
 
I am writing to you concerning research project on the measurement of fraud amongst 
the largest public, private and voluntary sector organisations which forms part of the 
assessment process for my Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice Studies. I am 
undertaking this project in my capacity as a research student with the University of 
Portsmouth in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Criminology at Birmingham City 
University. 
 
As part of this research project I would be obliged if you would pass this email which 
includes a hyperlink to an online questionnaire to the person responsible for fraud 
measurement and/or audit in your organisation (if your organisation does not possess 
such an individual please forward this email to the person considered most appropriate) 
for completion by Tuesday 31
st
 May 2011.  
 
This questionnaire is anonymous and should take no more than 15 minutes to 
complete. It can be accessed via the link is below 
http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/bcu/fraud 
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The proposal for this research has been reviewed and approved by the University Of 
Portsmouth Faculty Of Humanities Research Ethics Committee. Participants will receive 
an advance copy of the findings from the project if requested. 
 
I would also like to reassure you that all information will be anonymized in my thesis.   
 
If you require any further information please contact me on 07778 393315 or email me at 
martin.tunley@bcu.ac.uk  
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Martin Tunley 
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